3 4 clubs resemble the Phiditia in the Spartan constitution, and the magistracy of 104 resembles the Ephors, while the kings and the Gerusia are analogous to the kings and the Gerontes at Sparta. Most of the points, then, which might be censured 5 as deviations from pure constitutions, are common to all the states which have been mentioned: and of those involved in the fundamental conception of aristocratic or republican government, some deflect rather on the side of democracy, others on that of oligarchy. The constitution of Carthage deviates from aristocracy chiefly towards oligarchy in deference to a certain principle in which most people agree; for they think it right to elect their rulers not only by merit but by wealth also, believing it to be impossible that the necessitous can govern honourably and enjoy leisure. If, then, election by wealth is an oligarchical, and by merit an aristocratic principle, we have here a third constitutional type,10 on the model whereof 11 the political system of Carthage has been adjusted; for they elect, and especially the most important officers, the kings, for instance, and the generals, with reference to these two standards. But we must regard this deviation from aristocracy as an error of the lawgiver; for it is most essential to provide, at the outset, that the most capable men may be enabled to enjoy leisure, and to withhold themselves from any undignified pursuit,12 not only while in office but even in private life.13 And, if we must have regard to affluence as a condition of leisure, still it is objectionable that the most important of the magistracies, I mean royalty 14 and the command of the army, should be purchasable. 8 LX. For this law renders wealth honoured rather than merit,1 and makes the whole state avaricious. For, whatever the2 governing power may conceive to be worthy of honour, public opinion will follow. And it is impossible that a solid aristocratic commonwealth can subsist where merit is not principally honoured. And it is natural to suppose that the purchasers of office will accustom themselves to making money, whenever they have spent 5 money in attaining office; for it is absurd to suppose that, if a poor but deserving man is willing to make money,' a man of lower principle will not be willing, after all his expenditure. Those, therefore, ought to rule who are capable of ruling best. For it is better that, even though the lawgiver fail to relieve the poverty of the deserving, he should at any rate provide for their leisure while in office. 10 It would seem prejudicial, too, that the same man should hold a plurality 11 of offices; yet this is held a high distinction 12 at Carthage. For one function 13 is best discharged by one man. And the lawgiver ought to provide that 14 this may be the case, and not to enjoin that the same man be fluteplayer 15 and shoemaker.16 So that wherever the state is not inconsiderable in size, it is more constitutional 17 and more popular 18 to admit a large proportion to a share in the magistracies: for it diffuses the notion of a common interest, and each function is more advantageously and speedily discharged by special* officers. 1 'Αρετή. 2 Τὸ κύριον. 3 Ἡ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξα. 4 Partic. Partic., which here expresses, not the accompaniment of the • Επιεικής. 10 Partic. pres. pres. action, but the principal action. See JELF, § 705, 2. 7 Κερδαίνειν. 11 Πλείους ἀρχάς. conjunctive. 18 Δημοτικός. * Φαυλότερος. 12 Εὐδοκιμεῖν. 15 Αὐλεῖν. 9 Δαπανήσας. 13 Εργον. 16 Σκυτοτομεῖν. * Reading ὑπὸ τῶν, κ.τ.λ. 6 14 Όπως, with 17 Πολιτικώτερον. Thus they heal and This is obvious in military and naval affairs; for, in both branches of the service, alternate command and obedience pervade all ranks. But, though their constitution tends to oligarchy, they avoid its evils by means of their wealth, by dispatching from time to time detachments 19 of the commons to the tributary towns. give stability to the commonwealth. work of chance, whereas they ought to be free 20 from sedition through the wisdom of the lawgiver. But, at present, should 21 any misfortune occur, and the mass of the subject population revolt, there is no remedy owing to the apathy 22 of the laws. 19 Μέρος τι. 20 Αστασίαστος. 21*Av, with conjunctive. 22 Ησυχία. 5 LXI. It is for a reason of this kind that democratic states resort' to ostracism; for they certainly appear to cultivate equality with more zeal than any others, and on this principle they are in the habit of ostracising3 and removing from the state, for definite periods, all those whose power appears excessive, whether through wealth or the number of their partisans, or any other source of political influence. Mythology even asserts that the Argonauts abandoned Hercules for a similar reason; the Argo declining to carry him together with the rest, as he was much heavier than his fellow-voyagers. We must not, therefore, unreservedly pronounce that the censors 10 of tyranny and of Periander's advice to Thrasybulus, are just in their reproaches.12 The story is that Periander 11 6 9 8 2"NOTE. JELF, § 863. 1 Tilepal. JELF, § 362, 2. p. 14. perfect. JELF, § 402, 2. φιλία. Infin. with yáp Vπeрßáλλew 'Qs, with partic. 11 Adverb. 12 Infin. 3 Im 5 Πολυ 7 Πολύ 10 Partic. made no reply to the envoy who was sent to ask his advice, but that he cut off the tall stalks 13 of wheat, and thus levelled the crop: 14 upon which the envoy, not knowing what 15 was meant by the act, but having related the incident, Thrasybulus understood 16 that it was his policy to cut off the most ambitious of the citizens. For this expe dient is not useful to tyrants only, nor do tyrants alone resort to it, but it prevails equally in oligarchies and democracies; since ostracism has nearly the same effect as cutting down1 powerful citizens, and hunting them into exile.18 Those who have the power act in the same manner towards 19 states and tribes, as the Athenians, for instance, towards Samos, Chios, and Lesbos; for, as soon as they had established their supremacy, they reduced them in contravention of the treaties: while the Persian king frequently cut down 20 the Medes and Babylonians, and others of his subjects who prided 21 themselves on their former dominion. The question 22 applies, generally,23 to all, even to pure 24 constitutions; for while those which have deviated from the true model 25 consult their own advantage 26 by resorting to it, it is just the same with those who watch zealously for the public weal. The principle is clearly evinced in the case of 27 the other arts and sciences: no painter 28 would allow the animal he was pourtraying a foot too large to be symmetrical,29 even were its beauty transcendant, nor would a shipbuilder 30 suffer the stern or any other section of his vessel to be disproportioned. 5 LXII. 8 Revolutions are not created by slight causes, though they spring from3 slight occasions; but men embark in revolutions on important issues. Little revolutions are most virulent, when they take place among the ruling classes, as was the case, for instance, at Syracuse, in the olden times; for the constitution was changed in consequence of a quarrel between two youths, who were in office, on a love matter. We ought, therefore, to take every precaution in these cases at the outset, and to reconcile the feuds of men of power and influence; for the error is committed at the outset, which indeed is commonly said to be half of the whole; and thus a trifling blunder at the commencement is equivalent to all the errors committed in the sequel.10 In short, the quarrels of the great involve the whole state in their consequences, as happened in Histiæa, after the Persian war, two brothers having disagreed respecting the division 12 of their patrimony; when the poorer of the two, on the ground 13 that his brother gave no account of the estate,14 nor even of the treasure which his father had discovered, attached the popular party 15 to himself; while the other, who possessed an ample fortune, won over the affluent. At Mitylene, too, a quarrel about heiresses became the source of many evils, and of the war with Athens, in which Paches took their city; for Timophanes, an opulent citizen, having left two daughters, Doxander, who had been repulsed,16 and had failed to secure1 them for his own sons, kindled the revolution, and spurred on the 1 Στάσις. 5 Οἱ κύριοι. 66 2 Περὶ μικρῶν. 3 Εκ μικρῶν. 7 12 4 Στασιάζειν. Of two youths quarrelling? Περὶ ἑρωτικὴν αἰτίαν. 9 "Ωστε. JELF, § 863. 10 Τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν. & Partic. 11 Οἱ γνώριμοι. 14 Ovoía. 12 Νομή. 15 Οἱ δημοτικοί. 13 'Qs, with partic. gen. abs. JELF, § 701. 1 Περιωσθείς. 17 Οὐ λαβών. |