tronage.

to apply to parliament for supplies, but upon some public necessity of the whole realm. This restores to him that constitutional independence, which at his first accession seems, it must be owned, to be wanting. And then, with regard to power, we may find perhaps that the hands of government are at least sufficiently strengthened; and that an English monarch is now in no danger of being overborne by either the nobility or the people. The instruments of power are not perhaps so open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the less liable to jealous and invidious reflections; but they are not the weaker upon that account. In short, our national debt and taxes (besides Its great pa the inconveniences before mentioned) have also in their natural consequences thrown such a weight of power into the executive scale of government, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot ancestors; who gloriously struggled for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative, and by an unaccountable want of foresight established this system in their stead. The entire collection and management of so vast a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, have given rise to such a multitude of new officers created by and removable at the royal pleasure, that they have extended the influence of government to every corner of the nation. Witness the commissioners and the multitude of dependents on the customs, in every port of the kingdom; the commissioners of excise, and their numerous subalterns, in every inland district; the post-masters, and their servants, planted in every town, and upon every public road; the commissioners of stamps and taxes, and their distributors, which are full as scattered and full as numerous; and also the commissioners of the land-tax; all which, although, as we have seen, they have been recently lessened in number, are either mediately or immediately appointed by the crown, and removable at pleasure without any reason assigned; these, it requires but very little penetration to [ 336*] see, must give that power, on which they depend for subsistence, an influence most amazingly extensive. To this may be added the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obligations, by preference in loans, subscriptions, See ante p. 340.

The army.

The treasury.

tickets, remittances, and other money transactions, which will greatly increase this influence; and that over those persons whose attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the most desirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeseen consequence of erecting our funds of credit, and to support them, establishing our present perpetual taxes: the whole of which is entirely new since the Restoration in 1660; and by far the greatest part since the Revolution in 1688. And the same may be said with regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places which the army has created. All which put together give the executive power so persuasive an energy with respect to the persons themselves, and so prevailing an interest with their friends and families, as will amply make amends for the loss of external prerogative.

But, though this profusion of offices should have no effect on individuals, there is still another newly acquired branch of power; and that is, not the influence only, but the force of a disciplined army: paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by the crown: raised by the crown, officered by the crown, commanded by he crown. They are kept on foot it is true only from year to year, and that by the power of parliament; but during that year they must by the nature of our constitution, if raised at all, be at the absolute disposal of the crown. And there need but few words to demonstrate how great a trust is thereby reposed in the prince by his people. A trust, that is more than equivalant to a thousand little troublesome prerogatives.

Add to all this, that besides the civil list, the immense revenue of upwards of forty-four millions sterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of the public, or carried to the sinking fund, is first deposited in the royal exchequer, and [337*] thence issued out to the respective offices of payment. This revenue the people can never refuse to raise, because it is made perpetual by act of parliament: which also, when well considered, will appear to be a trust of great delicacy and high importance.

Concluding

reflections.

Upon the whole therefore I think it is clear, that, whatever may have become of the nominal, the real power of the crown has not been too far weakened by any transactions in

the last century. Much is indeed given up; but much is also acquired. The stern commands of prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence: the slavish and exploded doctrine of non-resistance has given way to a military establishment by law; and to the disuse of parliaments has succeeded a parliamentary trust of an immense perpetual revenue: the management of which, more especially of late years, has been open to public and parliamentary scrutiny, and the fullest inquiry allowed as to its appropriation. When indeed, by the free operation of the sinking fund, our national debts shall be lessened; although little can be now hoped from this; when the posture of foreign affairs, and the universal introduction of a well-planned and national militia, will suffer our formidable army to be thinned and regulated; and when (in consequence of all) our taxes shall be gradually reduced; this adventitious power of the crown will slowly and imperceptibly diminish, as it slowly and imperceptibly rose. But till that shall happen, it will be our especial duty, as good subjects and good Englishmen, to reverence the crown, and yet guard against corrupt and servile influence from those who are intrusted with its authority; to be loyal, yet free; obedient, and yet independent; and, above every thing, to hope that we may long, very long, continue to be governed by sovereigns, who, like unto her present majesty and many of her illustrious ancestors, in all those public acts that have personally proceeded from themselves, have manifested the highest veneration for the free constitution of Britain; have already in more than one instance remarkably strengthened its outworks; and will therefore never harbour a thought, or adopt a persuasion, in any the remotest degree detrimental to public liberty.

CHAPTER THE NINTH.

OF

SUBORDINATE

MAGISTRATES.

[ 338 ]

either su

preme or subordi. nate.

IN a former chaptera we distinguished magistrates into Magistrates two kinds: supreme, or those in whom the sovereign power of the state resides; and subordinate, or those who act in an inferior secondary sphere. We have hitherto considered the former kind only; namely, the supreme legislative power or parliament, and the supreme executive power, which is the king; and are now to proceed to inquire into the rights and duties of the principal subordinate magistrates.

What will be treated of in

And herein we are not to investigate the powers and duthis chapter. ties of her majesty's great officers of state, the lord treasurer, lord chamberlain, the principal secretaries, or the like; because I do not know that they are in that capacity in any considerable degree the objects of our laws, or have any very important share of magistracy conferred upon them: except that the secretaries of state are allowed the power of commitment, in order to bring offenders to trial. Neither shall I here treat of the office and authority of the lord chancellor, or the other judges of the superior courts of justice. Nor shall I enter into any minute disquisitions, with regard to the rights and dignities of mayors [ 339 ] and aldermen, or other magistrates of particular corporations; because these are mere private and strictly municipal rights, depending entirely upon the domestic constitution of their respective franchises. But the magistrates and 2 Ch. 2, page 141. 143. 5 Mod, 84. Salk. 347. Carth. 291.

b 1 Leon. 70, 2 Leon. 175. Comb.

officers, whose rights and duties it will be proper in this chapter to consider, are such as are generally in use, and have a jurisdiction and authority dispersedly throughout the kingdom which are, principally, sheriffs; coroners; justices of the peace; constables; surveyors of highways; and overseers of the poor. In treating of all which I shall inquire into, first, their antiquity and original; next, the manner in which they are appointed and may be removed; and lastly, their rights and duties. And first of sheriffs,

I. The sheriff is an officer of very great antiquity in this kingdom, his name being derived from two Saxon words, rcine genera, the reeve, bailiff, or officer of the shire. He is called in Latin vice-comes, as being the deputy of the earl or comes: to whom the custody of the shire is said to have been committed at the first division of this kingdom into counties. But the earls in process of time, by reason of their high employments and attendance on the king's person, not being able to transact the business of the county, were delivered of that burden; reserving to themselves the honour, but the labour was laid on the sheriff. So that now the sheriff does all the king's business in the county; and though he be still called vicecomes, yet he is entirely independent of, and not subject to the earl; the king by his warrant d committing custodiam comitatus to the sheriff, and him alone.

с

I. The

sheriff.

the people.

Sheriffs were formerly chosen by the inhabitants of the How chosen several counties. In confirmation of which it was ordained by statute 28 Edw. I. c. 8, that the people should have election of sheriffs in every shire, where the shrievalty is not of inheritance. For anciently in some counties the Formerly sheriffs were hereditary; as I apprehend they were in elected by Scotland till the statute 20 Geo. II. c. 43; and still continue in the county of Westmorland to this day: the city [ 340] of London having also the inheritance of the shrievalty of Middlesex vested in their body by charter. The reason of these popular elections is assigned in the same statute, c. 13. "that the commons might choose such as would not "be a burthen to them." And herein appears plainly a Dalton of sheriffs, c. 1. 3 Rep. 72. 43 & 4 Wm. IV. e. 99, s. 3.