consists in obeying the law within. It is from this source that we derive the notion of Duty.

Again, when we look outside of ourselves, when we study man under various climes in various ages, we see that the qualities and actions which have in different circumstances been sanctioned under the name of Right are such as make, or have been supposed to make, for the general welfare; that morality rests upon a convention, never expressed and but half-understood; that it is the outcome of a semi-conscious effort to secure the good of society a natural growth whose laws invite our study. In the last resort we recognize no common quality in the strangely different actions which have been considered right except their supposed utility, and we find that there is no method of disconnecting the idea of right from a line of conduct so sure as to convince men of its utter uselessness. To the race morality presents itself as the pursuit of Happiness.

Duty and Happiness, Conscience and Benevolence, Intuition and Reason-what battles have been fought under these opposing banners! But has not a fair adjustment of their claims been effected by the great doctrine, for the establishment of which the world is indebted to Mr. Herbert Spencer, that the experience of the race generates instincts in the individual? Bearing this principle in mind we may read through Mr. Lecky's words again, and accept both statements, though they are meant to be placed in such striking contrast. It is quite possible for us to believe that the race was originally void of all moral ideas—of all "knowledge of merit or demerit." Possessing, however, an appreciation of its own comfort and well-being, the inevitable result would be that such conduct in the individual as was perceived to promote that end would be approved, and its opposite condemned. Hence would arise moral sentiments, which, transmitted to the offspring as moral instincts, now give ground for the whole doctrine of Intuition. Of the

individual it is true to say that he has “a natural power of perceiving that some qualities are better than others, and that we ought to cultivate them and repress their opposites." Of the individual also it is true to say that the standard as well as the sanction of morality is to be found in Intuition and not in Experience; while for the race the standard is, and can only be, Utility.

WHY MUST I DO WHAT IS RIGHT?

N the matter of morals the great practical difficulty is not so much to know what is right as to do it. Were every man guided habitually by the highest light of his calmer moods, the world would be a Paradise

compared to what it is. Without overlooking the vast amount of evil that results from sheer ignorance—the untold misery inflicted with the best intentions in the world-it may still be allowed that if the will to do right were always present, the most important factor of human misery would be eliminated. Despite startling individual aberrations, there is, among civilized people, a tolerable unanimity as to what conduct is right and what wrong. It is few, indeed, who are ready with an opinion on the abstract nature of right and wrong, but in the main men agree on particular cases, where the passions do not interfere to bias them. To use logical language, they know the extension of the term "right" without knowing its intension. Unable to define "right" and "wrong," they can yet recognize the individual acts to which these names apply.

We set out, then, from the existence of moral sentiments among mankind at large, or, at all events, the civilized portion of them.

Now, looking into the mind of the individual, we find these sentiments, however generated, existing in various degrees of force. As so found in particular men and women we may call them, for distinction's sake, moral feelings. The existence, then, of moral feelings, of ideas,

that is, of right and wrong, attached to particular lines of action, no one can deny. It is the initial fact of moral science. The Utilitarian, indeed, has been accused of denying it, but he may justly resent the charge. He does not deny the existence of such feelings, but only endeavours to account for their origin. Most things that we know of have had a beginning, and the Utilitarian thinks that moral feelings may have had one too. This the Intuitionalist regards as a profane violation of the sanctity of virtue, and therefore fights as pro aris et focis for the eternity and immutability of moral ideas, humming to himself, as he smites at his foe, the pious refrain, "As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be." We saw enough, on a previous occasion, of The Two Schools of Thought," to lead us to expect this result. The natural tendency of Externalism, as was then remarked, is towards speculation on man's origin, which must be studied on the inductive method if it is to be studied at all. The Internalist, on the other hand, interrogating his own soul, receives an answer in the divine instincts which lead him to virtue. He finds moral feelings in existence, but gets no hint as to their origin. But while content to pause here himself, he should not frown on the adherent of the other method for pursuing his proper quest. No doubt his hostility arises from the belief that moral feelings must necessarily retain the character of the simpler elements out of which they are declared to have been evolved. But surely this is wholly a mistake! There are many noble things that have very dirty roots. Man may, indeed, be a fallen being, as theologians-Jewish, Neo-Platonist, and Christian-tell us, struggling to regain a lost perfection, but it certainly does not discord with what we otherwise know of the workings of the Supreme Energy to suppose that the human spirit, as we now find it, may have been developed upward out of the blind motions of animal instinct. Nor does this supposition derogate from its

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dignity. The butterfly, to use a trite simile, is not less the beautiful denizen of air because it once crawled on the damp earth; and even so the soul, having acquired her moral and religious instincts, learns to soar into the light of heaven and bask in the sunshine of the smile of God. We can accept Evolution and not deny Spiritualism. Instead of being pained to trace the brute in man, we should hail the promise of man in the brute. "Sons of the ape, but sires of the angel," if we value not ourselves for what we are now, let us at least imitate the practice of those nations who reckon nobility backwards, from the child to the parent.

Setting out, then, from the existence of a sense of right and wrong in the breasts of ourselves and our fellows, the inevitable problems present themselves to

us

1. What is right?

2. Why must I do what is right?

We have to determine both the standard and the sanction of morality. Here are two unknown quantities. Let us imitate the method of algebra and assume one of them as known. Right, we will suppose, is what conduces to general happiness. The second question then resolves itself into this, Why are we bound to promote the good of all? We must sift this inquiry somewhat before we attempt an answer.

The good of all lends itself readily to a division into our own good and that of others. Granting, then, that right action is defined by utility, we may say there are two kinds of utility—self-interest and the world's welfare; and, corresponding to these two ends, there are two motives of action-self-love and love of others. If the two ends harmonize, well and good, but if not, and there is a common impression that they do not in all cases coincide, the question will arise, which end must give way to the other, and which motive must, in consequence, be preferred. We obtain, then, at starting, a twofold