"other person had done it; it follows that in the mere question of guilt or innocence, all men have not only reason equally, but likewise all the materials on which the reason, considered as conscience, is to work. But when we pass out of ourselves, and speak, not exclusively of the agent as meaning well or ill, but of the action in its consequences, then of course experience is required, judgment in making use of it, and all those other qualities of the mind which are so differently dispensed to different persons, both by nature and education. And though the reason itself is the same in all men, yet the means of exercising it, and the materials (¿. e. the facts and ideas) on which it is exercised, being possessed in very different degrees by different persons, the practical result is, of course, equally different, and the whole groundwork of Rousseau's philosophy ends in a mere nothingism. Even in that branch of knowledge, on which the ideas, on the congruity of which with each other the reason is to decide, are all possessed alike by all men, namely, in geometry, (for all men in their senses possess all the component images, viz. simple curves and straight lines) yet the power of attention required for the perception of linked truths, even of such truths, is so very different in A and in B, that Sir Isaac Newton professed that it was in this power only that he was superior to ordinary men. In short, the sophism is as gross as if I should say-the souls of all men have the faculty of sight in an equal degree-forgetting to add, that this faculty cannot be exercised without eyes, and that some men are blind, and others short-sighted, &c.—and should then take advantage of this my omission to conclude against the use or necessity of spectacles, microscopes, &c., or of choosing the sharpest-sighted men for our guides.

Having exposed this gross sophism, I must warn against an opposite error-namely, that if reason, as distinguished from prudence, consists merely in knowing that black cannot be white-or when a man has a clear conception of an inclosed figure, and another equally clear conception of a straight line, his reason teaches him that these two conceptions are incompatible in the same object, i. e. that two straight lines cannot include a space the said reason must be a very insignificant faculty. But a moment's steady self-reflection will show us, that in the simple determination "black is not white "-or, "that two straight lines cannot include a space,”—all the powers are implied that distinguish man from animals-1st, the power of reflection; 2nd, of comparison; 3rd, and therefore of suspension of the mind; 4th, therefore of a controlling will, and the power of acting from notions, instead of mere images exciting appetites; from motives, and not from mere dark instincts. Was it an insignificant thing to weigh the planets, to determine all their courses, and prophesy every possible relation of the heavens a thousand years hence? Yet all this mighty chain of science is nothing but a linking together of truths of the same kind, as, the whole is greater than its

part:—or, if A and B = C, then A = B : or 3 + 4 = 7, therefore 7 + 5 = 12, and so forth. X is to be found either in A or B, or C or D: It is not found in A, B, or C, therefore it is to be found in D.-What can be simpler? Apply this to a brute animal—a dog misses his master where four roads meet—he has come up one, smells to two of the others, and then with his head aloft darts forward to the third road without any examination. If this was done by a conclusion, the dog would have reason-how comes it then, that he never shows it in his ordinary habits? Why does this story excite either wonder or incredulity?—If the story be a fact, and not a fiction, I should say—the breeze brought his master's scent down the fourth road to the dog's nose, and that therefore he did not put it down to the road, as in the two former instances. So awful and almost miraculous does the simple act of concluding, that take 3 from 4 there remains one, appear to us when attributed to the most sagacious of all brute animals.

THE FRIEND.

Section the First.

ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE.

HOC POTISSIMUM PACTO FELICEM AC MAGNUM REGEM SE FORE JUDICANS: NON SI QUAM PLURIMIS SED SI QUAM OPTIMIS IMPERET. PROINDE PARUM ESSE PUTAT JUSTIS PRESIDIIS REGNUM SUUM MUNIISSE, NISI IDEM VIRIS ERUDITIONE JUXTA AC VITÆ INTEGRITATE PRÆCELLENTIBUS DITET ATQUE HONESTET. NIMIRUM INTELLIGIT, HÆC DEMUM ESSE VERA REGNI DECORA, HAS VERAS OPES.

ERASMUS: EPIST. AD. EPIFC. PARIS.

ESSAY I.

Dum politici sæpiuscule hominibus magis insidiantur quam consulunt, potius callidi quam sapientes; theoretici e contrario se rem divinam facere et sapientiæ culmen attingere credunt, quando humanam naturam, quæ nullibi est, multis modis laudare, et eam, quæ re vera est, dictis lacessere norunt. Unde factum est, ut nunquam politicam conceperint quæ possit ad usum revocari; sed quæ in Utopiâ vel in illo poetarum aureo sæculo, ubi scilicet minime necesse erat, institui potuisset. At mihi plane persuadeo, experientiam omnia civitatum genera, quæ concipi possunt ut homines concorditer vivant, et simul media, quibus multitudo dirigi, seu quibus intra certos limites contineri debeat, ostendisse: ita ut non credam, nos posse aliquid, quod ab experientiâ sive praxi non abhorreat, cogitatione de hac re assequi, quod nondum expertum compertumque sit.

Cum igitur animum ad politicam applicuerim, nihil quod novum vel inauditum est; sed tantum ea quæ cum praxi optime conveniunt, certa et indubitata ratione demonstrare aut ex ipsa humanæ naturæ conditione deducere, intendi. Et ut ea quæ ad hanc scientiam spectant, eadem animi libertate, quâ res mathematicas solemus, inquirerem, sedulo curavi humanas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari; sed intelligere. Nec ad imperii securitatem refert quo animo homines inducantur ad res rectè administrandas, modo res rectè administrentur. Animi enim·libertas, seu fortitudo, privata virtus est; at imperii virtus securitas. SPINOZA, Op. Post. p. 267.

(Translation.)-While the mere practical statesman too often rather plots against mankind, than consults their interest, crafty not wise; the mere theorists, on the other hand, imagine that they are employed in a glorious work, and believe themselves at the very summit of earthly wisdom, when they are able, in set and varied language, to extol that human nature, which exists nowhere (except indeed in their own fancy), and to accuse and vilify our nature as it really is. Hence it has happened, that these men have never conceived a practical scheme of civil policy, but, at best, such forms of government only, as might have been instituted in Utopia, or during the golden age of the poets: that is to say, forms of government excellently adapted for those who need no government at all. But I am fully persuaded, that experience has already brought to light all conceivable sorts of political institutions under which human society can be maintained in concord, and likewise the chief means of directing the multitude, or retaining them within given boundaries: 50 that I can hardly believe, that on this subject the deepest research would arrive at any result, not abhorrent from experience and practice, which has not been already tried and proved.

When, therefore, I applied my thoughts to the study of political economy, I proposed to myself nothing original or strange as the fruits of my reflections; but simply to demonstrate from plain and undoubted principles, or to deduce from the very condition and necessities of human nature, those plans and maxims which square the best with practice. And that in al! things which relate to this province, I might conduct my investigations with the same freedom of intellect with which we proceed in questions of pure science, I sedulously disciplined my mind neither to laugh at, or bewail, or detest, the actions of men; but to understand them. For to the safety of the state it is not of necessary importance, what motives induce men to administer public affairs rightly, provided only that public affairs be rightly administered. For moral strength, or freedom from the selfish passions, is the virtue of individuals; but security is the virtue of a state.

ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

ALL the different philosophical systems of political justice, all the

theories on the rightful origin of government, are reducible in the end to three classes, correspondent to the three different points of view in which the human being itself may be contemplated. The first denies all truth and distinct meaning to the words right and duty, and affirming that the human mind consists of nothing but manifold modifications of passive sensation, considers men as the highest sort of animals indeed,

but at the same time the most wretched; inasmuch as their defenceless nature forces them into society, while such is the multiplicity of wants engendered by the social state, that the wishes of one are sure to be in contradiction with those of some other. The assertors of this system consequently ascribe the origin and continuance of government to fear, or the power of the stronger, aided by the force of custom. This is the system of Hobbes. Its statement is its confutation. It is, indeed, in the literal sense of the word preposterous: for fear presupposes conquest, and conquest a previous union and agreement between the conquerors. A vast empire may perhaps be governed by fear; at least the idea is not absolutely inconceivable, under circumstances which prevent the consciousness of a common strength. A million of men united by mutual confidence and free intercourse of thoughts form cne power, and this is as much a real thing as a steam engine; but a million of insulated individuals is only an abstraction of the mind, and but one told so many times over, without addition, as an idiot would tell the clock at noon-one, one, one, &c. But when, in the first instances, the descendants of one family joined together to attack those of another family, it is impossible that their chief or leader should have appeared to them stronger than all the rest together; they must therefore have chosen him, and this as for particular purposes, so doubtless under particular conditions, expressed or understood. Such we know to be the case with the North American tribes at present; such, we are informed by history, was the case with our own remote ancestors. Therefore, even on the system of those who, in contempt of the oldest and most authentic records, consider the savage as the first and natural state of man, government must have originated in choice and an agreement. The apparent exceptions in Africa and Asia are, if possible, still more subversive of this system: for they will be found to have originated in religious imposture, and the first chiefs to have secured a willing and enthusiastic obedience to themselves as delegates of the Deity.

cause.

But the whole theory is baseless. We are told by history, we learn from our experience, we know from our own hearts, that fear, of itself, is utterly incapable of producing any regular, continuous, and calculable effect, even on an individual; and that the fear, which does act systematically upon the mind, always presupposes a sense of duty, as its The most cowardly of the European nations, the Neapolitans and Sicilians, those among whom the fear of death exercises the most tyrannous influence relatively to their own persons, are the very men who least fear to take away the life of a fellow-citizen by poison or assassination; while in Great Britain, a tyrant, who has abused the power, which a vast property has given him, to oppress a whole neighbourhood, can walk in safety unarmed, and unattended, amid a hundred men, each of whom feels his heart burn with rage and indignation at