The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International OrderT. V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, James J. Wirtz Soon after nuclear weapons devastated the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Bernard Brodie and several colleagues wrote The Absolute Weapon, which predicted that the atomic bomb would revolutionize international politics. In TheAbsolute Weapon Revisited, a group of noted scholars explores the contemporary role of nuclear weapons in the world after the end of the Cold War. Although superpower rivalry has faded, the complexities of living with nuclear weapons remain. Working from different theoretical perspectives, the contributors offer a set of provocative assessments of nuclear deterrence and the risks of nuclear proliferation and disarmament. Some argue that assured destruction capabilities remain important, while others argue that nuclear deterrence will be increasingly irrelevant. Arms control, crisis stability, and continuity and change in nuclear doctrine as well as new issues such as virtual nuclear states and information warfare, are some of the issues addressed by the contributors to The Absolute Weapon Revisited. The contributors are Zachary Davis, Colin S. Gray, Richard J. Harknett, Ashok Kapur, Robert Manning, William C. Martel, Eric Mlyn, John Mueller, J. V. Paul, George Quester, and James J. Wirtz. This book will be of interest to scholars, policymakers and students interested in issues of nuclear strategy and deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament, international security and peace studies. T. V. Paul is Associate Professor of Political Science, McGill University, and the author of AsymmetricConflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. James J. Wirtz is Associate Professor of Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, and the author of The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure at War. Richard Harknett is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, and the author of numerous articles on security affairs. |
Contents
Understanding Nuclear Weapons in a Transforming World | 1 |
A Reassessment | 19 |
State Preferences Systemic Constraints and the Absolute Weapon | 47 |
The Escalating Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons | 73 |
Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Military Affairs | 99 |
Prospects for Nuclear Stability after the Cold War | 137 |
The Continuing Debate on Minimal Deterrence | 167 |
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Absolute Weapon allies American argued argument Arms Control atomic attack behavior Bernard Brodie bipolar bomb Brodie's China Cold Cold War conflict context cooperation counterforce CTBT Cyberwar debate defense deterrence theory developed disarmament dominant economic future gains global Harknett images of nuclear India international politics International Security Israel issue Kenneth Waltz Korea limited military millenarian minimal deterrence missile multipolar non-nuclear nonproliferation norms North Korea nuclear age nuclear arsenals nuclear balance nuclear capability nuclear deterrence nuclear forces Nuclear Policy nuclear possession nuclear powers nuclear proliferation nuclear strategy nuclear threats nuclear war nuclear weapons policy Pakistan peace plutonium policymakers possible post-Cold potential problem reduced regime regional relations relative retaliation Revolution revolutionary Richard Ned Lebow Robert Jervis role Russian Second World societies Soviet Union START II status strategic nuclear structural superpowers targeting theory tion treaty U.S. nuclear United Waltz warfare warheads Washington World Politics York