same effect as an estoppel as against subsequent suits on the same
cause of action. Held that:

Although one of two joint tort-feasors may be individually interested
in the result of a suit against the other, the result is merely that
of precedent and not of res judicata, and the courts of another
State are not under obligation to follow the decision.
Assistance by one of two joint tort-feasors in the defense of a suit
against the other, because of interest in the decision as a judicial
precedent affecting a case pending against him in another State,
does not create an estoppel as to the one so assisting in the defense.
Where the cause of action against joint tort-feasors is ex delicto, and
several as well as joint, one of the tort-feasors not sued is not a
privy to one that is sued so that a judgment dismissing the case
against the latter is a bar to another suit against the latter.
Where the remedy of the plaintiff in a suit against one of two joint
tort-feasors depends upon the defendant's own culpability, failure
to recover in a prior suit on the same facts against the other is not
a bar.

When dealing with the estoppel of a judgment, privity denotes mutual
or successive relationship to the same right of property, and while
there is diversity of opinion as to whether the estoppel can be ex-
panded so as to include joint tort-feasors not parties, the sounder
reason, as well as weight of authority, is that failure to recover
against one is not a bar to a suit or an individual cause of action
against the other. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 111.

20. Full faith and credit clause; status of judgment of Federal court in
court of State other than that in which the Federal court sits.
Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States de-
pends entirely upon diversity of citizenship, that court administers
the law of the State, and its judgment is entitled to the same sanc-
tion as would attach to a judgment of a court of that State, and is
entitled in the courts of another State to the same faith and credit
which would be given to a judgment of the court of the State in
which the Circuit Court which rendered it was sitting. Ib.

21. Full faith and credit; right of court in which judgment of court of
another State is set up to determine its effect as a bar.
Although a judgment dismissing the bill against one of two joint tort-
feasors may be a bar in the State where rendered against a suit on
the same cause of action against the other joint tort-feasor, the
courts of another State may, without denying full faith and
credit to such judgment, determine for itself under principles of
VOL, CCXXV-47

general law whether or not such judgment is a bar to suits against
the other tort-feasor. Ib.

22. Full faith and credit; status of judgment of court of one State when
sued upon or pleaded in estoppel in court of another State.
Under § 1 of Art. IV of the Constitution and § 905, Rev. Stat., the
judgment of a court of one State when sued upon or pleaded in es-
toppel in the courts of another State is put upon the plane of a do-
mestic judgment in respect to conclusiveness of the facts adjudged;
otherwise it would be reëxaminable as only prima facie evidence of
the matter adjudged as is the case with foreign judgments. Ib.

23. Full faith and credit clause; how construed.

The full faith and credit clause is to be construed in the light of the
other provisions of the Constitution, none of which it was intended
to modify or override. Ib.

24. Full faith and credit; right of court where judgment set up to inquire as
to jurisdiction of court rendering it.

The courts of one State are not required to regard as conclusive any

judgment of the court of another State which had no jurisdiction
of the subject or the parties; and the courts of the State in which
the judgment is set up have the right to inquire whether the court
rendering it had jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment which would
conclude the parties themselves or those claiming that the judg-
ment was effective as an estoppel. Ib.

25. Governmental powers; retrospective legislation: validity of naturaliza-
tion act of 1906.

The act of June 29, 1906, is not unconstitutional as an exercise of
judicial power by the legislative branch of the Government, nor is
it unconstitutional because retrospective. Johannessen v. United
States, 227.

Naturalization of Aliens. See IMMIGRATION, F.

26. States; effect of Fourteenth Amendment on power to regulate useful
occupations.

While the Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizen in his right to
engage in any lawful business, it does not prevent legislation in-
tended to regulate useful occupations, which because of their
nature and location, may prove injurious or offensive to the public.
Murphy v. California, 623.

27. States; effect of Fourteenth Amendment on right of municipality to
prohibit harmful business.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a municipality from
prohibiting any business which is inherently vicious and harmful.
Ib.

28. States; effect of Fourteenth Amendment on power to regulate or pro-
hibit business.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a State from regulating
or prohibiting a non-useful occupation which may become harmful
to the public, and the regulation or prohibition need not be post-
poned until the evil is flagrant. Ib.

29. States; when statute not revenue measure in disguise so as to render it
unconstitutional.

Where the fair import of the provisions of a state police statute is that

the fees exacted are for necessary expenses of inspecting an article
properly the subject of inspection, and the bill alleges no facts
warranting a conclusion that the charges are unreasonable as
compared with the cost, this court will not condemn the statute as
an unconstitutional revenue measure. Standard Stock Food Co.
v. Wright, 540.

30. States; when statute not revenue measure in disguise.

Where a state police statute involving inspection of goods is enforced
by the affixing of stamps, it will not be held unconstitutional as a
revenue measure in disguise if the bill does not allege any facts to
show that the charge for stamps is unreasonable and the total sale
is so much in excess of the cost of inspection as to impute bad
faith. Savage v. Jones, 501.

See SUPRA, 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 13;

STATES.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
See STATUTES, A.

CONTINUANCE.

See TRIAL, 1.

CONTINUING OFFENSES.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 6, 7, 14, 22.

CONTRACTS.

1. Rescission of contract for sale of mining properties; practice in this
court; res judicata.

One of the parties interested in and having control of a mining com-
pany purchased a neighboring group of mines and agreed that the
company should have the opportunity of taking them on reim-
bursing him for outlay; if not availed of, he to keep them for his
own. Subsequently the combined groups being sold he claimed the
agreement had by reason of certain resolutions been rescinded and
that he was entitled to the proceeds of the purchased group. The
case was twice before the Supreme Court of the Territory: on the
first appeal that court held that the agreement had been rescinded.
Held that:

The findings of fact sent up from the territorial court must alone be the
basis of the judgment of this court.

In interpreting the action of stockholders in passing resolutions regard-
ing the relative rights of the corporation and one of the stock-
holders and officers in property of the corporation, the surround-
ing facts and circumstances may be considered.

The agreement that the company could acquire the purchased group
was carried out and not rescinded.

Whatever effect the decision of the Supreme Court of a Territory may

have, as the law of the case, on the lower court or on the Supreme
Court itself, prior to an appeal to this court, it is not the law of the
case for this court.

Under the circumstances, the appointment of a receiver and his con-
tinuance for final settlement of the affairs of the company was
proper. Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 445.

2. Reality and substance of unrecorded instrument; power of creditors to
inquire as to.

The mere form of an instrument transferring property of a debtor can-

not exclude the power of creditors to inquire into the reality and
substance of a contract unrecorded although required by law to be
recorded in order to be effective against third parties. Valdes v.
Central Altagracia, 58.

3. Transfer of property of corporation as contract other than of condi-
tional sale.

Under the circumstances of this case, and in view of the existence of
an equity of redemption under prior transfers, held, that a transfer
of all the property of a corporation to one advancing money to en-
able it to continue its business was not a conditional sale of the

property but a contract creating security for the money advanced.
and on liquidation of the assets the transferee stood merely as a
secured creditor. Ib.

When to be deemed of state and not Federal creation.

A corporation which was organized in the Indian Territory while the
statutes of Arkansas were, under authority of Congress, in force in
that Territory is not for that reason a Federal corporation, but is
to be regarded for jurisdictional purposes as one of Oklahoma.
(Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. Co.,
112 U. S. 414.) Shulthis v. McDougal, 561.

Where Congress has power to pass an act and its provisions are plain,
the court must apply it even in a hard case. Low Wah Suey v.
Backus, 460.

2. Duty of this court to give effect to purpose of Congress in creating
special tribunal.

Where Congress creates a special tribunal for a special class of cases