as perception, or thought, are only higher developments of these organic activities, and are plainly traceable through natural sequences to the same simple source. Every movement of the microscopic speck of protoplasm is the direct function of its chemical constitution and its mechanical adjustment to the environment; and these names, chemical and mechanical, are acknowledged to represent merely special aspects or forms of motion. When the monad acts, however simply, that action expresses a law, or a truth, and constitutes the simplest imaginable form of perception. There is no structure to co-ordinate the action so that it can be reproduced in memory, adjusted in thought, and readjusted in action. The tiny cycle of change set up in this little being is too simple to receive any such classification; but from its motions are built up the activities of the highest life, without the intervention of any new principle. Science having familiarized the mind with all these particulars of development, the seeker after incomprehensibles is forced into the narrow limits of metaphysical terms. Space, time, matter, force, and motion, are found in consciousness, and they are found out of consciousness. One class of thinkers are puzzled with the question how they got into the mind; the other, how they managed to get out of it. The former class reason that as they are unknowables they cannot get into the mind as they really are, so they must run the gantlet in the guise of" organized consolidated conceptions"; and it is well understood after they do get in in this guise, they are to be utterly incomprehensible. The other class argue that these mystic principles are absolute entities, independent originals, that are found in the mind; and as they cannot in any way get out, they practically take every thing in with them. These two great classes of thinkers have, of course, displayed all degrees of ingenuity in expounding their theories. Some of them, in order to protect these precious fallacies, have built up intellectual fortifications which bid fair to last, at least as imposing ruins, throughout the existence of our race. No amount of subtility on the

part of these metaphysicians, however, seems to prevent the above simple classification of their systems, although, in the course of their arguments they have sounded the key-note of thought over and over again. The ultimate analysis declares these so-called incomprehensible principles to be but phases of a fact which is in the highest degree comprehensible; for to this fact perception and thought are directly traceable.

This is the distinguishing feature of the theory of Knowledge which I would here offer, and this it is which marks its contrast with all theories postulating an unknowable as taking part in any form, or through any manifestation, in the constitution of Knowledge. With regard to perception, the present theory teaches that the direction of perception is the direction of organic life, that its source and procedures are organic, and that the moving limits of individuality are its only circumscriptions. Thus mind has no proscriptions in nature. The vistas of consciousness are unlimited; the universe holds nothing back from thought. Throughout the receding simplifications of analysis, or the advancing constructions of synthesis, we meet with no fact or principle, however general, which the individual cannot assimilate, and which is not in itself an advancement and enlargement of our existence.

CHAPTER XII.

HERBERT SPENCER (CONCLUDED).

Sociology an Instrument in Determining Ultimate Beliefs.

We have now before us the more grateful task of describ ing the merits of Spencer's system of philosophy. In “First Principles," which is an epitome of the whole, and in the succeeding four volumes, two of "Biology" and two of "Psychology," we find a masterly picture of the related stages of progression from the simplest to the most complex type of organic life. In the first book of the above series, the changes expressed in this progressive organic development are more or less clearly affiliated to those changes broadly described as inorganic. In the last book we find an attempt to explain the organic side of mental life, and to apply to the highest of all phenomena the formula of evolution. The march from the simple to the complex is shown to be the direction of universal activity. This idea is further elaborated in a definition of life, to which we demurred because it merely adds to the conception of universal activity the characteristics of the activity of individual or organic life, and should, therefore, be called a definition, not of life in general, but of organic life. The principle so laboriously expounded, that "Function makes Structure," which has a fuller expression in the theory of "the direct adaptation of the creature to its environment," a prominent feature of Spencer's biological studies, was objected to on the ground that function and structure are but obverse sides of every phenomenon, and neither, therefore, can have precedence over the other as a

cause.

In constructing this system of thought, Mr. Spencer has

presented to the world a philosophy admirably articulated and constituting an organon of scientific truth of inestimable value. His best original work does not appear, however, in the first five books of the system. Beneath the imposing array of scientific knowledge we find an undercurrent of ontological speculation, a persistent effort at an ultimate analysis, which produces as its result, from crisis to crisis. throughout the work, the conception of the so-called "deepest knowable truth," denominated The Persistence of Force. It is true that at times this "deepest knowable truth" is declared to be unknowable, but for the most part, with remarkable consistency of purpose, he avoids placing this conception among the weird group of ultimates fully described in the last chapter, which are declared to be inconceivables; but the logical difficulty which this omission might be supposed to avoid is only thereby enhanced, for Force, according to Mr. Spencer, is a prominent name among the "unknowables," and how it is made to serve as the basis of "the deepest knowable truth" is not explained. We are left to infer, perhaps, that the depth attributed to this conception is solely a property of the attribute persistence; since we are certainly safe in assuming that whatever property an unknowable conception may have, it can lay no claim to a third dimension.

After this deep study of individual or organic life, which forms the principal theme of the first five books above mentioned, we come to the study of what Mr. Spencer denominates super-organic phenomena. This is the science of Sociology, for which he is so justly renowned. Its field is human life; its plan is to view humanity as a great organism, and to study the adjustments of this organism, as an aggregate, to its surroundings; tracing, through the changes of history, the sequences of its existence.

The purpose of this study, as can readily be seen, is to examine the different phases of conduct from the primitive family or tribe to the race viewed as a confederation of nations; the object being to create a science of morality.

Too much cannot be said in praise of such a work; its

very inception is an inspiration. The first volume of "Sociology" is one of the most interesting literary productions of our century. It is the romance of human life viewed from the most commanding position which thought affords. The subject of the Primitive Man is minutely studied; his probable surroundings, and the influence of these surroundings as the external factors of his existence, are estimated. The physical, emotional, and intellectual aspects of his nature are respectively considered, as the internal factors of his development, and this development is shown to be the establishment of those permanent relationships between individuals known as social organization. The different questions which the enormous periods of man's prehistoric existence give rise to are considered with the characteristic depth and thoroughness of the author; and in his treatment of them we have a graphic picture of the long and painful struggle for existence which preceded the primitive forms of civilization. The great impetus which co-operation among men has given to human life is depicted, and it is shown that social progress and the perfection of conduct are but obverse aspects of the same development.

In this book we have Mr. Spencer at his best. Sure of his subject and conclusions, his style is clear and comprehensive, his thought deep almost to the emotional. Persuaded by his earnestness, criticism gives way to conviction, and one is content to read and learn. An idea of the method can be gained from the following, which occurs in the chapter on "The Factors of Social Phenomena":

“There remains in the group of derived factors one more, the potency of which can scarcely be over-estimated. I mean that accumulation of superorganic products which we commonly distinguish as artificial, but which, philosophically considered, are no less natural than all others resulting from evolution. There are several orders of these.

"First come the material appliances, which, beginning with roughly-chipped flints, end in the complex automatic tools of an engine-factory driven by steam; which from boomerangs rise to thirty-five-ton guns; which from huts of branches and grass grow to cities with their palaces and cathedrals. Then we have language, able at first only to eke out gestures in communicating simple ideas, but