Of the nature and use of the scholastic art of syllogizing. fection of a man's knowledge in the language, aided by another's sophistry, and perhaps his own inattention, he is brought to admit of the one term, what he would refuse of the other, such an argument as this might be employed, Twelve, you allow, are equal to the fifth part of sixty; Therefore a dozen are equal to the fifth part of sixty. I mark the case rather strongly, for the sake of illustration; for I am sensible, that in what regards things so definite as all names of number are, it is impossible for any who is not quite ignorant of the tongue, to be misled. But the intelligent reader will easily conceive, that in abstruse and metaphysical subjects, wherein the terms are often both extensive and indefinite in their signification, and sometimes even equivocal, the most acute and wary may be intangled in them. IN further confirmation of my fourth remark, I shall produce an example in Camestres, the second mood of the second figure: All animals are mortal; But angels are not mortal; Therefore angels are not animals. When the antagonist calls the angel an animal, it must proceed from one or other of these two causes, either from an error in regard to the nature of the angelic order, or from a mistake as to the import of the Of the nature and use of the scholastic art of syllogizing. English word animal. If the first be the case; namely, some erroneous opinion about angels, as that they are embodied spirits, generated and corruptible like ourselves; it is evident that the forementioned syllogism labours under the common defect of all syllogisms. It assumes the very point in question. But if the difference between the disputants be, as it frequently happens, merely verbal, and the opponent uses the word animal, as another name for living creature, and as exactly corresponding to the Greek term*, arguments of this sort may be of service for setting the impropriety of such a misapplication of the English name in a clearer light. For let it be observed, that though Nature hath strongly marked the principal differences to be found in different orders of beings, a procedure which hath suggested to men the manner of classing things into genera and species, this does not hold equally in every case. Hence it is, that the different terms in different languages do not always exactly correspond. Some nations, from particular circumstances, are more affected by one property in objects, others by another. This leads to a different distribution of things under their several names. Now, though it is not of importance that the words in one tongue exactly correspond to those in another, it is of importance that in the same tongue uniformity in this respect be, as much as possible, observed. Errors in regard to the signs, tend not only to retard the progress of knowledge, but to introduce errors in Of the nature and use of the scholastic art of syllogising. regard to the things signified. Now by suggesting the different attributes comprised in the definition of the term, as so many mediums in the proof, an appeal is made to the adversary's practice in the language. In this way such mediums may be presented, as will satisfy a candid adversary, that the application he makes of the term in question, is not conformable to the usage of the tongue. On the other hand, it is certain, that in matters of an abstract and complex nature, where the terms are comprehensive, indefinite, not in frequent use, and consequently not well ascertained, men may argue together eternally, without making the smallest impression on each other, not sensible all the while, that there is not at bottom any difference between them, except as to the import of words and phrases. I do not say, however, that this is a consequence peculiar to this manner of debating, though perhaps oftener resulting from it, on account of its many nice distinctions, unmeaning subtleties, and mazy windings, than from any other manner. For it must be owned, that the syllogistic art has at least as often been employed for imposing fallacies on the understanding, as for detecting those imposed. And though verbal controversy seems to be its natural province, it is neither the only method adapted to such discussions, nor the most expeditious. To conclude, then, what shall we denominate the artificial system, or organ of truth, as it has been cal Of the nature and use of the scholastic art of syllogizing. led, of which we have been treating? Shall we style it, the art of reasoning? So honourable an appellation it by no means merits, since, as hath been shewn, it is ill adapted to scientific matters, and for that reason never employed by the mathematician; and it is utterly incapable of assisting us in our researches into nature. Shall we then pronounce it the science of logomachy, or, in plain English, the art of fighting with words, and about words? And in this wordy warfare, shall we say that the rules of syllogising are the tactics? This would certainly hit the matter more nearly; but I know not how it happens, that to call any thing logomachy or altercation, would be considered as giving bad names; and when a good use may be made of an invention, it seems unreasonable to fix an odious name upon it, which ought only to discriminate the abuse. I shall therefore only title it, the scholastic art of disputation *. It is the schoolmen's science of defence. 46 WHEN all erudition consisted more in an acquaintance with words, and an address in using them, than * In answer to that branch of logic which Lord Verulam styles Doctrina de elenchis hermeniæ, concerning which he affirms, “ De"dimus ei nomen ex usu, quia verus ejus usus est plané redargu❝tio, et cautio circa usum verborum. Quinimo partem illam de prædicamentis, si rectè instituatur, circa cautiones de non con"fundendis aut transponendis definitionum et divisionum terminis, "præcipuum usum sortiri existimamus, et huc etiam referri malu"mus." De Aug. Sci. L. v. c. 4. Of the nature and use of the scholastic art of syllogizing. in the knowledge of things, dexterity in this exerci. tation conferred as much lustre on the scholar, as agility in the tilts and tournaments added glory to the knight. In proportion as the attention of mankind has been drawn off to the study of Nature, the honours of this contentious art have faded, and it is now almost forgotten. There is no reason to wish its revival, as eloquence seems to have been very little benefited by it, and philosophy still less. NAY, there is but too good reason to affirm, that there are two evils at least which it has gendered. These are, first, an itch of disputing on every subject, however uncontrovertible; the other, a sort of philosophic pride, which will not permit us to think that we believe any thing, even a self-evident principle, without a previous reason or argument. In order to gratify this passion, we invariably recur to words, and are at immense pains to lose ourselves in clouds of our own raising. We imagine we are advancing and making wonderful progress, while the mist of words in which we have involved our intellects, hinders us from discerning that we are moving in a circle all the time * *How ridiculous are the efforts which some very learned and judicious men have made, in order to evince, that whatever begins to exist must have a cause. One argues, "There must have been 46 a cause to determine the time and place," as though it were more evident that the accidents could not be determined without a cause, than that the existence of the thing could not be so determined. Another insists very curiously, that if a thing had no |