Sect. IV. Man considered as endowed with passions. passion is most strongly excited by sensation. The sight of danger, immediate or near, instantly rouseth fear; the feeling of an injury, and the presence of Mi an injurer, in a moment kindle anger. Next to the influence of sense, is that of memory, the effect of which upon passion, if the fact be recent and remembered distinctly and circumstantially, is almost equal. Next to the influence of memory, is that of imagination; by which is here solely meant, the faculty of apprehending what is neither perceived by the senses, nor remembered. Now, as it is this power of which the orator must chiefly avail himself, it is proper to enquire what those circumstances are, which will make the ideas he summons up in the imagination of his hearers, resemble, in lustre and steadiness, those of sensation and remembrance. For the same circumstances will infallibly make them resemble also in their effects; that is, in the influence they will have upon the passions and affections of the hears. SECT. V...The circumstances that are chiefly instrumental in operating on the Passions. THESE are perhaps all reducible to the seven following, probability, plausibility, importance, proximity of time, connexion of place, relation of the actors or sufferers to the hearers or speaker, interest of the hearers or speaker in the consequences *. *I am not quite positive as to the accuracy of this enumeration, and shall therefore freely permit my learned and ingenious friend, Sect. V. Circumstances operating on the passions....I. Probability. PART I....Probability. THE first is probability, which is now considered only as an expedient for enlivening passion. Here again there is commonly scope for argument. Probability results from evidence, and begets belief. Belief invigorates our ideas. Belief raised to the highest becomes certainty. Certainty flows either from the force of the evidence, real or apparent, that is produced by the speaker, from the previous notoriety of the fact. If the fact be notorious, it will not only be superfluous in the speaker to attempt to prove it, but it will be pernicious to his design. The reason is plain. By proving he supposeth it questionable, and by supposing actually renders it so to his audience: he brings them from viewing it in the stronger light of certainty, to view it in the weaker light of probability: in lieu of sun-shine he gives them twilight. Of the different means and kinds of probation I have spoken already, PART II....Plausibility. THE second circumstance is plausibility, a thing to Dr Reid, to annex the et cætera he proposes in such cases, in order to supply all defects. See Sketches of the History of Man, B. ii. Sk. 1. Appendix, c. ii. sect. 2. In the judiciary orations of the ancients, this was the principal scope for argument. That to condemn the guilty, and to acquit the innocent, would gratify their indignation against the injurious, and their love of right was too manifest to require a proof. The fact, that there was guilt in the prisoner, or that there was innocence, did require it. It was otherwise in deliberate orations, as the conduct recommended was more remotely connected with the emotions raised. Sect. V. Circumstances operating on the passions....II. Plausibility. tally distinct from the former, as having an effect upon the mind quite independent of faith or probability. It ariseth chiefly from the consistency of the narration, from its being what it is commonly called natural and feasible. This the French critics have aptly enough denominated in their language vraisemblance, the English critics more improperly in theirs probability. In order to avoid the manifest ambiguity there is in this application of the word, it had been better to retain the word verisimilitude, now almost obsolete. That there is a relation between those two qualities, must, notwithstanding, be admitted. This, however, is an additional reason for assigning them different names. An homonymous term, whose differing significations have no affinity to one another, is scarce ever liable to be misunderstood. BUT as to the nature and extent of his relation, let it be observed, that the want of plausibility implies an internal improbability, which it will require the stronger external evidence to surmount. Nevertheless, the implausibility may be surmounted by such evidence, and we may be fully ascertained of what is in itself exceedingly implausible. Implausibility is, in a certain degree, positive evidence, against a narrative; whereas plausibility implies no positive evidence for it. We know that fiction may be as plausible as truth. A narration may be possessed of this quality in the highest degree, which we not only regard as improbable, but know to be false. Probability is a light darted on the object, from the proofs, which for this roason are pertinently Sect. V. Circumstances operating on the passions...II. Plausibility. enough stiled evidence. Plausibility is a native lustre issuing directly from the object. The former is the aim of the historian, the latter of the poet. That every one may be satisfied, that the second is generally not inferior to the first, in its influence on the mind, we need but appeal to the effects of tragedy, of epic, and even of romance, which, in its principal charac ters, participates of the nature of poesy, though written in prose. Ir deserves, however, to be remarked, that though plausibility alone hath often greater efficacy in rousing the passions, than probability, or even certainty; yet, in any species of composition wherein truth, or at least probability is expected, the mind quickly nauseates the most plausible tale, which is unsupported by proper arguments. For this reason it is the business of the orator, as much as his subject will permit, to avail himself of both qualities. There is one case, and but one, in which plausibility itself may be dispensed with; that is, when the fact is so incontestible, that it is impossible to entertain a doubt of it; for, when implausibility is incapable of impairing belief, it hath sometimes, especially in forensic causes, even a good effect. By presenting us with something monstrous in its kind, it raises astonishment, and thereby heightens every passion which the narrative is fitted to excite. BUT to return to the explication of this quality. When I explained the nature of experience, I showed that it consisteth of all the general truths collected ་ Sect. V. Circumstances operating on the passions....II. Plausibility. from particular facts remembered; the mind forming to itself often insensibly, and as it were mechanically, ⚫ certain maxims, from comparing, or rather associating the similar circumstances of different incidents *. Hence it is, that when a number of ideas relating to any fact or event, are successively introduced into my mind by a speaker; if the train he deduceth coincide with the general current of my experience; if in nothing it thwart those conclusions and anticipations which are become habitual to me, my mind accompanies him with facility, glides along from one idea to another, and admits the whole with pleasure. If, on the contrary, the train he introduceth run counter to the current of my experience; if in many things it shock those conclusions and anticipations which are become habitual to me, my mind attends him with difficulty, suffers a sort of violence in passing from one idea to another, and rejects the whole with disdain : For while upon such monstrous scenes we gaze, FRANCIS. In the former case I pronounce the narrative natural and credible, in the latter, I say, it is unnatural and incredible, if not impossible; and, which is particularly expressive of the different appearances in respect of connexion made by the ideas in my mind, the one * Chap. V. Sect. ii. Part 2. VOL. I. M HOR. De Arte Poet. |