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Part IV. Other passions, as well as moral sentiments, useful auxiliaries.

Other passions or dispositions may be called in as auxiliaries. Nothing is more efficacious in this respect

and that first in respect of the enormity of the action, No. 7.; of the disposition of the actor, N°. 3. 9, 10.; and to render probable what might otherwise appear merely conjectural, N°. 4, 5. 8. 11, 12.; in respect of consequences, their greatness, No. 1, 2.; where the crime is most artfully, though implicitly, represented as subversive of all that was dear to them, liberty, the right of citizens, their most valuable laws, and that idol of the people, the tribunitian power; their extent, No. 15, 16. Secondly, proximity of time; there is but an insinuation of this circumstance in the word tandem

N°. 2. There are two reasons which probably induced the orator in this particular to be so sparing. One is, the recency of the crime, as of the criminal's pretorship was notorious; the other and the weightier is, that of all relations this is the weakest; and even what influence it hath, reflection serves rather to correct than to confirm. In appearing to lay stress on so slight a circumstance, a speaker displays rather penury of matter than abundance. It is better, therefore, in most cases, to suggest it, as it were, by accident, than to insist on it as of design. It deserves also to be remarked, that the word here employed is very emphatical, as it conyeys at the same time a tacit comparison of their so recent degeneracy with the freedom, security, and glory which they had long enjoyed. The same word is again introduced, No. 14. to the same extent. Thirdly, local connexion; in respect of vicinage, how affectingly, though indirectly, is touched, N°. 4. 6. 8. 11, 12.? indirectly, for reasons similar to those mentioned on the circumstance of time; as to other local connexions, No. 2. " in provincia populi

Romani, in oppido fæderatorum." Fourthly, personal relation; first of the perpetrator, No. 2, " ab eo qui beneficio," &c. his crime therefore more atrocious and ungrateful, the most sacred rights violated by one who ought to have protected them; next of the sufferer, No. 2. "civis Romanus." This is most pathetically

VOL, I.

N

urged,

'Sect. VI.

Other passions as well as moral sentiments, useful auxiliaries.

than a sense of justice, a sense of public utility, a sense of glory; and nothing conduceth more to operate on these, than the sentiments of sages whose wisdom we venerate, the example of heroes whose exploits we admire. I shall conclude what relates to the exciting of passion, when I have remarked, that pleading the importance and the other pathetic circumstances, or pleading the authority of opinions or

urged. and, by a comparison introduced, greatly heightened, No.13. 14. Fifthly, the interest; which, not the hearers only, but all who bear the Roman name, have, in the consequences, N°. 15, 16.

We

e see, in the above example, with what uncommon address and delicacy those circumstances ought to be sometimes blended, sometimes but insinuated, sometimes, on the contrary, warmly urged, sometimes shaded a little, that the art may be concealed; and, in brief, the whole conducted so as that nothing material may be omitted, that every sentiment may easily follow that which precedes, and usher that which follows it, and that every thing said may appear to be the language of pure nature. The art of the rhetorician, like that of the philosopher, is analytical. The art of the orator is synthetical. The former acts the part of the skilful ana-. tomist, who, by removing the teguments, and nicely separating the parts, presents us with views at once naked, distinct, and hideous, now of the structure of the bones, now of the muscles and tendons, now of the arteries and veins, now of the bowels, now of the brain and nervous system. The latter imitates Nature in the constructing of her work, who, with wonderful symmetry, unites the various organs, adapts them to their respective uses, and covers all with a decent veil, the skin. Thus, though she hide entirely the more minute and the interior parts, and show not to equal advantage even the articulations of the limbs, and the adjustment of the larger members, adds inexpressible beauty, and strength, and ener gy to the whole.

Sect. VI.

Other passions, as well as moral sentiments, useful auxiliaries.

precedents, is usually considered, and aptly enough, as being likewise a species of reasoning.

THIS Concession, however, doth not imply, that by any reasoning we are ever taught that such an object ought to awaken such a passion. This we must learn originally from feeling, not from argument. No speaker attempts to prove it; though he sometimes introduceth moral considerations, in order to justify the passion when raised, and to prevent the hearers from attempting to suppress it. Even when he is enforcing their regard to the pathetic circumstances abovementioned, it is not so much his aim to show that these circumstances ought to augment the passion, as that these circumstances are in the object. Their effect upon their minds he commonly leaves to nature; and is not afraid of the conclusion, if he can make every aggravating circumstance be, as it were, both perceived and felt by them. In the enthymeme, (the syllogism of orators, as Quintilian * terms it) employed in such cases, the sentiment that such a quality or circumstance ought to rouse such a passion, though the foundation of all, is generally assumed without proof, or even without mention. This forms the major proposition, which is suppressed as obvious. His whole art is exerted in evincing the minor, which is the antecedent in his argument, and which maintains

*Instit. 1. 1. c. 9.

Sect. VII.

How an unfavourable passion must be calmed.

the reality of those attendant circumstances in the case in hand. A careful attention to the examples of vehemence in the First Chapter, and the quotation in the foregoing note, will sufficiently illustrate this remark.

SECT. VII.....How an unfavourable passion must be

calmed.

I COME now to the second question on the subject of passion. How is an unfavourable passion, or disposition, to be calmed? The answer is, either, first, by annihilating, or at least diminishing, the object which raised it; or, secondly, by exciting some other passion which may counterwork it.

By proving the falsity of the narration, or the utter incredibility of the future event, on the supposed truth of which the passion was founded, the object is annihilated. It is diminished by all such circumstances as are contrary to those by which it is increased. These are, improbability, implausibility, insignificance, distance of time, remoteness of place, the persons concerned such as we have no connexion with, the consequences such as we have no interest in. ́ The method recommended by Gorgias, and approved by Aristotle, though peculiar in its manner, is, in those cases wherein it may properly be attempted, coincident in effect with that now mentioned.

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Sect. VII.

How an unfavourable passion must be calmed.

was a just opinion of Gorgias, that the serious argu❝ment of an adversary, should be confounded by ridicule, and his ridicule by serious argument *." For this is only endeavouring, by the aid of laughter and contempt, to diminish, or even quite undo, the unfriendly emotions that have been raised in the minds of the hearers; or, on the contrary, by satisfying them of the seriousness of the subject, and of the importance of its consequences, to extinguish the contempt, and make the laughter which the antagonist wanted to excite, appear, when examined, no better than madness.

THE Second way of silencing an unfavourable passion or disposition, is, by conjuring up some other passion or disposition which may overcome it. With regard to conduct, whenever the mind deliberates, it is conscious of contrary motives impelling it in opposite directions; in other words, it finds that acting thus would gratify one passion; not acting, or acting otherwise, would gratify another. To take such a step, I perceive, would promote my interest, but derogate from my honour. Such another will gratify my resentment, but hurt my interest. When this is the case, as the speaker can be at no loss to discover the conflicting passions, he must be sensible, that whatever force he adds to the disposition that favours

* Δειν εφη Γοργίας την μεν σπεδην διαφθείρειν των εναντίων γελείς ὃς γέλωτα οπωδής ορθώς λέγων. Rhet. 1. 3. c. 18.

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