Of wit.

founding artfully the proper and the metaphorical sense of an expression. In this way one will assign as a motive, what is discovered to be perfectly absurd, when but ever so little attended to, and yet, from the ordinary meaning of the words, hath a specious appearance on a single glance. Of this kind you have an instance in the subsequent lines,

While thus the lady talk'd, the knight
Turn'd th' outside of his eyes to white,
As men of inward light are wont

To turn their optics in upon't †.

For whither can they turn their eyes more properly than to the light?

A FOURTH variety, much resembling the former, is when the argument or comparison (for all argument is a kind of comparison) is founded on the supposal of corporeal or personal attributes in what is strictly not susceptible of them, as in this,

But Hudibras gave him

a twitch

As quick as lightning in the breech,

Just in the place where honour 's lodg'd,

As wise philosophers have judg'd;

Because a kick in that place, more

Hurts honour than deep wounds before t.

Is demonstration itself more satisfactory? Can any thing be hurt but where it is? However, the mention of this as the sage deduction of philosophers, is no in

+ Hudibras, Part III. Canto I.
Ibid. Part II. Canto 3.

considerable addition to the wit. Indeed, this particular circumstance belongs properly to the first species mentioned, in which, high and low, great and little, are coupled. Another example, not unlike the preceding, you have in these words,

What makes morality a crime,

The most notorious of the time ;
Morality, which both the saints
And wicked too cry out against?

'Cause grace

and virtue are within

Prohibited degrees of kin

And therefore no true saint allows
They shall be suffer'd to espouse

When the two foregoing instances are compared together, we should say of the first, that it has more of simplicity and nature, and is therefore more pleasing; of the second, that it has more of ingenuity and con. ceit, and is consequently more surprising.

THE fifth and only other variety I shall observe, is that which ariseth from a relation not in the things signified, but in the signs, of all relations, no doubt, the slightest. Identity here gives rise to puns and clinches. Resemblance to quibbles, cranks, and rhimes Of these, I imagine, it is quite unnecessary to exhibit specimens. The wit here is so dependent on the sound, that it is commonly incapable of being transfused into another language, and as, among persons of taste and discernment, it is in less request than

VOL. I.

* Hudibras, Part III. Canto I.

D

I

the other sorts above enumerated, those who abound in this, and never rise to any thing superior, are distinguished by the diminutive appellation of witlings.

LET it be remarked, in general, that from one or more of the three last mentioned varieties, those plebeian tribes of witticism, the conundrums, the rebuses, the riddles, and some others, are lineally, though perhaps not all legitimately, descended. I shall only add, that I have not produced the forenamed varieties as an exact enumeration of all the subdivisions, of which the third species of wit is susceptible. It is capable, I acknowledge, of being almost infinitely diversified ; and it is principally to its various exhibitions that we apply the epithets sportive, spritely, ingenious, according as they recede more or less from those of the declaimer.

SECT. II..... Of humour.

As wit is the painting, humour is the pathetic, in this inferior sphere of eloquence. The nature and efficacy of humour may be thus unravelled. A just exhibition of any ardent or durable passion, excited by some adequate cause, instantly attacheth sympathy, the common tie of human souls, and thereby communicates the passion to the breast of the hearer. But when the emotion is either not violent or not durable, and the motive not any thing real, but imaginary, or at least quite disproportionate to the effect; or when the passion displays itself preposterously, so as rather

to obstruct than to promote its aim; in these cases a natural representation, instead of fellow-feeling, creates amusement, and universally awakens contempt. The portrait in the former case we call the pathetic, in the latter humorous*. It was said, that the emotion must be either not violent or not durable. This limitation is necessary, because a passion, extreme in its degree,

* It ought to be observed, that this term is also used to express any lively strictures of such specialities in temper and conduct, as have neither moment enough to interest sympathy, nor incongruity enough to excite contempt. In this case, humour not being addressed to passion, but to fancy, must be considered as a kind of moral painting, and differs from wit only in these two things: first, in that character alone is the subject of the former, whereas all things whatever fall within the province of the latter; secondly, humour paints more simply by direct imitation, wit more variously by illustration and imagery. Of this kind of humour merely graphical, Addison hath given us numberless examples in many of the characters he hath so finely drawn, and little incidents he hath so pleasantly related in his Tatlers and Spectators. I might remark of the word humour, as I did of the term wit, that we scarcely find in other languages a word exactly corresponding. The Latin facetiæ seems to come the nearest. Thus Cicero," Huic generi o"rationis aspergentur etiam sales, qui in dicendo mirum quantum "valent: quorum duo.genera sunt, unum facetiarum, alterum di"cacitatis: utetur utroque, sed altero in narrando aliquid venusté, "altero in jaciendo mittendoque ridiculo; cujus genera plura sunt." Qrator, 48. Here one would think, that the philosopher must have had in his eye the different provinces of wit and humour, calling the former dicacitas, the latter facetiæ. It is plain, however, that, both by him and other Latin authors, these two words are often confounded. There appears, indeed, to be more uniformity in the use that is made of the second term, than in the application of the first.

as well as lasting, cannot yield diversion to a well-disposed mind, but generally affects it with pity, not seldom with a mixture of horror and indignation. The sense of the ridiculous, though invariably the same, is in this case totally surmounted by a principle of our nature, much more powerful.

THE passion which humour addresseth as its object, is, as hath been signified above, contempt. But it ought carefully to be noted, that every address, even every pertinent address to contempt, is not humorous. This passion is not less capable of being excited by the severe and tragic, than by the merry and comic manner. The subject of humour is always character, but not every thing in character; its foibles generally, such as caprices, little extravagancies, weak anxieties, jealousies, childish fondness, pertness, vanity, and self-conceit. One finds the greatest scope for exercising this talent in telling familiar stories, or in acting any whimsical part in an assumed character. Such an one, we say, has the talent of humouring a tale, or any queer manner which he chooseth to exhibit. Thus we speak of the passions in tragedy, but of the humours in comedy; and even to express passion as appearing in the more trivial occurrences of life, we commonly use this term, as when we talk of good humour, ill humour, peevish or pleasant humour; hence it is that a capricious temper we call humoursome, the person possessed of it, a humourist, and such facts or events as afford subject for the humorous, we denomi nate comical.