should accordingly be made. They requested General Washington to write to Dr. Franklin, and the Marquis de Lafayette, who was then at Boston, ready to depart for Europe, and state to them such details as might be laid before the French court, in order that eventual measures might be taken for coöperation in case an armament should be sent to Quebec from France. The plan in this shape, however, was not more satisfactory to him, than in its original form. He saw no reason for supposing the British would evacuate the States, and he believed a system of operations built upon that basis would fail. At any rate he was not prepared to hazard the responsibility of drawing the French government into a measure so full of uncertainty, and depending on so many contingencies.

The army being now in winter-quarters, and his presence with it not being essential, he suggested the expediency of a personal interview with the members of Congress, in which his sentiments could be more fully explained than by writing. This proposition was approved. He arrived in Philadelphia on the 24th of December, and, after several discussions between him and a committee of Congress, the Canada scheme was wholly laid aside.

It is a remarkable fact, as connected with the above suspicions on political grounds, that the French government was decidedly opposed to an expedition against Canada. The French minister in the United States was instructed, before he left France, not to favor any projects of conquest; and it was the policy of the court of Versailles, that Canada and Nova Scotia should remain in the power of Great Britain. The reasons for this policy may not be obvious; but the fact is unquestionable. It is to be considered, however, that France had by treaty pledged herself to carry on

the war, till the independence of the United States should be secured; but she had not engaged to fight for conquests, nor for the extension of the territories of the United States beyond their original limits. Such an engagement would have bound her to continue the war indefinitely, with no other object than to gratify the ambition or enmity of her ally, while every motive of interest and of national honor might prompt her to seek for peace. It was evident, too, that the pride of England, humbled by conceding the independence of her revolted colonies, would never brook the severance of her other provinces by the direct agency of France. All conquests thus made, therefore, would perplex the negotiations for peace, and might involve France in a protracted war, without the least prospect of advantage to herself. Hence she resolved to adhere strictly to her pledge in the treaty of alliance. But, although the French minister in America was instructed not to hold out encouragement of coöperation in plans of conquest, yet he was at the same time directed not to throw any obstacles in the way; thus leaving the United States to decide and act for themselves. Should they gain conquests by their own strength, these might reasonably be claimed by them in a treaty of peace, without embarrassing the relations between France and England.

CHAPTER XII.

Conferences with a Committee of Congress, and Plans for the next Campaign. Sullivan's Expedition against the Indians. - The Enemy commence a predatory Warfare. - The Burning of New Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk.-Stony Point stormed and taken.-Successful Enterprise against Paulus Hook.-Washington's Interviews with the French Minister. Plans proposed for coöperating with Count d'Estaing. — The Army goes into Winter-quarters.- Depreciation of the Currency, and its Effects. - Arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette, with the Intelligence that a French Armament was on its Way to the United States. -The Army takes a Position near Hudson's River. - The French Squadron arrives at Newport. —Count de Rochambeau's Instructions. - French Fleet blockaded. Interview between General Washington and the French Commander at Hartford.-The Treason of Arnold. -Plans for attacking New York.

GENERAL Washington remained in Philadelphia about five weeks, holding conferences with a committee of Congress, and making arrangements for the campaign of 1779. He suggested three plans, with remarks on the mode of executing them, and the probable result of each. The first plan had in view an attempt to drive the enemy from their posts on the seacoast; the second, an attack on Niagara, and an offensive position in that quarter; and, by the third, it was proposed to hold the army entirely on the defensive, except such operations as would be necessary to chastise the Indians, who had committed depredations on the frontiers during the past year, and who, emboldened by success, might be expected to repeat their ravages.

After mature deliberation, and taking into the account the exhausted state of the country in regard both to pecuniary resources and supplies for an army, it was decided to adopt the third plan as the best suited to circumstances, the least expensive, and perhaps the

most beneficial in its ultimate effects. It would afford an opportunity to retrench the heavy charges of the war, and to pursue a system of economy imperiously demanded by the financial embarrassments in which Congress had become involved, and thus enable them. to do something for the relief of public credit, and for restoring the value of the currency, which was fast sinking into disrepute, unsettling prices, and threatening ruin to almost every branch of industry. It would also give repose to the country, and, by leaving a larger number of laborers to cultivate the soil, contribute to increase the supplies so much wanted for the comfort of the people, as well as for the subsistence of the army.

This plan had its disadvantages. The inactivity in military operations might be thought to imply weakness, and thus injure the credit of the nation with foreign powers, dispirit the people at home, give confidence to the disaffected, and afford leisure for the factious and discontented to foment divisions. These inconveniences were, nevertheless, in the opinion of General Washington, more than balanced by other considerations; and he recommended the defensive system, preferring what he deemed the greatest public good to the glory that might be acquired by large military enterprises, even with a fair prospect of success. After the alliance with France, and especially after the indications given by Spain of an approaching war between that power and England, he had no doubt that the independence of the United States would be secured at the peace, whenever it should happen. It was evident, moreover, that England, being thus employed by her European foes, could not enlarge her army to a formidable extent in America. In his view, therefore, it was not expedient to exhaust the country and multiply the

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calamities of war by extraordinary exactions for military undertakings, which, although they might annoy the enemy and perhaps drive them from one post to another, could not hasten the desired end, depending as it now did mainly on events beyond the control of the United States. By an ambitious chieftain, aiming only to aggrandize himself and establish his power, the subject might have been regarded in a different light; but the designs and actions of Washington centred in nobler objects, the freedom, tranquillity, and happiness of his country, in which he was to participate equally with every other citizen, neither seeking nor expecting any other preeminence than that of having been an instrument in the hand of Providence for effecting so great a good in so just a cause, nor any other reward than the consciousness of having done his duty, and the enjoyment in common with his countrymen of the benefits flowing from his services.

Having completed all the necessary arrangements with Congress, he returned to head-quarters at Middlebrook. The infantry of the Continental army was organized for the campaign in eighty-eight battalions, apportioned to the several States according to the ratio hitherto assumed. There were four regiments of cavalry and forty-nine companies of artillery.

As the term of service, for which a large number of the troops had been engaged, would expire in a few weeks, the business of recruiting was begun without delay. The irregular, and in some cases enormous, bounties given by the States had operated in such a manner, as almost to defeat any attempt to enlist soldiers in camp. Even those, who intended to reënlist, were lured away by the prospect of State bounties, and were thus absent from the army till they could go home and come back with the new recruits. This evil was