existence, the atoms or elements supposed to produce the phenomena of thought and volition, but from the repugnance of the scheme of materialism to our natural apprehensions: and from a secret anxiety to guard against a l'oral interprctation of our metaphorical phraseology? nor has this dis position been contined to the vulgar. Pailosophical materialists themselves have only refined farther on the popular conceptions, by entrenching themselves against the objections of their adversaries, in the modern discoveries concerning light and electricity, and other inscrutable causes, manifested by their effects alone. In some instances, they have .had recourse to the suppositson of the possible existence of matter, under forms incomparably more subtile than what it probably assumes in these or in any other class of physical phenomena; a hypothesis which it is impossible to describe better than in the words of La Fontaine:

"Quintessence d'atôme, extrait de la lumière!"

It is evident that, in using this language, they have only attempted to elude the objections of their adversaries, by keeping the obscurity of their theory a little more out of the view of superficial inquirers; divesting matter completely of all those properties by which it is known to our senses; and substituting, instead of what is commonly meant by that word, infinitesimal or evanescent entities, in the pursuit of which, imagination herself is quickly lost'.- pp. 171-2.

Mr. Stewart admits that the philological speculations upon which he animadverts, have been prosecuted by many writers, who have not ventured, and who have not perhaps meant to draw from them any inferences in favour of materialism. Such writers will here learn that they have been pursuing very fallacious lights, if their object was to make discoveries in philosophy. In their proper province the researches of the philologer may be highly useful; but the philosophy of the human mind does not fall within that province, and must be built upon other and better data than can be derived from grammars and lexicons. Mr. Stewart frequently bestows merited and liberal praises upon the learning and genius of Mr. Tooke, and observes that,

as long as the philologer confines himself to the discussion of Grammar and of Etymology, his labours, while they are peculiarly calculated to gratify the natural and liberal curiosity of men of erudition, may often furnish important data for illustrating the progress of laws, of arts, and of manners; for clearing up obscure passages in ancient writers; or for tracing the migrations of mankind, in ages of which we have no historical records.' But, he indignantly adds, when the speculations of the mere scholar or glossarist presume to usurp, as they have too often done of late, the honours of philosophy, and that for the express purpose of lowering its lofty pursuits to a level with their own, their partisans stand in need of the admonition which Seneca addressed to his friend Lucilius, when he cautioned him against those grammatical sophists, who, by the frivolous details of their verbal controversies, had brought discredit upon the splendid disputations of the stoical school: Relinque istum

ludum

hudum literarium philosophorum, qui rem magnificentissimam ad syllabas vocant, qui animum minuta docendo dimittunt et conterunt, et id agunt ut philosophia potius difficilis quam magna videatur.'-p. 188.

The following passage is so characteristic of Mr. Stewart's truly philosophic mind, and of that animated and impressive eloquence which never forsakes him when dangerous scepticism is to be rebuked, or the dignity of human nature vindicated, that we cannot refuse our readers the gratification of perusing it.

When I study the intellectual powers of man, in the writings of Hartley, of Priestley, of Darwin, or of Tooke, I feel as if I were examining the sorry mechanism that gives motion to a puppet. If, for a moment, I am carried along by their theories, of human knowledge, and of human life, I seem to myself to be admitted behind the curtain of what I had once conceived to be a magnificent theatre; and while I survey the tinsel frippery of the wardrobe, and the paltry decorations of the scenery, am mortified to discover the trick which had cheated my eye at a distance. This surely is not the characteristic of truth or of nature; the beauties of which invite our closest inspection; deriving new lustre from those microscopical researches which deform the most finished productions of art. If, in our physical enquiries concerning the material world, every step that has been hitherto gained, has at once exalted our conceptions of its immensity, and of its order, can we reasonably suppose, that the genuine philosophy of the mind is to disclose to us a spectacle less pleasing, or less elevating, than fancy or vanity had disposed us to anticipate?'-p. 187.

Mr. Stewart has, greatly to the advantage of his reader, taken a wider range than the immediate subject of his essay required, and shows with equal elegance and acuteness, that Mr. Tooke's incul'cation of the necessity of etymological research, in order to discover the import of words in common use, is as productive of errors in criticism as in philosophy.

It is implied as an axiom,' he observes, in almost every page of Mr. Tooke's work, that in order to understand with precision, the import of any English word, it is necessary to trace its progress historically through all the successive meanings which it has been employed to convey, from the moment it was introduced into our language; or if the word be of foreign growth, and transmitted to us from some dialect of our continental ancestors; that we should prosecute the etymological research, till we ascertain the literal and primitive sense of the root from whence it sprung.'-p. 191. The necessary consequence of this preposterous doctrine is, that usage has nothing to do in adjusting the meaning of words, and that in matters of style, we must appeal from the authority of our standard writers, to the woods of Germany. We must take counsel as to our forms of speech, not from those who are universally allowed to have purified and adorned our language by their classical compositions, but from the dubious researches of glossarists and antiqua

ries. Mr. Stewart justly holds up to ridicule, the idea of opposing established practice by the arcana brought to light by a few curious etymologists. He thinks that there are few, if any, instances, in which etymology furnishes effectual aids to guide us, either in writing with propriety the dialect of our own times,-or in fixing the signification of ambiguous words, or in drawing the line between expressions which seem to be nearly equivalent. Nothing he adds can in such cases be trusted to, but that habit of accurate and vigilant induction, which, by the study of the most approved models of writing and of thinking, elicits gradually and insensibly the precise notions which our best writers have annexed to their phraseology.'

Upon this subject of the critical inutility of etymological research, we cannot make room for any more of Mr. Stewart's numerous remarks, than are contained in the following pointed and we think decisive extract.

'How very little advantage is to be gained from etymology, in compositions where taste is concerned, may be inferred from this obvious consideration, That among words deriving their origin from the same source, we find some ennobled by the usage of one country; while others very nearly allied to them, nay, perhaps identical in sound and in orthography, are debased by the practice of another. It is owing to this circumstance, that Englishmen, and still more Scotchmen, when they begin the study of German, are so apt to complain of the deep rooted associations which must be conquered, before they are able to relish the more refined beauties of style in that parent language on which their own has been grafted.

'On the other hand, when a word originally low or ludicrous, has, in consequence of long use, been once ennobled or consecrated, I do not well see what advantage, in point of taste, is to be expected from a scrupulous examination of its genealogy or of its kindred connexions. Mr. Tooke has shewn, in a very satisfactory manner, that some English words which are now banished, not only from solemn discourse, but from decent conversation, are very nearly allied, in their origin, to others which rank with the most unexceptionable in our language; and he seems disposed to ascribe our prejudice against the former to a false delicacy. I should be glad to know what practical inference Mr. Tooke would wish us to draw from these discoveries. Is it that the latter should be degraded, on account of the infamy of their connexions; or that every word which can claim a common descent with them from a respectable stem is entitled to admission into the same society?'—p. 192.

Besides the important discussions already noticed, this excellent essay contains a variety of original and profound remarks upon the great imperfection of language, considered as an organ of mental intercourse. Instead of conveying knowledge as is commonly said, the most perfect language can only enable us, in many cases,

to

to suggest hints, or to excite a similar train of thinking, in the minds of others.

'The truth is,' says Mr. Stewart, that even in conversing on the plainest and most familiar subjects, however full and circumstantial our statements may be, the words which we employ, if examined with accuracy, will be found to do nothing more, than to suggest hints to our hearers, leaving by far the principal part of the process of interpretation, to be performed by the mind itself. In this respect, the effect of words bears some resemblance to the stimulus given to the memory and imagination, by an outline or a shadow, exhibiting the profile of a countenance familiar to the senses.'-p. 154.

Yet strikingly just as this observation undoubtedly is, nothing is more common than to find language unqualifiedly designated as the express image of thought; and some even of our most cautious philosophers have repeatedly appealed to this maxim in their discussions, without appearing to have made any distinction between its letter and spirit. Mr. Stewart seems, indeed, to have been almost the first to make the profound remark, that the mechanism of speech is not so wonderful by far, as the mechanism which it puts into motion behind the scene. The reader will be in some measure enabled to enter into his views upon this interesting subject, by means of the following observations.

In reading, for example, the enunciation of a proposition, we are apt to fancy, that for every word contained in it, there is an idea presented to the understanding; from the combination and comparison of which ideas, results that act of the mind called judgment. So different is all this from the fact, that our words, when examined separately, are often as completely insignificant as the letters of which they are composed; deriving their meaning solely from the connection, or relation, in which they stand to others. Of this a very obvious example occurs, in the case of terms which have a variety of acceptations, and of which the import, in every particular application, must be collected from the whole sentence of which they form a part. When a word of this kind occurs to me in a book, or even when I hear it pronounced in the rapidity of viva voce discourse, I at once select, without the slightest effort of conscious thought, the precise meaning which it was intended to convey. How is this to be explained but by the light thrown upon the problematical term by the general import of the sentence?-a species of interpretation easily conceivable, when I have leisure to study the context deliberately; but which, in the circumstances I have now supposed, implies a quickness in the exercise of the intellectual powers, which, the more it is examined, will appear the more astonishing. It is constant habit alone, that keeps these intellectual processes out of view;-giving to the mind such a celerity in its operations, as eludes the utmost vigilance of our attention; and exhibiting, to the eyes of common observers, the use of speech, as a much simpler, and less curious phenomenon, than it is in reality.'-pp. 155-6.

From

From this truly admirable essay, (to which all that we have to object is, that it is a little indefinite in some of its allusions, and somewhat desultory in its arrangement,) we now proceed to the second part of the work, which contains five essays; of which, the two first are dedicated to some inquiries regarding the origin and successive generalizations of our ideas of beauty and sublimity. D.d our limits permit us to enter fully into all the interesting speculations which this volume contains, these essays would call for an ample analysis. But as we have not room for any thing like a complete abstract of their contents, we shall content ourselves with briefly observing, that they afford a decisive refutation of the old and mysterious notion, That all the things to which we apply the terms beautiful and sublime, have some common quality; and that it is this common quality which procures the application of these terms to so great a variety of objects. They also contain some excellent and original remarks upon Mr. Price's new system of the picturesque, in which Mr. Stewart very clearly and satisfactorily shows, that it is a radical error, to make the picturesque a distinct genus from the beautiful. We must, however, add, that there appears to us to be a good deal which requires farther explanation, and not a little that is strained and fauciful, in Mr. Stewart's speculations upon the origin and progress of our conceptions of beauty and sublimity: but, upon the whole, we can safely say, that these two essays display a rare union of philosophy, sensibility, and taste; and may be read with equal advantage by the artist, the critic, and the philosopher.

The next essay is on taste, and is extremely valuable for the masterly account which it contains of the nature and formation of that important faculty. Taste has been often represented as an original faculty of the mind-as a gift of nature, conferring upon those who possess it the exclusive right of pronouncing judg ment both as to the beauties of her own productions and those of the fine arts. Mr. Stewart shows very clearly that it is not an original faculty of the mind, but a power of rapid judgment, gradually acquired by habitual attention to the particulars which produce or obstruct the emotions of beauty and sublimity. Taste has been sometimes confounded with mere sensibility, and it indeed supposes some degree of natural relish for the pleasures of beauty; but it is in the power of promptly distinguishing the particular qualities or circumstances, by which these pleasures are occasioned, that this faculty essentially consists.

، The fact, says Mr. Stewart, ، is perfectly analagous in that bodily sense from which this mental power derives its name. A dealer in wines is able, in any of the common articles of his trade, to detect the least ingredient which does not properly enter into the composition;

and,