lefs abfurd than that the most decifive and rapid commander ever known, fhould, by the tardinefs of his movements, have fuffered an event to take place wholly beneficial to his enemies, and alto-, gether hurtful to himself. Let us confider, then, continues our author, whether there is nothing in this event which favours the views of France. Had the court remained at Lifbon, fome impediment to Buonaparte's plans of fubjugating and dividing Portugal would unquestionably have been raised up. But, what is of far greater moment, England would have feized on the colonies of her ally, and held them in full undivided fovereignty until she chofe, by reftoring them, to obtain fome ample equivalent, or emancipated them, and established a new government there under her unmingled influence, deftroying all poffibility of reuniting them with the mother country. The retreat of the Prince to Brazil, was the only event which could at once keep England out of that country, and give France the option of restoring it, at some future period, to its former dependent state. She now, Mr Rylance contends, by occupying his European poffeffions, keeps a faft hold over the Prince Regent, favours her plan of excluding us from the Continent,-affifts her projects of aggrandizement in Spain, and retains the power of tempting the Prince Regent back again with a fhare of his former territory, after profiting by his fubmiffion to her views during all the period of his refidence in America. By these views, Mr Rylance concludes Buonaparte was influenced in permitting the emigra tion, and regarding it upon the whole as the moft fortunate event for the fuccefs of his own projects. If he also allowed the Portuguese fleet and part of the treasure to be removed, it was part of the fame plan; for, had the Prince Regent gone over deftitute of all resources, he must have been fettled in his colony by an English force, and been reduced to a mere tool in their hands.

Mr Lingham takes a very different view of this part of the queftion; and his opinions are founded in a great measure upon what he afferts to be the character and difpofition of the court of Lisbon. In explaining this, it is difficult to imagine any thing more abufive, than the language he employs towards his antagonift. Some paffages, we are pretty fure, would fubject him to punishment in a court of juftice. In the courfe of a single page, we find him launching against poor Mr Rylance, the epithets of obfcure pamphleteer,' (as if this polite gentleman were himfelf any thing elfe), and auretched libeller,' and describing his tract as full of falsehoods- malevolent infinuations' wanton and bafe infults' corvardly attacks,' and many other things, which we cannot stop to quote. Almoft in the next page, he proceeds to call

Mr

251

un

Mr Rylance one of the most despicable of mankind,' and the authorized tool of a party; and to exclaim, good heavens! what a fhocking profeffion is that of a libeller!' (p. 17.) And, in p. 19, he calls Mr Rylance' a pamphleteer, who would, without fcruple, vilify and traduce the character of an individual, provided it anfwered the purpose of a moment.' In a note, he accufes him of

telling lies.

We have little doubt that the above paffages are themselves libellous; and, in truth, fo foul and fcurrilous an attack upon a private individual, we have feldom feen, as this invective against Mr Rylance, for fome fuppofed difrespect to a foreign court, very lately in avowed hoftility with his own country. Nor do we think Mr Lingham very happy in refcuing either the Prince Regent or his people from his adverfary's criticifms. It will mightily aftonish any one who knows the character of that unfortunate Prince, to be told that the most falfe thing which can be faid of it, is to impute to him want of refolution and inferior talents, (p. 21.); and that the moft remarkable trait in his character, is a decided diflike and dread of favouritfm. (p. 23.) We fufpect Mr Lingham has overlooked the jet of his adverfary's remark on this fubject. Mr Rylance does by no means affert, that the Prince's minifters or grandees were his favourites ;-he plainly points at a very inferior description of perfons, as having enjoyed the greatest influence over him; and we believe, in spite of our author's indignation, the fact to be, that the Prince was jealous of the influence of the only men who deferved to rule him, and, as always happens in fuch cafes, gave the preference to a fecret cabinet (as we call it in England), compofed of the most unworthy councillors. We hope Mr Lingham will not break out into one of his fits of paffion at this affertion. We trust he will permit us to make, with refpect to a friendly people,' a remark, which we are perfectly difpofed to repeat with refpect to our own country. His veneration for the Portugueze nation, is, indeed, a little ridiculous. We care not if he calls them refpectable, and full of energy and forefight,' (p. 12. & 13.); but, when he tells us of their realizing fome of the happiest fictions of Epic poetry, and astonishing the world by exhibiting the magnificent fpectacle of a people, quitting, by common confent, the land which gave them birth, and the tombs of their forefathers, to feek for independence in another hemifphere,' one is really difpofed to afk, if the author be awake, or in a dream. Then comes a hobbling excufe for all this fine flight, viz. that though all the people did not go, all expressed a wish to go,-only that there was no room for them in the cabin! There is a vaft deal more ranting to the fame purpose, and much strong denunciation against thofe who prefume to fufpect the Portugueze people of apathy with respect

1

refpect to their government and country. We fhould think fuch nonsense must be eminently disgufting to every rational native of Portugal.

Pursuing thefe views of the Portugueze character, Mr Lingham views the late emigration as wholly effected by the wife and refolute conduct of the Prince, and the fupport of his generous and magnanimous' people, which has revived, in our unfortunate times, the recollection of one of the most brilliant epochs in the history of Greece. By the moft skilful policy, the court of Lisbon overreached Buonaparte; and prepared measures, with fuch admirable promptitude and addrefs, that the utmost exertions of the French army could not bring it to the Tagus in fufficient time to prevent the great ftep from being effected. He is peculiarly indignant at Mr Rylance's fuppofition, that England would have feized the Brazils, had the Prince remained in Portugal, and been dethroned by France; and affirms, that this can only proceed from the greateft ignorance of the military refources of that extenfive colony. It is extremely remarkable, however, and quite decifive of this material point, that when our author comes to argue his cafe, he can only make out the poffibility of defending the Brazils against England, by supposing that every precaution had previously been taken for its defence, with the aid of England. For he says, that if the Prince had intended to throw himself into the arms of France, he must have begun by deceiving England, and making her believe that it was necessary for him to secure his retreat from Europe. We should then have helped him to transport armies and stores for the protection of his colony; and when this game of deep perfidy and profound dissimulation was played,' (we think it could not have deceived any minister, even of this country,) we should have suddenly found ourselves shut out of the Brazils. (p. 45.) How then could the unaided resources of this colony have protected it against England, when Buonaparte suddenly made known his intention to dethrone the House of Braganza? If no steps had been taken to defend that settlement, how could England fail to succeed in seizing it when the conquest of Portugal gave her a full right to occupy it? We do not, nor does Mr Rylance, contend, that the Prince Regent wished to sign his own destruction by siding with France, rather than to escape to America; but we maintain, that because he was faithful to England, and because he had taken no measures to keep an English force out of his colony, it became Buonaparte's interest to send him over, as the only means of preventing the Mistress of the East from adding the West to her Empire. We by no means wish to assert, as some for party purposes have done, that England will not be benefited by the migration of the Portu

gueze

gueze court; but we must contend, that she would have benefited much more certainly and more speedily by a total emancipation of the Brazils, or some arrangement, not of conquest, but for securing an undivided and permanent iufluence to her in that quarter. It was for Buonaparte's interest, perhaps, that she should benefit to this limited extent, rather than that his plans should be obstructed in Europe. It was not for his interest that she should obtain the much greater advantages of the other plan, merely that he might add one to the list of the Princes whom he has sent a-wandering over the face of the earth, and seize a few ships, as useless as the famous Copenhagen Navy, for which he has rejoiced to see his once proud and virtuous rival sacrifice her honour and her influence. He knows better the value of ships, colonies and commerce.'

Before leaving this branch of the subject, we must be permitted to notice the great absurdity of the language which it has been so fashionable to hold respecting the grandeur and magnificence' of the spectacle exhibited by the emigration. This vain talk, for it is really nothing else, is in no-small degree hurtful in its consequences. It leads the country to believe, that the tide has at length been turned against France, and that glorious deeds may yet be performed by those who have no power to resist her aggressions. Men, prone to admire and to fancy things, discover somewhat wonderful in the emigration of a whole people; and thoughtlessly compare it to the resolution of the Athenians or the Dutch, to prefer liberty with exile, to slavery at home. It is an ungrateful task to dispel such pleasing illusions; but we must really suggest, that there was in the present case no emigration of the Portugucze people. They stood quietly by, and saw themselves handed over from the Braganzas to the Buonapartes, without any other solicitude than their regular and very natural anxiety about the price of bread. They saw their sovereign and his court sail down the Tagus, and crowded to the banks to see the sight, just as they would have crowded to see a great whale speared, and as they will assuredly flock to witness the triumphal entry of whoever is to be their new king. What then are the 'magnanimous' persons whose heroic self-devotion every throat in this country has been roaring so loudly about? Why, the plain fact reduces itself to this-Buonaparte sends an army to dethrone, probably to imprison or kill, the Prince; and, he having tried his utmost endeavours to make his peace, finds the army still advancing. He therefore, as all Princes do in such situations, when they have not the rare disposition to die in the last ditch, packs up his awls over night, and, with his courtiers and favourites, and a proper assortment of monks and nuns, runs

away

away to a place of safety, there to wait until the storm should blow over. We are far from blaming him. He could have done no real good by remaining to be swallowed up :-but, let us not be compelled to venerate such heroism as this. To have remained with his subjects ;-to have prepared, not perhaps when the danger was just going to crush him, but beforehand, for his defence; -to have roused his people, planted himself at their head, fought with them until he could no longer grasp a sword, and then fallen covered with wounds, but unwilling to outlive, not his own greatness, but the liberties of his country:-this would have entitled him to the praises which have preposterously been lavished on his prudent retreat; and would have justified us in bestowing on him some of the epithets which we have idly been giving to one who preferred safely ruling over a few subjects in a distant settlement, to sharing the fortunes of the mass of his people, left a prey to successful invasion. The best of it, however, is, that all this t nonsense has been talked by the very men whose admiration of the King of Sweden's hopeless but gallant resistance knows no bounds; who used to sneer both at the emigration of the Bourbons, and the frequent Sicilian trips of the Neapolitan Court; and whose utmost abuse was ever ready to fall upon whatever unfortunate prince was compelled by repeated defeats to escape from destruction, by a tolerably fair treaty of peace with France. Surely, if there be any thing more disgusting than the folly of our public measures, it is the childishness of our common talk; and, if signs of evil times were not to be found in great plenty among our actions, we might well be frightened at the ominous appearance of that effeminate license of tongue, now become so habitual to the natives of this country.

Instead of gazing with a stupid wonder and delight at the flight of a feeble court and its selfish attendants, from the pressing danger of losing their places, let us rather follow the example of Mr Rylance, and endeavour to appreciate the probable consequences of a measure which, however common-place and far removed from the sublime or heroic in its motives, must certainly be attended with effects of no small moment. Mr Rylance appears to us to adopt the most temperate and judicious mode of viewing this subject; neither undervaluing the benefits likely to result to this country from the establishment of an independent government in the Brazils, as some distinguished persons have betrayed rather a factious disposition to do, nor foolishly exaggerating those advantages, as the multitude have done, who viewed Brazil as a compensation for the loss of the Continent. As for Mr Lingham, he says not one word upon this, the most important part of the question; and, professing to answer

Mr