which, the affairs of the Venetian government could not poffibly be properly conducted. But the Savi had ufurped an authori ty far beyond what belonged to them by the conftitution; and we fhall foon have occafion to fee, that their unfkilful exercise of this authority, was one chief cause of irremediable weakness and embarraffment which led to the fubverfion of the government. The Venetians at this time probably entertained little doubt of being able to maintain their neutrality: and indeed, until the French overran Piedmont in 1795, the theatre of war was at fuch a distance from their territories, that the experiment was perhaps perfe&ly jus ftifiable. Whether this was the cafe after the appointment of General Bonaparte to the chief command of the army of Italy, is quite a different queftion; the solution of which, in this part of the narration, we shall not attempt to anticipate. We fhall only observe, that, during the interval, the Venetians, in order more effectually to avoid the hazard of war, acknowledged the French republic, and its ambaffador, though the English minifter remonftrated, without effect, against the reception of the latter, As a further teftimony of their defire to maintain a good understanding with France, a Venetian ambaffador was directed to proceed to Paris. He was prefented to the Convention on the 30th of July, 1795, and was received with diftinction, and many affurances of friendship and attachment. In the mean time, however, a few circumstances had arisen which created some jealousy and dissatisfaction in France. The Venetians refused to acknowledge M. Noel, a very active and intriguing diplomatist, in the capacity of minister plenipotentiary; they had supplied the Austrians with an inconsiderable quantity of provisions; and they had permitted the Count de Provence (Louis XVIII.) to fix his residence in Verona. Besides, the Senate, upon the suggestion and persuasion of the procurator, Francis Pesaro, had decreed that the republic should arm, with a view more effectually to protect the state, and to cause their neutral system to be generally respected; but intrigue frustrated the execution of this salutary decree. France complained, of course, of all these acts of alleged partiality; and, in consequence of her repeated remonstrances, the Senate reluctantly determined to suggest to the Count de Provence the necessity of retiring from their territories. The intimation was made with the utmost delicacy; but it excited in the Count an undue degree of indignation. He withdrew from Verona in May 1796, the month. in which Bonaparte first entered the Venetian territories. Notwithstanding the Count's retirement, his former residence at Verona was afterwards regularly included in the charges against the Venetians. An An armistice having been concluded between France and Sardinia in April 1796, the success of the French armies, and the disasters of the Austrians, soon transferred the scene of hostilities to the neighbourhood of Venice. Conformably to an antient and existing treaty with Austria, the Venetians were obliged to grant them a passage for troops through that part of their territory which separates the dutchy of Mantua from the other possessions of the House of Austria. The misfortunes of the campaign had compelled the Austrians to occupy for a short time the Venetian fortress of Peschiera. It was thought expedient to explain this circumstance to General Bonaparte, and for this pur pose a deputy was sent to him at Vallegio. No explanation, however, would be received. There were two reasons, the Gene ral said, which justified France in her resolution to treat Venice as a hostile state:-they had granted an asylum to the Count de Provence, the implacable enemy of the French republic; and they had allowed the Austrians to occupy Peschiera: and, in re venge for these offences, he threatened, in revenge, to burn Verona and the capital. Foscarini, the Proveditor of Terra Firma, made a second attempt to mollify him; but the General repeated his former complaints, and charged the Venetian government with violating their neutrality, and favouring the enemies of the French republic. He had orders from the Directory, on this account, to burn Verona; and Massena, he said, was then on his march to execute these orders. In a few days, too, he expected to receivé from Paris instructions to declare war in form against Venice. All Foscarini's expostulations could only obtain from him an as surance that Verona should not be burnt, provided the French troops should be allowed to take possession of the town without meeting with the least resistance. On the 1st June, accord ingly, they entered Verona, and immediately adopted every mea sure for securing the permanent possession. The Senate, alarmed at the contents of Foscarini's despatch, ordered an immediaté equipment of their maritime forces, and an enrolment of troops. They also sent two deputies to Bonaparte on a conciliatory mission. The General now thought proper to change his tone. He hoped for a favourable change in their affairs; demanded supplies, and dismissed them courteously, with instructions to express to their government his desire to contribute his offices for the preservation of a good understanding between the two republics. The French having thus obtained possession of Verona, immedi atély proceeded to treat the greater part of Venetian Terra Firma as a conquered country. The most oppressive requisitions were levied on the inhabitants, and their vineyards and olive plantations wan tonly destroyed. The pusillanimity with which these provinces had been been abandoned produced very great discontent; but the people still continued steadily loyal and faithful to their government. The contiguity of Bergamo, however, to the Milanese, which had already been revolutionized, could scarcely fail of producing a change in the political sentiments of the inhabitants. The progress of disaffection, however, was for a long time extremely slow; and the proceedings of the French, being daily marked with the greatest violence and injustice, at last awakened the loyalty and patriotism of the Bergamascs, who, to the number of ten thousand, offered their services to the Senate, and required no reward but the gratification of seeing their offer accepted. It was, indeed, accepted by the Senate; but afterwards rendered unavailing by the intrigues of the Savi. The progress of the French armies at length excited so much alarm, that it was deemed expedient to take immediate measures for the defence of the capital. Great exertions were therefore made for the equipment of the navy, and the organization of the military force. To supply financial difficulties, a heavy tax was imposed; and extensive assistance. was received in the shape of spontaneous contributions. In money alone they considerably exceeded 1,000,000 ducats. Every thing, in fact, appeared to demonstrate a determination to defend the capital. But, notwithstanding these preparations, the government persisted in its fatal system of neutrality, or made war against France only by remonstrances and deputations. In the course of the year 1796, while the affairs of the repub lic were daily becoming more critical, several proposals of alliance were made to the government by the belligerents, and by a neutral power. With a view to increase the enemies of the House of Austria, Bonaparte projected an alliance with the Porte and Venice, and even promised the latter an augmentation of territory. In the month of December, the French being obliged to withdraw from Verona a part of their military force, in order to prevent the Austrians from attempting the relief of Mantua, General Alvinzi, with a view to open the road to this fortress, requested of the Venetian government permission to dislodge the French who had been left in Verona. This proposition, of course, amounted to an offer of alliance, since it would have identified the cause of Venice and Austria, and, if acceded to, must have united these powers in hostility against France. From a suspicion that Austria might, in the event of peace, be aggrandized by the territorial annexation of the Venetian States, Prussia, in December 1796, made overtures for an alliance with the Venetian republic. Surrounded by innumerable political dangers, and totally incapable of averting them by its own energies, this infa VOL. XII. No. 24. Bb tuated tuated government still obstinately persevered in its scheme of neutrality. All these overtures, therefore, were successively rejected; and the amicable professions of the French, though in every instance at variance with their proceedings, was still credited by the weak, and cherished by the insidious, members of the Venetian councils. In the very midst of these professions of amity, a detachment from the French army took possession of Legnago, and thence openly impeded the navigation of the Adige, detaining the vessels proceeding to Verona, and thus increasing the scarcity which prevailed not only in the Veronese, but in the provinces beyond the Mincio. The Senate remonstrated, as usual, in polished and dignified sentences; and were referred by the French resident to General Bonaparte, and by Bonaparte to the Directory, who referred them back to the ambassador. The raising of the siege of Mantua gave them a temporary hope of deliverance, and might have shown them the policy of siding with the Austians; but this triumph was, unfortunately, of short duration. Mantua fell in February 1797; and the French armies then found themselves at liberty to pursue the retreating Austrians, and finally to accomplish their design of taking entire possession of the Venetian territories. Previous to this important event, indeed, and under pretext of saving them from being occupied by the enemy, they had seized on the town and citadel of Bergamo, and proceeded shortly after to take possession by force of most of the towns of the Venetian Terra Firma ; while their leader still continued to hold the language of peace and amity, and, with many protestations, to assure the deluded Venetians, that, on the return of peace, their states should constitute a barrier against Austrian treachery; and that the towns in the hands of the French should be restored, and the expenses incurred gradually liquidated. Having got possession of most of the territory by these manoeuvres, the French next proceeded to stir up the inhabitants to declare against the old government, and to claim the protection of France in erecting themselves into independent municipalities. This happened at Bergamo, Bolsena, Cremo, and other places; and a club was openly formed for the purpose of revolutionizing the whole Venetian States. When the Senate remonstrated, Bonaparte told them that they might reclaim their revolted subjects in the best way they could; but that it was necessary that they should accommodate him with a monthly loan of one million of francs for six months; accompanying this intimation with such suitable menaces as might ensure compliance. It appeared, indeed, throughout the conferences, that Bonaparte considered the Venetian Venetian States as entirely at his disposal. The object of his government was evidently to procure an equivalent for the Low Countries; and, in fact, about this time a despatch was received from the Venetian minister in Paris, which stated, that the war in Italy was continued in order to provide indemnities for the Emperor of Germany, who would then be induced to cede Belgium to the French; and that, for the accomplishment of this purpose, the French pursued the twofold plan of revolutionizing and conquering the Venetian provinces. While their territories were thus mouldering away, the government was laudably occupied in providing a fund for the payment of one million of francs monthly; annexing to these enormous supplies the vain and hopeless condition, that requisitions. and revolutionary proceedings on the part of the French should be entirely suppressed. Something very different, however, was in the contemplation of their leader; and to give a colour to his outrageous proceedings, Bonaparte took advantage of a proclamation, falsely attributed to the Venetian government, which authorized the people to take up arms against the insurgents and the French. Upon this, he immediately demanded that the whole Venetian Terra Firma should be disarmed; and, from his headquarters at Judemberg, despatched to Venice his adjutant Junot, charged with letters to the Doge and the French minister. The menacing letter to the Doge, Junot delivered to him personally in council, and, consequently, under circumstances that added insult to an infraction of the laws of the republic. The letter to Lallemont, the French minister, contained a series of unfounded charges against the government, and a categorical demand of reparation. To these letters conciliatory answers were returned; the government justified their measures, but weakly engaged to comply with most of Bonaparte's demands. In April 1797, a part of the populace of Verona was stimulated to rise against the government; and, after a sanguinary contest of many days, were enabled to subvert its establishment, by the open cooperation of a considerable French force. At this very critical moment, when force and treachery were ready to seize their victim, a very important despatch was received by the Inquisitors of State from the Venetian ambassador at Vienna. It related to an overture for cooperation with Austria. By some unaccountable fatality, the Inquisitors neglected to communicate this despatch, either to the Savi, or the Senate. Whether or not the acceptance of this overture could have snatched the Venetians from destruction, is a problem of difficult solution; but certainly a happier result might reasonably have been expected from it, than from an overture of a very different description, Bb 2 which |