Page images
PDF
EPUB

The seventeenth chapter is chiefly extracted from the voyage of Sir Walter Raleigh, which may not be altogether useless to readers of ordinary perseverance; although the original account has lately been published entire, in the Appendix to Mr Arthur Cayley's unwieldy Life of that distinguished navigator.

The eighteenth chapter comprehends a summary of the leading ideas advanced in the book; and recommends a systematic attention to Guiana, as by far the most improveable province of the empire.

Notwithstanding its transcripts, its trifling, and its repetitions, this volume contains a respectable portion of new information, and much sound sense. The deputy vendue-master of Surinam has not made his voyages in vain. By the many, his account will be read with amusement; and by those who meditate to visit or to trade with these unexplored districts, with multifarious instruction. Among elerks of office, and managers of colonies, it has still more irresistible claims to attention. Hardly a chapter occurs, in which ministers are not invited to seize on some old office in favour of a British appointee; or to create some new piece of patronage for the advancement of a needy adherent. At p. 66. there ought to be more recorders; at p. 76. there ought to be more keizers in each college; at p. 78. the guardianship of orphans is indicated as a lucrative but neglected post; at p. 208. there ought to be more exploiteurs; at p. 387. the salaries of governors ought to be increased; and at p. 394, a batch of geometricians and zoologists ought to be sent out, to survey the whole province philosophically. And thus, under every possible pretext, the people are to be taxed, and the parasites of the State enriched. Colonists, no doubt, will easily be found, where residence is to be so profusely remunerated: and this China of the . West, as Mr Bolingbroke prophetically entitles it, may speedily be stocked with various colleges of mandarines, as idle, ignorant, and pretending, as their brethren in the East.

ART. X. A Memoir on the National Defence. By J. F. Birch, Captain of the Royal Engineers. 8vo. London.

On the Necessity of a more Effectual System of National Defence, and the Means of Establishing the Permanent Security of the Kingdom. By the Earl of Selkirk. 8vo. London.

WE have, on a former occasion, endeavoured to show, that a

well disciplined regular army is superior to every other species of force; and that, when irregular levies are exposed on

equal

equal terms to its attack, there is very little reason to think that they will be able to stand their ground-that the defence of a country, therefore, which has no regular army, can only be rendered practicable by a strong barrier of fortified towns, or by a difficult and mountainous frontier, which may stop the progress of an invader, and give time to the nation to array against him its physical strength. Even a regular army, however, is not a sure protection. It may be beaten by another regular army, more numerous and better disciplined: and therefore it deserves to be considered, what other resources a nation may provide for its defence; and in what manner its regular army can be aided by its effective population, and the natural and artificial strength of the country.

It is to the consideration of these important questions that the authors of the publications before us have principally directed their attention. They both admit the exclusive advantages of a regular army, and the necessity of its forming the basis of our force; but, in order to give complete security to the country, they both think that additional precautions are necessary. It seems to be their opinion, that we ought not to rest satisfied until our military preparations are such as to give us every possible chance of victory, and to provide at the same time against the consequences of defeat.

The work of Mr Birch is valuable both for its knowledge and its good sense. It is not perfectly well arranged; but the rea soning it contains is forcible and clear. He begins by endeavouring to show, that an invasion of Britain, though difficult, is not impracticable. He then examines the force which we would have to oppose to such an attack; and is decidedly of opinion, that neither our militia nor our volunteers would be at all able to cope with the veteran troops of France. In support of this opinion, he refers, not only to the common cases of the defeat of occasional forces by regular armies; but to the experience of the Americans and the French in the outset of their revolutions. He shows, from Washington's letters, that that general never had any confidence in the American militia; that they were dismayed and dispirited by the first checks which they received; that they deserted in whole companies at a time; that it was impossible to establish among them any thing like discipline or subordination; that their bad example spread disorder among the rest of the troops; and that, upon the whole, they did more harm than good. The final success of the Americans, our author ascribes to the extent, to the strength, and to the distance of the · country which was the scene of action; to the feeble efforts that were made during the three or four first years of the war; and ultimately to the French alliance, which gave them regular sol❤

Dd 2

diers,

diers, and, for a short time, the command of the sea.' The facts furnished by the late French war are still more decisive of this question. It appears that the French levies, when they were first brought within reach of the enemy, turned their backs in the most disgraceful manner and fled, leaving their equipage, cannon, and baggage; that they were constantly liable to panics; and that, on one occasion, 15,000 men actually fled before a squadron of Prussian hussars ;-that, before the battle of Neirwinden, Dumourier dismissed 10,000 of them, and that it was by the misbehaviour of those who remained that he lost the battle; -that it was only the regular forces who made any effectual resistance; and had it not been for their efforts, and the fortified frontier through which the allies had to penetrate, joined to their own inactivity and want of enterprize, the independence of France would have been in great danger. The French officers were at length so well convinced of the inefficiency of those kinds of troops, that when the volunteer battalions joined the army, they were entirely disorganized, their officers reduced to the ranks, and the privates incorporated into the mass of the regulars. The greatest attention was then paid to the reelection of new officers; and it was chiefly by their talents. and persevering efforts that the new levies were at last trained to steadiness and bravery in the field. The substance of our author's argument is contained in the following striking and pertinent observations.

I have thus noticed the principal military events which took place in France and part of the neighbouring territory, at the commencement of the revolutionary war, in order to show the influence which the different species of troops and the fortified positions had on them. Her militia and volunteers were always beaten, whilst the troops of the line and her fortified positions supported her. The situation and circumstances of France at that period, were perfectly distinguished from what ours would be in case of invasion. She was the most populous nation of Europe,-was as warlike as any other, was equally spirited, was more enthusiastic, and had the most convenient form and circumscription of limits for defence, with all her natural resources in the highest degree improved. She was the best fortified state, without any comparison, on the Continent, which is the grand and sure basis of either defensive or offensive operations. It is to this cause that the first successes of the French, in both those sorts of warfare, is in a great measure to be attributed, and not to their capacity of meeting the enemy in the field. They were fighting on the finest fortified frontier possible, with all the resources of France immediately behind them. The allies durst not penetrate beyond that frontier, for fear of being enveloped by it; and their at tacking it gave time to the French to recruit and discipline them

selves,

selves, and to profit of all their means, which were called out to the utmost under Robespierre, while the allies were wasting themselves, having inferior means to act with, and being obliged to bring them from a great distance, principally from Austria. The situations of the Americans and French are, I say, particularly distinguished from ours, in those circumstances, which were the very cause of their success; for our territory is of inconsiderable extent; it is of a very bad figure for defence, (the parts of it being exposed to be separated from each other, so as to afford no mutual cooperation and assistance, unless they be connected by a chain of fortified positions ;) nor have we any fortified frontier to arrest the first impulse of the enemy, who would endeavour to prosecute his measures of attack with such vigour and rapidity, as to give us no time to prepare ourselves, if we should not be already prepared, as we indisputably ought to be with a good regular army, and fortified positions to support it, which, as I have observed, are the true basis of all offensive as well as defensive war. '

As a further proof of the inefficiency of irregular troops, Mr Birch refers to the conduct of the Swifs militia, and to that of the Irish militia, when they fled from the French at Castlebar; and, from all these facts, he concludes that it would be unsafe to truft the fafety of the country to forces of fuch a defcription. He proposes that the militia fhould be either incorporated with the regujar army, or that experienced officers should be appointed to command them. They are already, he juftly obferves, completely abstracted from the pursuits of civil life; they are as expenfive as regular foldiers; and it is evidently of the utmost importance, as we have but a limited population, that thofe who devote themselves to arms, should be rendered as perfect in their calling as poffible. The volunteers, our author thinks entitled to praise for their past exertions; but he confiders them as nearly the worst species of militia. Many of them are phyfically incapable of encountering the fatigues of a military life; many of them are married and have families, a circumitance which our author confiders as a great drawback on their exertions; and he informs us that the French, in their confcriptions, always take care to feled for fervice the youngeft, and those that were unmarried. A fimiliar practice, he thinks, ought to be adopted with refpect to volunteer corps. All the youth between eighteen and twenty-five years, ought to be formed into corps near their places of refidence; and on the landing of an enemy, they ought to be completely difpofeable; and either to act by themfelves, or be incorporated with the regular troops. With refpect to the recruiting of the army, our author thinks that every encouragement ought to be given to voluntary fervice, by rendering the condition of the foldier as defirable in point of pay and other advantages,

Dd3

vantages, as is confiftent with military difcipline, Along with every other intelligent officer, he is for abolishing the difgraceful punishment of flogging. If this method of raifing men, however, fhould fail, he thinks the army ought to be recruited by ballot. He seems quite sensible of the hardships which this will entail on the middling and lower classes of society; but he comforts himself by the reflection, that this is an unavoidable consequence of the inequality of fortunes in civil society.' Now, while we entirely agree with him that a regular army, supported by an armed population, is the only sure defence for a nation, we must decidedly object to the recruiting of the regular army by ballot. Our author observes, that it is not just to take the goods of the rich to induce the poor to do their duty. But why their duty particularly? Is it not the duty of the rich to defend the country as well as the poor; and, if they think it too burdensome, is it not quite fair that they should pay the poor for relieving them from it? Because the conditions of mankind are unequal, is that any reason why Government should aggravate this natural inequality? Captain Birch ought to consider, that a country which exists only for the rich will never be defended by the poor. We agree perfectly with him as to the expediency of keeping up as large an army as the population and resources of the country can support; but let us pay the necessary expense of raising and maintaining it, and there will be no occasion for resorting to compulsion.

In addition to those means of defence, Captain Birch is of opinion, that the country ought to be still further strengthened by the establishment of defensive fortified positions. Although we do not profess fully to enter into all the details with which our author illustrates his argument, yet the general principles on which he proceeds appear to us so plain and satisfactory, that we must gratify our readers with an abstract of this very important part of his work. Fortified positions are evidently of use, by enabling an army, inferior either in numbers or discipline, to make head against a force superior in both these respects. Their utility consists in arresting the progress of an invader, by forcing him to spend some time in their reduction, while the invaded country is preparing against him the means of his destruction. They require also few men to defend them; and inexperienced troops, with a few veterans, who would not be qualified for the fatigues of the field, would be fit for this purpose. If fortified positions, however, are sufficient to compensate the disadvantages of irregular troops, it is hardly necessary to point out the incalculable superiority which they must give to a regular army. have already endeavoured to show, that the true policy of an in

« PreviousContinue »