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means of their regular army, supported by the inexhaustible fund of an immense population to supply its losses, that France defended herself against a host of foes. It is by the same means that she has been enabled to carry into effect such vast schemes of offensive warfare, and even to outnumber her enemies (such appears to have been the case in the late contest with Russia) even upon their own frontiers. Here, then, is a plain precedent for us to copy. It is not, indeed, handed down to us by our ancestors, but it is held out for our benefit by our enemies. Henceforth, therefore, if we are disposed to profit by experience, the object of our military policy will be to form, in the first place, a regular army; and for the purpose of assisting and recruiting it, we may enrol the names of all young men between 18 and 25, and give them such drilling as will qualify them to take their station in its ranks. One great advantage of this plan would be, that it would be attended with little or no expense; and it would not disturb the ordinary occupations of society. There would be no need for the expense and parade of uniforms; nor would it be necessary to spend much time in drilling. The French reckon three weeks sufficient to make a recruit fit for service, and, in military matters, it is not for us to dispute their authority. We perfectly agree with Lord Selkirk, that there ought to be no exemptions for the rich. To let them off for the payment of a fine is merely a device for throwing the burden of defending the Country on the poor, which is eafily feen through, and which never fails to excite general and well-founded difcontent.

Lord Selkirk proceeds to compare the establishment of the local militia with the volunteer fyftem, and with the plan for a general array of the whole male population of mature age; and he gives the preference, in our opinion on very juft grounds, to his own meafure. He concludes his obfervations, on this part of the subject, with recommending a more general enrolment of the population, for the purpofe of cutting up roads, breaking down bridges, and other fervices not strictly military.

The meafures, however, of which we have been confidering the propriety, apply only to Britain. The defence of Ireland, therefore, remains yet to be provided for. It would not be fafe, according to our author, to establish a local militia in that country, on account of a certain lawless and difaffected fpirit' which is faid to prevail among a great proportion of the people. He proposes, therefore, to fubftitute a general militia, to ferve for three years in any part of the united kingdom, and to be perma nently embodied during that time, the number to be between 30,000 or 40,0co men, to be raised by ballot; from which an exemption for three years may be purchased by the previous pay

YOL. XII. NO. 24.

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ment of a fine of 10l.; but no exemptions after the ballot is begun, and no fervice by fubftitution.

If it be true that difaffection exifts very generally in Ireland, we are much afraid that this fevere measure would tend to confirm, and to extend it. It is evident that it would operate (like the ballot in this country) as a tax on all thofe who could by any means fcrape together ten pounds; and whatever fervice was obtained, would be extorted from the poverty of those who could not pay the neceflary fum. Lord Selkirk endeavours indeed to mitigate the oppreffion of the measure as much as possible; but its defects are radical, and cannot be diffembled. The dif content that has been excited in this country, by the vexation of ballots, is greater than can be well imagined. The iniquity of making the poor pay for defending the country, while the rich are allowed to escape free, is fo grofs that nothing can cover or difguife it.

Why, however, it may be asked, is Ireland difaffected? Is difaffection an ultimate fact, of which no further account can be given? On the contrary, we hold it as an eternal truth, that where a government is adminiftered in juftice and in mercy, difaffection can never either fettle permanently, or fpread very generally among its fubjects; and if it be true that difcontent is very prevalent in Ireland, it must be in a great measure owing to the fault of its rulers. We could have wifhed that a perfon of Lord Selkirk's rank and eminent talents had fpoken out more plainly upon this fubject. But, while he feems to allow all the faults of the Irish government, there is a management and referve in his language which we fcarcely know how to account for. The fum and fubftance of what he fays feems to be,-that there has exifted in Ireland a refractory spirit, not to be repreffed but by the strong hand of power;-that government had no military force adequate to this purpofe;-that they were, confequently, forced to depend on the inhabitants most immediately interested in the prefervation of good order ;-that thofe men were too much influenced by irritating circumftances, to preferve, on all occafons, their coolness and moderation;-and that government could not interfere to curb their violence. With refpect to repreffing a refractory fpirit by the ftrong hand of power, we will confefs we are not over fond of this kind of policy. We would rather prefer inquiring into its caufe; and we might then perhaps find, that what was termed a refractory fpirit, was nothing more than a natural impatience of oppreffion, which would ceafe with the grievance which produced it. But as to Government being obliged to prop up its authority by the aid of a party, and to deliver Tover to the vengeance of this irritated faction any part of those

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whom it was bound to protect,-we must say that we confider fuch policy to be as weak as it is odious, and cannot help expreffing our furprife, that a perfon, fo gifted and difpofed as Lord Selkirk, Thould have hefitated about giving it its true appellation. On whom did Lord Fitzwilliam rely for fupport in his short but glo rious administration, but on the Irish people at large? On whom did Lord Cornwallis rely, when he nobly branded with difgrace that party on whom, Lord Selkirk informs us, the government depended for its fupport? And on whom did the Duke of Bedford rely, when he refufed to listen to the violent counfels of that fame party, and to outlaw feveral counties which were said to be in a state of disturbance? Let the government be uprightly administered, and the most powerful of all parties, the party of the people, will rally round it for its fupport.

Lord Selkirk concludes his work with a few obfervations on our prefent militia establishment,-the difadvantages of which he points out with great force and perfpicuity. The notion of their being the conftitutional force of the country, he very fuccefsfully expofes. When this kind of cant, however, once gets poffeilion of the public ear, there is no diflodging of it. We have only further to remark, that Lord Selkirk's ftyle appears to us to be diftinguished by an unaffected elegance and fimplicity, which renders the perufal of his work both eafy and pleafant.

ART. XI. A Letter from Mr Whitbread to Lord Holland, on the present Situation of Spain. Third Edition. London. Ridgeway, 1808.

W E are induced to notice this little pamphlet, more from the high character of the perfons named in the title of it, than from any great value which we are difpofed to fet upon either the opinions contained in it, or the manner of delivering them. In fact, the letter confilts pretty much of the bare dium of the refpectable and enlightened author. As a statement of dis fimple and unfupported opinion, it no doubt deferves the greatest attention from the country; and the different parties which divide the ftate, are very fure to bestow upon it as much notice as it deferves, each for its peculiar purpofe: But our way happens not to lye through fuch paths; and the bare cogitavit of a man, how ever high in pohtical eftimation, can scarcely affect us, except in fo far as it may be accompanied by a fair ftatement of grounds and reafonings. The fubject of the letter' is nevertheless of fuch general importance, and the public are, in our humble apprehenfion, running fo far out of the right courfe in their views of it

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that we avail ourselves of this opportunity to fay a few words upon it,-adding, we fear, one to the numberlefs inftances in which we have attempted vainly to preach reafon in a conflict of paflions, and have met with the fuccefs which attends thofe unpleasant counsellors, who would fain prevent the pains of difappointment, by recommending a temperate indulgence in the pleasures of hope. We fhall be difpofed to alter our courfe of practice, as foon as we find that we have been mistaken: hitherto the event has too fatally juftified thofe ungrateful profpects which we have fo often deemed it our duty to unfold.

It is neceffary, however, here to premife, that we by no means intend to enter at large into the fubject of Spanish affairs. Our object is to touch upon them only in their connexion with the doctrines fo often delivered in this Journal upon continental politicsdoctrines, in a recurrence to which, we are intimately perfuaded, the falvation of England is to be found. Even if we had the information required for a full difcuffion of the questions, whether or not the Spaniards are likely to fucceed? and how are they to feek fuccefs?'-even if the perfons beft qualified to treat of thefe matters had promulgated their fentiments upon them-if Lord Holland had written a long letter to Mr Whitbread, instead of receiving a very short note upon the fubject from his honourable friend,-ftill we fhould deem it inconfiftent with our proper province to enter into thofe queftions of present and paffing politics, and to deliver arguments upon the probabilities of events fo very near at hand, that in all likelihood they will happen before our fpeculations can reach the public. We purpose, therefore, to keep as much as poffible to the moft general views of thofe queftions, and rather to confider the whole fubject in its relation to the political conduct of England, and the different pofitions which have been maintained refpecting it by the various reafoners who have of late years decided men's opinions.

Mr Whitbread begins his letter with defending his conduct in the House of Commons, when Mr Sheridan brought the situation of Spain under the consideration of Parliament. At that time it was altogether uncertain what part it would be most adviseable for the Spanish leaders to take; and, ignorant as every body, except the Government, of necessity was, respecting the real state of affairs in the peninsula, Mr Whitbread very properly thought

that Government should be left free and unbiassed in its deliberations upon this weighty subject. Subsequent events, however, Mr Whitbread remarks, have wholly changed the appearance of the

It has been ascertained, that all over Spain an unexampled spirit of resistance to the enemy has burst forth. The Spaniards are suddenly and of themselves committed. What then remains,

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he asks, but that we should assist them with all the means in our power? Having dilated upon this topic with great earnestness, and in a manner quite demonstrative, both of his participation in the universal good wishes towards the cause of Spanish liberty, and of his entertaining almost the same sanguine expectations of its success which the people of England are now fondly indulging,-Mr Whitbread passes to another topic, which he just touches, but in a temper of moderation and impartiality which cannot be too highly commended,--the choice of leaders for such an armament as it may be deemed expedient to send into Spain. Here, too, he joins in what we trust is the universal wish, that no generals should be chosen for their rank in the state, or their connexion with the royal family, but that the choice should fall on the men whom merit and past services point out. We may remark by the way, that the truly British public seem wholly to have forgotten, upon this question, their usual predilection for the taste and feelings of the Sovereign. Highly as we rejoice in the circumstance, we cannot help pointing out its inconsistency with former and very recent popular clamours; and we may be permitted to marvel, that, where the Spaniards are concerned, scarcely a voice should be raised for the paternal feelings and amiable family-prejudices of the Monarch in 1808, among a people which, one little year before, was loud, and almost sanguinary, in denouncing those upright and enlightened statesmen who dared to thwart the King's prejudices against four millions of his Irish subjects!

Mr Whitbread concludes with a few words upon a topic always dear to him, and most honourably supported by his powerful talents, at a time when the Whigs themselves manifestly deserted their ancient tenets, and, betrayed by false hopes of Continental victories, or debauched by the enjoyment of power, adopted the language and views of their ancient adversaries-we mean the subject of peace. He scruples not to affirm, that the present is a fit moment for thinking of negotiation; and as this part of his pamphlet, like the rest of his manly and virtuous conduct upon the question of peace, has been made a subject of the most base and wilful misrepresentation, we shall quote his own words;-the rather, because we have the misfortune, for the first time, and in the way we shall afterwards state, to differ from him in one particular of his sentiments on this important matter.

At the conclusion of my speech, on the act of Appropriation, I declared that I still adhered to the opinions I laid down on the 29th of February last, when I moved, as a resolution in the House of Commons, "That there is nothing in the present state of the war which ought to preclude his Majesty from embracing any fair opportunity E e 3

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