judice. The intelligence derived from secondary sources, under such circumstances, may well be spared, and must always be more than suspicious. These observations, however, apply directly to Grecian history, and especially to that portion of Grecian history which occupies the greater part of the volume before us. Of the state of Grecian politics, in the time of Philip of Macedon, we know, or may know much, from the writings of contemporary authors. The writers, on the other hand, who, towards the decline of the Roman power, compiled histories of Greece, were not only far separated from the period in question, but were also deeply tinged with that sophistical spirit,-that mania of sacrificing accuracy to hypothesis, which was the pest of the later literature of antiquity. Yet, modern authors have implicitly trusted these guides. So far from recollecting that just division of employment which assigns the province of testimony to the contemporary historian, and that of judgment to those who come after, they have most preposterously inverted this or der. They have borrowed their text from Justin; their commentary from Demosthenes; and have justified the prejudiced declamation of the demagogue, by an appeal to the libellous anecdotes of the fabulist. On this last subject, the readers of Mr Mitford will find a clear, and, on the whole, we think, an unexceptionable essay, in his introductory chapter. Were we called to name the circumstance which, of all others, distinguishes Mr Mitford's history, we should mention the light which it throws on the state of parties in Greece. Every Grecian city, whether in the mother-country or in the colonies, was divided into two parties,-the aristocratic and the democratic. This was, of course, the case also with Athens and Lacedæmon. In the latter, however, the aristocratic party was generally preponderant, and the democratic in the former. The same division is observable in Greece, considered as a large community. The respective parties in each town, besides acting separately, naturally made a common cause. The Athenians and Lacedæmonians, from the prevailing difference in their politics, took opposite sides; and were, of course, at the head, the Lacedæmonians of the aristocratic, and the Athenians of the democratic factions. This was the general rule. There were, indeed, occasions in which it was reversed; but these were only under very peculiar circumstances. The Peloponnesian war is properly termed by Mr Mitford a civil war. It was the decisive struggle between the two interests. It is curious to remark, how the changes of fortune that befell the principais in this struggle, ran along the whole line of their subordinate adherents. Any considerable success, on either side, tended to produce a defection of the allies of the opposite party. When the Lacedæmonians were victorious, the allies of Athens revolted; that is, the aristocratic party among the allies gained the ascendancy; and, in the same manner, the success of the Athenians gave power to the democratic factions in all the cities of Greece. Thus, there was a close union between the respective parties in the different States. The circumstances of Greece naturally led to this posture of affairs, to which the history of Italy, prior to the sixteenth century, presents something analogous, if not exactly parallel. The nearness of the cities to each other facilitated a constant and secret communication. The language in general use was the same. The antipathies and affections, being crowded into a narrow theatre, became personal and even hereditary. These were some of the causes which led to this peculiarity; and, of these, the first was probably the most effectual. Few tasks would be more inviting, than that of watching the successive steps of these parties through the whole course of Grecian history. That task, however, would require a detail too minute for the present occasion. It is enough to have pointed out the clue to a just knowledge of their internal politics. It is rather incumbent upon us to turn our attention to that state which, for a longer period than any of its rivais, possessed the sovereignty over the rest of Greece,-which is itself most interesting to the general reader,-of which we know most ;-which has been the most celebrated for refinement in arts, and for liberal politics, and which, at the period under review, filled alone, in point of influence and consideration, the space which had before been divided between several considerable nations. In the time of Philip of Macedon, Athens was Greece. The government of Athens, as it stood originally, it is unnecessary to describe. A very satisfactory representation of it may, be seen in a former part of the history before us. It is well known that Solon, desirous to repress the disorders of the deniccracy which he found in his country, interposed several checks, and especially the areopagus and the senate of five hundred; but that, in spite of these checks, so much weight was left on the popular side, as to defeat his purpose, and to insure the ultimate ascendancy of the democratic party. The stages by which the Athenian constitution descended from its first greatness, and again rose to a bad eminence,' are traced by Mr Mitford with great accuracy and success. We shall make no apology for offering to our readers a pretty copious extract from this most interesting part of his labours. After stating, that in consequence of the blow given to the Lacedæmonian power by Epaminondas, and of the decline of the Thebans on the death of that general, Athens remained, by her power and by the reputation of her most eminent citizens, the most respected of the republics,' the historian proceeds, Unfortunately Athens had not a government capable of maintaining a conduct, that could either hold or deserve the respect which a large part of Greece was ready to pay. When, after overthrowing the tyrannical government of the thirty, and of their successors the ten, Thrasybulus refused to mect any proposal for checking, in the restored democracy, the wildness of popular authority, it seems to have been because he saw no sufficient disposition to moderation among those who put forward such proposals. The faults of both parties had produced violence in both. The profligate tyranny of the former democracy had been such (Isocrates ventured, in a chosen opportunity, to aver the bold truth to the people in their restored sovereinty), that a majority, even of the lower ranks, had voted for the oligarchy of the four hundred. But the tyranny of the thirty afterward so exceeded all former experience, that, in natural course, the popular jealousy, on the restoration of popular power, would become, in the highest degree, suspicious and irritable. In this state of things it was a sense of public weakness, while the power of Lacedæmon or Thebes threatened, that inforced respect for the counsels of such men as Conon, Thrasybulus, Iphicrates, Timotheus, Chabrias, and Niceratus. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances, sycophancy again reared its baleful head. Wise men accommodated themselves, as they could, to the temper of the times, endevoring so to bend before popular tyranny as not to sink under it. But Thrasybulus himself, as we have formerly seen, tho honored as the second founder of the republic, did not escape a capital prosecution. The great men who followed him, began, like the Lacedæmonian kings, to prefer military command abroad to residence in the city. Giving their advice in the general assembly only when pressure of circumstances required, they avoided that general direction of the republic's affairs, that situation of prime minister, which Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, and Thrasybulus himself had held. It has been remarked that Conon chose to pass his leisure in Cyprus, Iphicrates in Thrace, Timotheus in Lesbos, Chares in Sigeium, and Chabrias in Egypt, or anywhere rather than in Athens. This dereliction of civil situation by the great political and mili tary characters of the republic, incouraged the evil which produced it. The field was left open for adventurers, without other recommendation than readiness and boldness of speech, to take the lead in public affairs; and oratory became a trade, independent of all other vocations.' IV. 230, 231. Hb 3 • Whea When the fear of Lacedæmon or Thebes, long the salutary check upon this vicious government, was removed by the event of the battle of Mantineia, its extravagances soon grew extreme. The people in general assembly being soverein, with power less liable to question than that of a Turkish sultan, who dares not deny his veneration for Mahomet's law, or his respect for those appointed to high situations under it, any adventurer in politics, who had ready elocution, could interfere in every department of government. Ratification by the people was required for every measure of administration. The most delicate forein interests were discussed before the people at large, and the contending orators abused forein powers and one another with equal grossness. Unsteddiness then became a characteristic of the Athenian government. Propositions rejected in the morning, says Isocrates, are often ratified before night, and condemned again at the next meeting of the assembly; and we find even Demosthenes, the popular favorite of his day, complaining, that a measure decreed was as uncertain of execution as if it had never been taken into consideration. Assurance therefore for forein states, of any maintenance of public faith, was impossible. As soon as a treaty was con cluded, it was the business of the opposing orators to persuade the people that they had been deceived and misled. If the attempt succeeded, the consistency of government and the faith of the republic were equally disregarded: the treaty was declared null, and those who had persuaded to it, rarely escaping capital prosecution, were fortunate if they could escape capital punishment. Seldom, therefore, tho everything must be discussed, could there be any free discussion. In the soverein assembly of Athens, as in democratical assemblies in England, a common hall of the city of London, or a county meeting for political purposes, freedom of speech often was denied; the people would hear the orators only on one side. Flattery to the tyrant, as we have seen the people in democracy often called among the Greeks, was always necessary. But honest and plain admonition, tending to allay popular passion, to obviate mischievous prejudice, or even to correct popular misinformation, could rarely obtain attention, unless in times of pressing public danger, and alarm among all parties. It seems to have been a liberal spirit that, on the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus, gave the freedom of the city to all who had borne arms in the contest for it. Nevertheless the precedent was dangerous for a state where despotic power, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial authority, was constitutionally vested in the whole people. Formerly, tho the large patriotism, which should have embraced the whole Greek nation, was rarely found among the republics, yet that narrower political virtue, the love of the city, was often seen warm. But as, through the successive alterations of the constitutions of Theseus and Solon, security for property, and especially for landed property, was weakened, and at length al most most destroyed, attachment to the Attic soil would proportionally fail, So many strangers to Attic blood then, admitted among the citizens, would of course be desirous that the purity of Attic blood should no longer be the honorable distinction, and would be ready to vote, on all occasions, for the admission of others, who possessed it no more than themselves. Accordingly the freedom of the city became an. ordinary favor, profusely conferred. Perhaps we should ascribe somewhat to joke in the story of the two youths, raised to the once envied dignity of Athenian citizens, for the merit of their father, an` ingenious cook, in the invention of some approved new sauces. IV. 232-234. To these symptoms succeeded unbounded luxury among the multitude. The citizens, declining military service, resorted to the aid of mercenaries, and engaged in hostilities for the avowed purpose of plunder. After the battle of Mantineia, when the decay of Theban influence over the confederacy, whose councils Epameinondas had been able to guide, became manifest, an altered disposition toward the subject states appeared. Interested adventurers in politics quickly saw the opportunity, and hastened in contention to profit from it. The former empire of Athens, and the advantages which the body of the people derived from it, became the favorite topics of declamation in the general assembly. The people heard with eager attention, when it was asked, "Whence was the want of energy, that the fleets brought no treasures home? Why was free navigation allowed? The Athenian navy commanded the scas. Why then was any republic permitted to have ships, and maritime commerce, that would not pay tribute as formerly?" Thus wrought into fermentation, the public mind, with a favorite object in view, would no longer bear contradiction. To urge the injustice of arbitrary exaction would have been dangerous for the most popular orator. Even for showing the impolicy, without venturing to name the iniquity of such measures, none could obtain a hearing. Fleets therefore were sent out, under the imperial mandate of the people, with general instructions to bring home tribute. For command in such interprize, military ability and experience were little requisite; and, as the cautious Isocrates did not scruple publicly to aver, men of such mean estimation, that, for managing any private concern, none would trust them, were commissioned, with dictatorial powers, to conduct the affairs of the republic with the Greek nation. A soverein multitude, and the orators who, by flattery, ruled the soverein multitude, would be likely to allow great indulgence to those ordered, without limitation by any precise instructions, to extend empire and bring home money. Complaints insuing, endless, from the injured allies, were generally disregarded. Money, judiciously distributed among the officers of the courts which ought to take connisance of such complaints, was generally necessary even to bring the matter to a hearing; and then any justice in decision was very uncertain. Fraud, |