ACT OF GOD — As a general rule, injury produced by an act of God does not relieve one from liability where his own negligent acts concur in or contribute to the injury.
See GREELEY v. STATE OF NEW YORK
ADMISSION — Oral admissions of an ancient date have little probative force.] Oral admissions, uncorroborated by other facts or evidence, should always be weighed with great caution, and admissions made in the course of a casual conversation are, after a great lapse of time, of little probative force. ROBERGE V. BONNER......
ADVERSE POSSESSION - Occupation of land under a sale for a term of years for non-payment of a municipal assessment - the title in fee is not dis- turbed thereby the possession of the purchaser during the term of the lease and its continuance thereafter is subordinate thereto.
MILLER v. WARREN..
See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
AGENCY- Generally.
See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
ALLOWANCE:
See COSTS.
ANARCHIST - Charge that one is an anarchist - it is a charge of criminal anarchy.
APARTMENT HOUSE- Injury to a prospective tenant from falling down a staircase. See NEGLIGENCE.
APPEAL-Criticism by the trial court of the decision of the Appellate Divi- sion rendered on an appeal previously taken — when it requires a reversal. See SMITH v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD Co....
What errors in the rejection of evidence, bearing on issues not disputed on the trial, do not require the reversal of a judgment. See ROBERGE v. BONNER..
Appeal from an interlocutory judgment in partition of a County Court, heard by stipulation as a motion for a new trial. See Russ v. MAXWELL..
Right to appeal from an order granting a new trial, after such new trial has been had.
See PROCESS COPPER Co. v. PERFECT ARC LAMP CO...... ARBITRATION AND AWARD Award under an insurance policy — where the umpire has acted with one appraiser without consultation with the other the award will be set aside.
See N. Y. MUT. SAV. ASSN. v. MANCHESTER ASSUR. Co....... ARREST Without a warrant what is insufficient.
when a proper information must be filed —
See PEOPLE EX REL. FARLEY v. CRANE... ASSAULT-When the question whether a defendant used excessive force in removing the plaintiff from his personal property is improperly submitted to the jury.] In an action brought to recover damages for an assault it appeared that the plaintiff was a tenant on a farm of the defendant under an agree- ment by which each was to have half the produce; that on the day in question the defendant attempted to remove from the farm a number of bags of grain to which he claimed to be entitled as part of his share of the product; that after the defendant had removed a number of them the plaintiff assaulted him, scratched him, raised a pitchfork as if to strike him and seated herself upon the bags; that the defendant took the pitch- fork from her, and, taking her by the wrists, removed her from the bags and held her while his assistants put the bags in the wagon. His action in this respect constituted the alleged assault.
There was nothing in the evidence to indicate that the plaintiff was taken off the bags without resistance or that any more force was used by the defendant than was necessary to enable him to secure what he claimed to be his share of the grain.
Held, that it was improper for the court to submit to the jury the question whether the defendant used excessive force, and that a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff should be reversed."
ASSIGNMENT - By a contractor with the State of a portion of the contract price to a sub-contractor — duty of the State after notice thereof-chapter 755 of the Laws of 1900 is simply a waiver by the State of its right not to be sued. See WILLIAMS v. STATE OF NEW YORK...
ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS — As against one filing a mechanic's lien for materials furnished, a trustee in bankruptcy has no greater right than a general assignee for the benefit of the sub-contractor's creditors would have. CRANE Co. v. PNEUMATIC SIGNAL Co.. See LIEN.
ASSOCIATION - Expulsion from a labor union — when it is not necessary to prosecute an appeal within the organization before appealing to the courts for reinstatement.] 1. A member of a local union of printers, who has been unlawfully expelled therefrom without notice and without a hearing, and been thereby deprived of his means of livelihood, will not be denied redress
by the courts because of his failure to seek relief within the organization by an appeal to an international union with which the local union was affili- ated, where it appears that the local union refused to afford him access to the records, charges and evidence upon which he was expelled and which were necessary to his appeal, except upon the payment or deposit by him of a fine of fifty dollars which had been unlawfully imposed; that the alleged offense for which he was expelled was that of slandering the presi- dent of the international union, who would hear the appeal in the first instance, and who would preside over the tribunal which would finally review the correctness of his own decision; and that the court in which the appeal would be heard was located in a city several hundred miles distant from the residence of the expelled member. CORREGAN v. HAY.. ...
2. Insolvent savings and loan association — foreclosure of a mortgage by its receiver - credit for dues or premium paid by the mortgagee.] In an action by the receiver of an insolvent savings and loan association to foreclose a mort- gage executed to the association by a shareholder who had assigned his shares to the association as security for the performance of the conditions of the mortgage, the shareholder is not entitled to be credited upon the mortgage in the foreclosure action with the amount of dues paid by him to the asso- ciation or with the amount of the monthly premium which he paid as a bonus for the loan. ROBERTS v. CRONK....
3. When such credit will be given.] He will, however, upon the final adjustment of the affairs of the association, be entitled to credit for such payments, the amount of such credit depending upon the amount of the net assets of the association. Id.
Saving clause in the foreclosure.] What provision in the judgment rendered in the foreclosure action fully protects the shareholder's rights in this respect, considered. Id.
For mutual benefit insurance. See INSURANCE.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK :
See NEGLIGENCE.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT -Action to recover money collected by an attorney for three tenants in common, brought by one of them.] When it is improper to dismiss the complaint in an action brought by one of three persons entitled, as tenants in common, to certain moneys which the defend- ant, an attorney, had collected for them, to recover her portion of such moneys, the shares of the other two tenants in common having been paid to them, considered. JACKSON v. MOORE.
Subpoena issued out of a court in another State to an attorney in the State of New York - what questions, as to the persons represented in the action by the attorney, are incompetent as involving confidential communica- tions. MATTER OF SHAWMUT MINING CO....... See PROCESS.
BAILMENT - Pawnbroker in New York city - he cannot apply the sur- plus arising on a sale under one pledge to the payment of a deficiency arising on a sale under another. STEPHENS . SIMPSON.
BANKING - Duty of a depositor to examine an entry made in his pass book.] In an action in which the issue involved was whether the plaintiff deposited with the defendant bank on a certain date a $1,000 greenback, as claimed by him, or a $100 gold certificate, as claimed by the bank, witnesses sworn on APP. DIV - VOL. XCIV. 40
behalf of the plaintiff testified that an hour and a half before the deposit the plaintiff received in a business transaction a $500 bill and a $1,000 bill.
It further appeared that at the time of making the deposit the plaintiff was given a bank book containing a credit of $100, and that he did not discover the alleged error until eleven days thereafter.
The defendant asked the court to charge, "That it was the duty of the plaintiff to look at his pass book when he received it, or within reasonable time thereafter, and if the defendant's position was prejudiced by the plaintiff's neglect in that respect then the plaintiff cannot recover," and the court replied, "I decline to charge that; I leave that to the jury to determine." Held, that the ruling was correct, as the plaintiff owed no duty to the bank to examine his bank book for the purpose of ascertaining whether the bank cashier had correctly counted the money deposited, and for the further reason that it did not appear that the bank had been prejudiced by the plaintiff's failure to examine his bank book.
KEMBLE. NATIONAL BANK OF RONDOUT..
Limited partnership-liability of a bank, in which the amount con- tributed by the special partner is deposited the day before the certificate is filed, and is on that day withdrawn by one of the general partners, to pay a debt of a firm whose assets are taken over by the limited partnership-it is not a misappropriation of the fund - who may sue therefor.
LA MONTAGNE v. BANK OF NEW YORK...
Check the title passes, subject to equities, by delivery without indorsement by the payee the certification thereof is the acceptance of a bill of exchange. a certification by the bank for the holder operates to
release the drawer. MEUER v. PHENIX NATIONAL BANK.
BANKRUPTCY - The giving of an order for the payment of money to a materialman and a letter agreeing to collect the order for him create a fidu- ciary relation - -a failure to pay over money thus collected is not discharged by the Bankruptcy Law.] 1. A building contractor, in consideration of the sale and delivery to him of materials for use in performing a contract, delivered to the materialman the following order addressed to the individual for whom he was doing the work:
"Please pay to The J. L. Mott Iron Works, New York, Eighty-three & 25/100 dollars for materials to be furnished by them for your building or buildings and charge the same to me or us.
He also delivered to the materialman at the same time the following letter:
"GENTLEMEN.-I or we hereby agree to collect the above order for you and turn the money over to you immediately after having been collected by
"As soon as you make delivery of the materials, I or we shall proceed with the work with all due despatch, so that I or we believe that the collec- tion can be made within 30 or 60 days after delivery.
"Should I or we not be able to make the collection within that time I or we shall report to you the reason why, and continue to keep you posted from time to time at short intervals. Yours truly, "JOHN TOUMEY & SON."
Held, that the parties intended that the money represented by the order should become the property of the materialman when collected by the con- tractor, and that the failure of the contractor to turn over such money to the materialman constituted a misappropriation or defalcation by the contractor when acting in a fiduciary capacity, which is excepted from the effect of a
discharge in bankruptcy by subdivision 4 of section 17 of the Bankruptcy Law. MOTT IRON WORKS v. TOUMEY... . . .
2. Preference to a bank when not established.] A bank discounted for a firm a note for $1,000 which matured March 12, 1900. February 15, 1900, the firm's place of business was destroyed by fire. Subsequent to the fire, one of the members of the firm called on the president of the bank and stated that his insurance policies had been adjusted at the sum of $3,875, but that he could not then get the money from the insurance company; that he needed the money as the firm was going to continue its business. In reliance upon these statements, the bank, on March 6, 1900, purchased the insurance poli- cies, paying therefor the sum of $2,875 in cash, with the understanding that what the bank collected from the insurance companies in excess of the $2,875 it was to apply to the payment of the note.
The bank collected from the insurance companies $2,601.65, and also obtained a judgment for $1,000 against one of the insurance companies which it was unable to collect owing to the insolvency of the judgment debtor.
The firm was adjudged bankrupt in proceedings instituted March 9, 1900. In an action brought by the firm's trustee in bankruptcy to recover from the bank the sum of $1,000, which it was alleged to have received from the firm in payment of an existing indebtedness in violation of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Law relating to unlawful preferences, it was
Held, that the trustee was not entitled to recover, for the following reasons, viz.:
That it had been expressly adjudicated in a prior action brought by the trustee in bankruptcy against the bank that the bank was entitled to retain the money received by it;
That it did not appear that at the time the bank purchased the insurance policies it knew or had cause to suspect that the firm was insolvent;
That, as the bank had not obtained from the insurance companies any. thing in excess of the amount of the cash payment which it made at the time of the transaction, it could not be said that the effect of the transfer was to enable the bank to obtain a greater percentage of its debt than other creditors of the same class, and that it, therefore, constituted an unlawful preference within section 60a of the Bankruptcy Law.
ENGEL v. UNION SQUARE BANK
3. Discharge in bankruptcy. — a judgment will be discharged of record although the notice required by the Bankruptcy Law was addressed to the judg- ment creditor, who died prior to the proceedings in bankruptcy, and her name appeared in the schedule of creditors.] Adelaide V. Lent, who, on May 28, 1898, recovered a judgment against William H. Farnsworth, died in Novem- ber, 1898, leaving a last will and testament, in which she named her mother, Sarah J. Lent, sole legatee, devisee and executrix. The will was admitted to probate in September, 1903. March 4, 1899, Farnsworth was adjudged a bankrupt and on May 9, 1899, he was discharged from his debts. In the schedule of creditors accompanying the petition in bankruptcy the name of the owner of the judgment was given as Adelaide V. Lent and her resi- dence as Niagara Falls, N. Y., which was the place where she resided at the time of her death and where Sarah J. Lent resided. The notices required by the Bankruptcy Law were mailed to Adelaide V. Lent at that residence. Sarah J. Lent claimed that she never received the notices sent to Adelaide V. Lent and had no actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding.
Upon a motion made by Farnsworth, in 1903, under section 1268 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to have the judgment discharged of record, it appeared that the failure to mail the statutory notices to Sarah J. Lent was not due to any fraudulent purpose on the part of the bankrupt and that no injury had resulted to her or to any one therefrom.
Held, that, under the circumstances, the mailing of the notices addressed to Adelaide V. Lent was a sufficient compliance with the law and that the bankrupt was entitled to have the judgment discharged of record.
Insolvent savings and loan association foreclosure of a mortgage by its receiver-credit for dues or premium paid by the mortgagee-it
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