§ 3 δοκεῖ τε τὸ φῶς ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ σκότει· ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος στέρησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ τούτου παρουσία τὸ φῶς ἐστιν. καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς Εμπε- 20 δοκλῆς, οὐδ ̓ εἴ τις ἄλλος οὕτως εἴρηκεν, ὡς φερομένου τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ γιγνομένου ποτὲ μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἡμᾶς δὲ λανθάνοντος· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἀλήθειαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα. ἐν μι κρῷ μὲν γὰρ διαστήματι λάθοι ἄν, ἀπ ̓ ἀνατολῆς δ ̓ ἐπὶ 15 § 4 δυσμὸς τὸ λανθάνειν μέγα λίαν τὸ αἴτημα. ἔστι δὲ χρώ ματος μὲν δεκτικὸν τὸ ἄχρουν, ψόφου δὲ τὸ ἄψοφον. ἄχρουν δ ̓ ἐστὶ τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον ἢ τὸ μόλις ὁρώμενον, οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ σκοτεινόν. τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ διαφανὲς μέν, ἀλλ ̓ οὐχ ὅταν ᾗ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανές, ἀλλ ̓ ὅταν δυ- 30 νάμει ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ φύσις ότὲ μὲν σκότος ὁτὲ δὲ φῶς ἐστίν. οὐ πάντα δὲ ὁρατὰ ἐν φωτί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἑκάστου 419 τὸ οἰκεῖον χρῶμα· ἔνια γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ φωτὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἐν δὲ τῷ σκότει ποιεῖ αἴσθησιν, οἷον τὰ πυρώδη φαινόμενα καὶ λάμποντα (ἀνώνυμα δ ̓ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἑνὶ ὀνόματι), οἷον μύκης, κέρας, κεφαλαὶ ἰχθύων καὶ λεπίδες καὶ ὀφθαλ μοί· ἀλλ ̓ οὐδενὸς ὁρᾶται τούτων τὸ οἰκεῖον χρῶμα. δι ̓ ἣν § 5 μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ταῦτα ὁρᾶται, ἄλλος λόγος. νῦν δ ̓ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐν φωτὶ ὁρώμενον χρῶμα. διὸ καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἄνευ φωτός· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτὸ τὸ χρώματι εἶναι τὸ κινητικῷ εἶναι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφα νοῦς· ἡ δ ̓ ἐντελέχεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς φῶς ἐστίν. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου φανερόν· ἐὰν γάρ τις θῇ τὸ ἔχον χρῶμα ἐπ ̓ αὐτὴν τὴν ὄψιν, οὐκ ὄψεται· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα κινεῖ τὸ δια 18. τε] δὲ TUVX Trend. 22. τεινομένου Εν. Του. || τὴν τοῦ λόγου ETVWy || ἐνάργειαν TWy. καὶ om. EUW. [] αὐτὸ] αὐτῷ Tor. 24. τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐνάργειαν 419" 1. ὁρᾶται Χ. 9. 10 This explanation of light is confirmed by the ordinary view which regards light as the opposite of darkness. Darkness in fact is really the removal of such a positive quality from what is pellucid, so that light must necessarily be its presence. Empedocles therefore and any others who have followed him have not described the phenomenon correctly in speaking of the light as moving itself and as coming some time or other, without our knowing it, into existence between the earth and the surrounding air. Such a theory is contrary at once to reason and to experience. Within the limits of a narrow space, such a process might escape our observation: but to imply that it should do so from the rising to the setting sun is to make too great a postulate. It is in fact the colourless which is receptive of colour, just as it is the soundless which is receptive of sound. But such an absence of colour is characteristic of the pellucid and of the invisible or what is scarcely visible (as darkness is generally thought to be). And the pellucid itself is also similarly dark, but it is so not when it is pellucid in actuality, but only so potentially: for it is one and the same element which is at one time darkness, at another time light. It must not however be supposed that light is exclusively the condition of seeing things: it is so only for the peculiar colour of each object. There are in fact some things which are not visible in the light, but admit of being perceived in darkness, as for instance those phosphorescent objects which cannot be denoted by any one single name, but are such things as fungi, horns, fish-heads, scales and eyes-but in none of these is the colour specially belonging to them perceived in darkness. The reason of this is matter for another argument: at present this much is clear that what is perceived in light is colour. Colour therefore is not visible without the presence of light: this indeed we saw was the essential character of colour that it is calculated to set the actually pellucid in movement: and the full play of this pellucid constitutes light. It is an obvious proof of the existence of this pellucid that if the object be placed close upon the very eye, this object will not be seen. The colour in fact moves the pellucid substance, for instance. 7 W. AR. φανές, οἷον τὸν ἀέρα, ὑπὸ τούτου δὲ συνεχοὺς ὄντος κινεῖται § 6 τὸ αἰσθητήριον. οὐ γὰρ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγει Δημόκριτος οπό- 15 μενος, εἰ γένοιτο κενὸν τὸ μεταξύ, ὁρᾶσθαι ἂν ἀκριβῶς καὶ εἰ μύρμηξ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἴη· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. πάσχοντος γάρ τι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ γίνεται τὸ ὁρᾶν· ὑπ ̓ αὐτοῦ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὁρωμένου χρώματος ἀδύνατον, λείπεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ μεταξύ, ὥστ ̓ ἀναγκαῖόν τι εἶναι μεταξύ· κενοῦ δὲ γενο- 20 § 7 μένου οὐχ ὅτι ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλ ̓ ὅλως οὐθὲν ὀφθήσεται. δι ̓ ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τὸ χρῶμα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶσθαι, εἴρηται. πῦρ δὲ ἐν ἀμφοῖν ὁρᾶται, καὶ ἐν σκότει καὶ ἐν φωτί, καὶ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τὸ γὰρ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ τούτου γίνεται § 8 διαφανές. ὁ δ ̓ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ψόφου καὶ ὀσμῆς 15 ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενον τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ ̓ ὑπὸ μὲν ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου τὸ μεταξὺ κι νεῖται, ὑπὸ δὲ τούτου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑκάτερον· ὅταν δ ̓ ἐπ ̓ αὐτό τις ἐπιθῇ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ τὸ ὄζον, οὐδεμίαν αἴσθησιν ποιήσει. περὶ δὲ ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἔχει μὲν 30 ὁμοίως, οὐ φαίνεται δέ· δι ̓ ἣν δ ̓ αἰτίαν, ὕστερον ἔσται δῆλον. § 9 τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφων μὲν ἀήρ, ὀσμῆς δ ̓ ἀνώνυμον· κοινὸν γὰρ δή τι πάθος ἐπ ̓ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ τὸ διαφανὲς χρώματι, οὕτω τῷ ἔχοντι ὀσμὴν ὃ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχει τούτοις· φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἔνυδρα τῶν ζῴων 35 ἔχειν αἴσθησιν ὀσμῆς. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶν πεζῶν 419 ὅσα ἀναπνεῖ, ἀδυνατεῖ ὀσμᾶσθαι μὴ ἀναπνέοντα. ἡ δ ̓ αἰτία καὶ περὶ τούτων ὕστερον λεχθήσεται. νῦν δὲ πρῶτον περὶ ψόφου καὶ ἀκοῆς διορίσωμεν. 14· δὲ] δὴ ΕTW. μεταξύ om. SUX. 33. 18. αἰσθητηρίου VW. 19. dn ETW. 20. ώστ 419 4. ἀκοῆς] ὀσφρήσεως EWXy. the air, and it is only through this as it extends from the object to the sense that motion can be communicated to the visual organ. Democritus is therefore not at all correct in thinking, as he does, that if the intermediate space were empty, everything would be fully seen, even an ant should there be one in the sky. This is really an impossibility. Vision is the result of some impression made upon the faculty of sense: an impression which cannot be effected by the colour itself as perceived; and must therefore be due to the medium which intervenes. An intervening substance then of one kind or another there must necessarily be: and were this intervening space made empty, not only will the object not be seen exactly, but it will not be perceived at all. We have thus shewn why colour must be seen in light. Fire is seen under both conditions, both in darkness and in light: and this necessarily for it is by means of fire that the potentially pellucid becomes so actually. This same account holds good likewise of sound and smell. Neither produces perception by actual contact with the organ : the scent and the sound move the intervening medium: and this medium moves in turn each of the two sense-organs. Thus, in this case also, if the sonorous or odorous object be placed close upon the organ itself, it will produce no perception. Nor is this true only of these senses: it is really the case with touch and taste as well, though apparently it is not so a fact of which the reason will be afterwards evident. This intervening medium is in the case of sound air, in the case of smell it is some element found both in air and water which has no name assigned it, but which, just as the pellucid serves as medium in the case of colour, so in the case of what possesses smell is present as a common quality in both of these. And thus it is that even animals which live in water seem to possess the sense of smell: man and all other animals that breathe cannot smell unless when inhaling air. The reason of this will be stated afterwards: for the present we must first proceed to determine the nature of sound and hearing. § I VIII. Εστι δὲ διττὸς ὁ ψόφος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐνέργειά τις, 85 δὲ δύναμις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐ φαμεν ἔχειν ψόφον, οἷον σπόγγον, ἔρια, τὰ δ ̓ ἔχειν, οἷον χαλκὸν καὶ ὅσα στερεὰ καὶ λεῖα, ὅτι δύναται ψοφῆσαι. τοῦτο δ ̓ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς § 2 ἐμποιῆσαι ψόφον ἐνεργείᾳ. γίνεται δ ̓ ὁ κατ ̓ ἐνέργειαν ψό φος ἀεί τινος πρός τι καὶ ἔν τινι· πληγὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ποι- 10 οῦσα. διὸ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἑνὸς ὄντος γενέσθαι ψόφον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον· ὥστε τὸ ψοφοῦν πρός τι ψοφεῖ. πληγὴ δ ̓ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φορᾶς. ὥσπερ δ ̓ εἴπομεν, οὐ τῶν τυχόντων πληγὴ ὁ ψόφος· οὐθένα γὰρ ποιεῖ ψόφον ἔρια ἂν πληγῇ, ἀλλὰ χαλκός καὶ ὅσα λεῖα καὶ κοῖλα, 15 ὁ μὲν χαλκός, ὅτι λεῖος· τὰ δὲ κοῖλα τῇ ἀνακλάσει πολλὰς ποιεῖ πληγὰς μετὰ τὴν πρώτην, ἀδυνατοῦντος ἐξελθεῖν τοῦ κινηθέντος. ἔτι ἀκούεται ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, ἀλλ ̓ ἧττον. § 3 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ψόφου κύριος ὁ ἀὴρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ· ἀλλὰ δεῖ στερεῶν πληγὴν γενέσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ὑπομένῃ πληγεὶς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ μὴ διαχυθῇ. διὸ ἐὰν ταχέως καὶ σφοδρῶς πληγῇ, ψοφεῖ· δεῖ γὰρ φθάσαι τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ῥαπίζοντος τὴν θρύψιν τοῦ ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σωρὸν ἢ ὁρμαθὸν ψάμμου τύπτοι τις φερόμε § 4 νον ταχύ. ἠχὼ δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος ἑνὸς γενομέ- 15 νου διὰ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τὸ διορίσαν καὶ κωλῦσαν θρυφθῆναι πάλιν ὁ ἀὴρ ἀπωσθῇ, ὥσπερ σφαίρα. ἔοικε δ' ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι ἠχώ, ἀλλ ̓ οὐ σαφής, ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει γε ἐπὶ τοῦ ψόφου 5. ἐνεργείᾳ Tor. 6. δυνάμει Ε Tor. marg. U. 24. ἂν om. STUX. 25. 15. ἔριον ἢ πατάξαν ή πληγέν, ἀλλὰ VX ἀπὸ τοῦ om. SUVX Tor. 20 |