actually two, because the organs of the one sense cannot take the place of those of the other. There is a question which might be started here. Every body, it will be granted, possesses depth, that is, is of the third dimension, and two bodies with some third body between them can never come into contact with one another. Now neither the moist nor the fluid can exist independently of water: they must either be or have water. But those objects which touch one another in water, seeing that the edges are not dry, must necessarily have between them water with which the extremities are filled. If however this be true, then it is impossible for one object really to be in contact with another in water, and the same thing holds good with objects in the air: the air standing in the same relation to the objects in it as that in which water stands to the objects in water, although we rather fail to notice, just like aquatic animals, whether the fluid touches on the fluid. The question then naturally arises whether there is one mode of sensation for all objects equally, or whether different kinds of objects are perceived in different manners. Popular thought accepts the latter view, and holds that the perceptions of touch and taste take place through immediate contact with their object, while the other senses operate at a distance. This however is not really the case. We really perceive both the hard and soft through media, just as we also do the sonorous, the visible, and odorous: the only difference being that in the one case the objects are further off, in the other case more close at hand. And thus, by reason of the close proximity, the fact escapes our notice, the real truth being that we perceive all objects through the intervention of some medium, although we fail to observe it in the senses we have mentioned. Yet, as we said before, were we to perceive all the objects of touch through a membrane of whose intervention we were unconscious, we should be in the same condition as we are in now both in water and in air, in which we imagine ourselves to touch the very objects themselves, and think of no intervening medium. There is, however, this difference between the object of touch and the objects of sight and sound, that, in the case of the latter, perception is the result of some action on the part of the ταξὺ ἀλλ ̓ ἅμα τῷ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ ὁ δι ̓ ἀσπίδος πλη- 15 γείς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀσπὶς πληγεῖσα ἐπάταξεν, ἀλλ ̓ ἅμ ̓ ἄμφω § 9 συνέβη πληγῆναι. ὅλως δ ̓ ἔοικεν ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, ὡς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν καὶ τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὥστ περ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἁπτομένου το οὔτ ̓ ἐκεῖ οὔτ ̓ ἐνταῦθα γένοιτ' ἂν αἴσθησις, οἷον εἴ τις σῶμα τὸ λευκὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄμματος θείη τὸ ἔσχατον. ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντὸς τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν συμβαίνοι ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτιθεμένων γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητή ριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένων αἰσθά- 25 § 1ο νεται· ὥστε τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ. ἁπταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ᾗ σῶμα· λέγω δὲ διαφορὰς αἳ τὰ στοιχεῖα διορίζουσι, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, περὶ § 11 ὧν εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ στοιχείων. τὸ δὲ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἁπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη ἀφὴ ὑπάρ- 30 χει πρώτῳ, τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι μόριον· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθά νεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἐστίν· ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, 4243 τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ δυνάμει ὄν. διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ ἢ σληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ 5 αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων· καὶ δεῖ ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον αἰσθή σεσθαι λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος μηδέτερον αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, δυνάμει δ' ἄμφω, (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων) καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς § 12 ἀφῆς μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρόν. ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ ὁρατοῦ καὶ το 13. ἐκεῖνα ESTUVX. 20. ἁπτομένων UVX. 16. ἀλλ ̓ ἅμ ̓ ἄμφω E. Tor., ἅμ' om. ceteri. 21. τὸ σῶμα Tor. 9. δὴ SUW. Trend. Bekk. STUVWXy. 28. als SUVX. 424 Ι. τὸ δυνάμει ὄν Tor. 2. ὁμοίου TUX. 6. αἰσθητήρια STUX. medium towards us, whereas in regard to the objects of touch we perceive not by means of, but along with the medium; just like a man who has been struck through his shield, where it is not the shield which by being struck has hit the man, but the two which have been struck together. Altogether, in short, the flesh and tongue seem to stand in the same relation to touch as that in which air and water do to sight, hearing, and smell. In the one case too, as little as in the other, would perception ensue on direct contact with the organ of sensation, as for instance by placing a white object on the very extremity of the eye. From this it is evident that the organ of touch is internal. For the same thing must happen in regard to touch as in regard to other senses. There, when anything is placed upon the actual organ, no perception follows; it is however perceived when placed upon the flesh, and hence, we may infer, it is the flesh which serves as medium for the sense of touch. It is then the different qualities of body qua body that are apprehended by the touch; such qualities being those which distinguish the different elements, viz. hot and cold, dry and moist, concerning which we have spoken before now in our Treatise on the Elements. And the organ fitted to perceive them by the touch and that in which what is called touch primarily inheres is a part which is in capacity what the objects of touch are in full actuality. For perception is a sort of passive impression, and thus the object which is acting makes the organ, which is potentially the same with it, to be actually so as well. Thus we do not perceive that which is hot or cold, or hard or soft to the same degree as we ourselves are, while we perceive the states that pass into extremes, sense-perception being as it were a sort of mean between the opposition in the things of sense. And hence it is that sense discriminates its objects; that which occupies the mean judging of the two extremes because it becomes for each of them its opposite. And just as that which is to perceive the white and black must be actually neither of them but potentially both, as is similarly the case with the other senses, so also, in the special case of touch, it should be neither hot nor cold. ἀοράτου ἦν πως ἡ ὄψις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ ἀνάπτου· ἄναπτον δ ̓ ἐστὶ τό τε μικρὰν ἔχον πάμπαν διαφορὰν τῶν ἁπτῶν, οἷον πέπονθεν ὁ ἀήρ, καὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί, ὥσπερ τὰ φθαρτικά. καθ ̓ ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴρηται 15 τύπῳ. ΧΙΙ. Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ 20 χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ ̓ οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρώμα ή χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ ̓ οὐχ ἡ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ ̓ § 2 ᾗ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, τὸ δ ̓ εἶναι ἔτε- 25 ρον· μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον· οὐ μὴν τό γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι, οὐδ ̓ ἡ αἴσθησις μέγεθός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λό§ 3 γος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου. φανερὸν δ ̓ ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια· ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ κίνησις, λύε- 30 ται ὁ λόγος, (τοῦτο δ ̓ ἦν ἡ αἴσθησις), ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συμ § 4 φωνία καὶ ὁ τόνος κρουομένων σφόδρα τῶν χορδῶν. καὶ διὰ 18. εἰδῶν om. SUX. Tor. EUVW. 24. 28. ἐκεῖνο Ε. τὸν om. Ε. 25. ταυτὰ SX. ταὐτόν Touch, again, is occupied at once with the tangible and the intangible, just as we saw that eye-sight was in a way perceptive both of the visible and the invisible and that the other senses equally applied themselves to opposites. By the intangible must here be understood both that which presents too slight differences to be discriminated by touch, (for instance, air,) and also those objects of touch which are in such excess as to be destructive of all sense-perception. A sketch has thus been given of the separate senses. CHAPTER XII. THE general character of sense in all its forms is to be found in seeing that sense-perception is that which is receptive of the forms of things sensible without their matter, just in the same way as wax receives the impress of the scal without the iron or the gold of which it is composed and takes the figure of the gold or bronze but at the same time not as bronze or gold. Similarly, sense receives the impress of each object that possesses colour, or flavour, or sound, not however, in so far as each of them is such and such a definite individual, but rather so far as it is of such and such a general character, and relatively to its notion. An organ of sense-perception then is reached so soon as any part displays this power of apprehending the general character of objects. And thus the organ and the faculty of sense are essentially and fundamentally the same, although they manifest themselves in different ways; otherwise in fact, the faculty perceiving would be as it were a sort of magnitude: whereas neither the essential character of perception nor the faculty of sense can be described as a magnitude-rather it is a power to read the essential notion of the object. These considerations shew why sentient impressions in excess destroy the organ of sense. The reason is that if the movement of the organ of sense be too strong, the relation, which, as we have seen, sense involves, is broken, much in the same manner as harmony and tone become discordant when the strings are violently struck. The same fact explains also |
