τί ποτε τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχι κὸν καὶ πάσχοντά τι ὑπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν· καὶ γὰρ ψύχεται καὶ θερμαίνεται· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ 424 τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οἵαν τὰ εἴδη δέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ § 5 πάσχειν μετὰ τῆς ὕλης. ἀπορήσειε δ ̓ ἄν τις εἰ πάθοι ἄν τι ὑπ ̓ ὀσμῆς τὸ ἀδύνατον ὀσφρανθῆναι, ἢ ὑπὸ χρώματος τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον ἰδεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ 5 τὸ ὀσφραντὸν ὀσμή, εἴ τι ποιεῖ, τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ποιεῖ. ὥστε τῶν ἀδυνάτων ὀσφρανθῆναι οὐθὲν οἷόν τε πάσχειν ὑπ ̓ ὀδμῆς· ὁ δ ̓ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· οὐδὲ τῶν δυ νατῶν, ἀλλ ̓ ᾗ αἰσθητικὸν ἕκαστον. ἅμα δὲ δῆλον καὶ οὕτως. οὔτε γὰρ φῶς καὶ σκότος οὔτε ψόφος οὔτε ὀσμὴ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ το τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ ̓ ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, οἷον ἀὴρ ὁ μετὰ βροντῆς § 6 διίστησι τὸ ξύλον. ἀλλὰ τὰ ἁπτὰ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ ποιοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ μή, ὑπὸ τίνος ἂν πάσχοι τὰ ἄψυχα καὶ ἀλλοιοῖτο; ἆρ ̓ οὖν κἀκεῖνα ποιήσει; ἢ οὐ πᾶν σῶμα παθητικὸν ὑπ ̓ ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου· καὶ τὰ πάσχοντα ἀόριστα, καὶ οὐ μένει, οἷον 15 ἀήρ' ὄζει γὰρ ὥσπερ παθών τι. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁ δ ̓ ἀὴρ παθὼν ταχέως αἰσθητὸς γίνεται. τι om. ETW, Tor. 424 4. ETWy, εμποιήσει Τ. 17. 7. ὑπ' ὀδμῆς om. SUX. ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι Ε. Tor. 14. ἐμποιεῖ why plants possess no sense-perception although they have a psychic element and are impressed in some degree by things tangible, becoming, as they do, both hot and cold. The reason is that they do not possess that faculty (which sense implies) of acting as a mean between extremes, and have no fundamental capacity for receiving the form only of the things of sense: but that on the contrary, at the same time as they receive the form of anything, they receive the matter likewise. The question might be further raised whether that which is without the sense of smell could be affected by odour, or that which is without the faculty of vision by colour, and so on, in like cases. In answer to this we may reply that if the object of smell be odour, it is the sense of smell (if anything) which odour calls into exercise; and therefore none of those objects that are without the faculty of smell can be affected by odour, (the same account being given also of the other senses); nor indeed can any of those objects which have the faculties of sense perceive anything except in so far as they have some particular sensitive capacity. The matter will be clear also in the following manner. Neither light, nor darkness, nor sound, nor smell, can produce any effect on bodies, although the substance in which they are contained may do so, just as it is the air which accompanies thunder that breaks up trees. Tangible qualities, however, and flavours do themselves act on bodies; otherwise, in fact, by what would things inanimate be affected and altered? Will not then, it may be said, other sensible qualities act also in this manner? Or is the truth this-that every body cannot be affected by smell and sound; and those objects which are affected by them (as, for instance, air,) are indefinite and shifting: for the air gives out odour as if it had been subject to an impression. What then, it may be said, is smell but an impression of this same kind? And to this we must reply that smelling over and beyond this mere impression means perceiving, whereas the impression of the air only makes it quickly perceptible. ero SI ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ Γ. Ὅτι δ ̓ οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἑτέρα παρὰ τὰς πέντε (λέγω δὲ ταύτας ὄψιν, ἀκοήν, ὄσφρησιν, γεῦσιν, ἀφήν), ἐκ τῶνδε πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις. εἰ γὰρ παντὸς οὗ ἐστιν αἴσθησις ἁφή, καὶ νῦν αἴσθησιν ἔχομεν (πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ ἢ ἁπτὸν πάθη τῇ ἁφῇ ἡμῖν αἰσθητά ἐστιν), ἀνάγκη τ', εἴπερ ἐκλείπει τις 25 αἴσθησις, καὶ αἰσθητήριόν τι ἡμῖν ἐκλείπειν· καὶ ὅσων μὲν αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι αἰσθανόμεθα, τῇ ἁφῇ αἰσθητά ἐστιν, ἣν τυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες· ὅσα δὲ διὰ τῶν μεταξύ, καὶ μὴ αὐ τῶν ἁπτόμενοι, τοῖς ἁπλοῖς, λέγω δ ̓ οἷον ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι· § 2 ἔχει δ' οὕτως, ὥστ ̓ εἰ μὲν δι ̓ ἑνὸς πλείω αἰσθητὰ ἕτερα ὄντα 30 ἀλλήλων τῷ γένει, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰσθητή ριον ἀμφοῖν αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι· οἷον εἰ ἐξ ἀέρος ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ ψόφου καὶ χρόας· εἰ δὲ πλείω τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χρόας καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ (άμφω γάρ διαφανή), 425 καὶ ὁ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἔχων μόνον αἰσθήσεται τοῦ δι ̓ ἀμ § 3 φοῖν. τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν ἐκ δύο τούτων αἰσθητήρια μόνον ἐστίν, 424 22. τούτων EW. τῶνδε δῆλον SX. 27. αὐτῶν] αὐτοὶ TW. 29. ἁπλοῖς διαστήμασι λ. Wy. ἀμφοῖν TW. 425 2. αἰσθήσεται ἀμφοῖν Bekk., τοῖν ἀμφοῖν L., τοῦ δι BOOK THIRD. CHAPTER I. The five senses just enumerated-sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch—would seem to comprise all our perceptive faculties and to leave no further sense to be explained. The following considerations will help to make this clear. Let it be granted that we, as matters stand, perceive everything of which touch is the appropriate sense, since all the properties of the tangible as such are perceived by us through touch: and let it be allowed, further, that the absence of any faculty of sense-perception involves the absence of the corresponding organ. Now all those objects which are naturally known by actual contact are perceived through the sense of touch, and this we actually possess: those objects, on the other hand, which are known through media without contact on our part, are perceived through the elements such as air and water. (Thus if several objects of sense, different in kind from one another, are perceived through one such element, it follows of necessity that any one possessing one such organ must have the power also of perceiving both qualities so that for instance, if the organ is composed of air, and air is the medium both of sound and colour, the one organ will perceive both qualities. If, on the other hand, there be several elements acting as media to one and the same objectfor instance, both air and water, as being both pellucid, act as media for colour-the possession of one only of these media will ensure the perception of that which can be seen through one or other medium.) Now it is from these two alone among the elements-that is, air and water-that the organs of sense W. AR. 9 5 ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόρη ὕδατος, ἡ δ ̓ ἀκοὴ ἀέρος, ἡ δ ̓ ὄσφρησις θατέρου τούτων. τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἢ οὐθενὸς ἦς κοινὸν πάντων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἄνευ θερμότητος αἰσθητικόν· γῆ δὲ ἢ οὐθενός, ἢ ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ μάλιστα μέμικται ἰδίως. διὸ λείποιτ' § 4 ἂν μηθὲν εἶναι αἰσθητήριον ἔξω ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔχουσιν ἔνια ζῷα. πᾶσαι ἄρα αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἔχονται ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀτελῶν μηδὲ πεπηρωμένων· φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ το ἡ ἀσπάλαξ ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα ἔχουσα ὀφθαλμούς· ὥστ ̓ εἰ μή τι ἕτερόν ἐστι σῶμα, καὶ πάθος ὃ μηθενός ἐστι τῶν ἐνταῦθα § 5 σωμάτων, οὐδεμία ἂν ἐκλείποι αἴσθησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν οἷόν τ ̓ εἶναι αἰσθητήριόν τι ἴδιον, ὧν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα κατά συμβεβηκός, οἷον κινήσεως, στάσεως, 15 σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ, ἑνός· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα, οἷον μέγεθος κινήσει· ὥστε καὶ σχῆμα μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα· τὸ δ ̓ ἠρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαι· ὁ δ ̓ ἀριθμὸς τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις· ἑκάστη γὰρ ἓν αἰσθάνεται αἴσθησις. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ὁτουοῦν το ἰδίαν αἴσθησιν εἶναι τούτων, οἷον κινήσεως· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται § 6 ὥσπερ νῦν τῇ ὄψει τὸ γλυκὺ αἰσθανόμεθα· τοῦτο δ ̓ ὅτι ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντες τυγχάνομεν αἴσθησιν, ᾗ καὶ ὅταν συμπέσωσιν ἅμα γνωρίζομεν. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἀλλ ̓ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ᾔσθανόμεθα, οἷον τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν οὐχ ὅτι 15 20 |