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are constructed. (Thus the pupil of the eye consists of water : the organ of hearing is composed of air: the sense of smell depends on one or other of these two.) As for fire, on the other hand, it is either a constituent in no one of the organs
of sense or it is a common element in all, as there is no faculty of sense which can act independently of heat; and as regards earth, it is either present in none of the organs, or it is chiefly incorporated in a special manner with the touch. Hence then no element is left to act as an organ of sense-perception outside air and water. Now, as matter of fact, several animals do possess the organs so constituted. Thus, then, we may venture to conclude, all the senses are possessed by those animals which are not imperfect nor mutilated : even the mole is found to have eyes underneath its skin. And thus, unless there exist bodies differing from those we know, and unless there are properties of substances which are found in none of those around us, it would follow that no sense whatever can be wanting to us.
Nor can there, in the next place, be any one special organ for those common properties which we perceive in connection with each perception—such properties, viz., as movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number and unity. All of these are perceived as some modification or other of movement. Thus, for instance, magnitude is perceived in connection with such movement, and this also is the case with figure (a kind of magnitude) while rest is perceived by the absence of movement. Number, on the other hand, is apprehended by the negation of continuity, as also by the individual senses, because the object of each sensation is a unit. It is, therefore, clearly impossible that there should be any one particular sense attached to any of these forms, as for instance movement. Were there in fact such a special sense appropriated to the common sensibles, we should perceive them only in the way in which we now perceive something to be sweet through seeing it-because, that is, we happen to possess from past experience a perception of two qualities united in one object, and thereby, when the two qualities coexist, we know them together. Apart, indeed, from such co-existence of the two qualities, we should have no perception of them except incidentally, just as we know the son of Cleon, not as
Κλέωνος υιός, αλλ' ότι λευκός, τούτω δε συμβέβηκεν υιω
$ Κλέωνος είναι. των δε κοινών ήδη έχομεν αίσθησιν κοινήν,
ου κατα συμβεβηκός" ουκ άρ' έστιν ιδία ουδαμώς γαρ αν
ήσθανόμεθα άλλ' ή ούτως ώσπερ είρηται τον Κλέωνος υιον
ημάς οράν. τα δ' αλλήλων ίδια κατά συμβεβηκός αισθά- 30
νονται αι αισθήσεις, ουχ η αυται, αλλ' ή μία, όταν άμα
γένηται η αίσθησις επί του αυτού, οίον χολήν ότι πικρά 425
και ξανθή ου γαρ δη ετέρας γε το ειπείν ότι άμφω έν διο και απατάται, και εαν η ξανθόν, χολήν οίεται
8 8 είναι. ζητήσειε δ' άν τις τίνος ένεκα πλείους έχομεν αισθήσεις,
αλλ' ου μίαν μόνην. ή όπως ήττον λανθάνη τα ακολουθούντα και
και κοινά, οίον κίνησις και μέγεθος και αριθμός ει γαρ ήν η όψις μόνη, και αυτη λευκού, ελάνθανεν αν μάλλον
και έδόκει ταυτό είναι πάντα δια το ακολουθείν αλλήλους
άμα χρώμα και μέγεθος. νύν δ' έπει και εν ετέρω αισθητω τα κοινά υπάρχει, δηλον ποιεί ότι άλλο τι έκαστον 1ο
ΙΙ. Επει δ' αισθανόμεθα ότι δρώμενα και ακούομεν, ανάγκη
29. ή om. ELTV.
31. αυται] αι αύται SUy. Trend. Βekk. χολή STUVWXy. .
5. μόνον SUX. ήττον] μη TVWXy. κάν LSTUVWX. . 9. άμα] coni. Tor. αεί.
4256 1. ότι
such, but as a white object, to which it is an incidental concomitant, to be the son of Cleon. But when we reach the common sensibles we find we have a common perception of them which enters into all the senses, not a perception incidentally united with some single sense. There is, therefore, no one special sense assigned to the common properties of objects of sensation; for were there only such a special sense, we should never perceive them except in that incidental manner in which, as has been said, we see through something white the son of Cleon. At the same time, the faculties of sense do perceive the qualities that belong to adjacent senses incidentally, but they do so not as separate senses in themselves, but in so far as they meet in one, when one perception takes place simultaneously with another in regard to the same object. It is, for instance, in this manner that sense perceives gall to be both bitter and yellow : it is not the part of any separate sense to say that both qualities are in union : this, indeed, is just the reason why people are deceived, and led to suppose that if a fluid be yellow it must be gall.
The question may now be raised, why is it that we have several senses, and not one only, in order to perceive these common properties of sense? The reason may be that it is to prevent the common qualities associated with particular sensations, such as motion, magnitude, and number, escaping possibly our observation. Were sight the only sense which we possessed, restricted, say, for instance, to white colour, all other qualities would readily escape our notice, and would be thought to be the same with the reports of particular sensations, in consequence of the manner in which such qualities as colour and magnitude accompany each other. On the other hand, with the arrangement which prevails, the presence of the common qualities in other objects of sensation makes it evident that each of them is different.
In addition to actually seeing and hearing, we perceive also that we see and that we hear. We must then perceive that we
ή τη όψει αισθάνεσθαι ότι ορα, ή ετέρα. αλλ' ή αυτή έσται της όψεως και του υποκειμένου χρώματος. ώστε ή δύο του αυτού έσονται και αυτη αυτής. έτι δ' ει και ετέρα είη η της 15
όψεως αίσθησις, ή εις άπειρον είσιν ή αυτή τις έσται αυτής. $ 2 ώστ' επί της πρώτης τούτο ποιητέον. έχει δ' απορίαν· ει γαρ
το τη όψει αισθάνεσθαι εστιν οράν, οράται δε χρώμα ή το
έχoν, εί όψεται τις το ορών, και χρώμα εξει το όρων πρώ8 3 τον. φανερον τοίνυν ότι ουχ έν τό τή όψει αισθάνεσθαι· και 20
γαρ όταν μη ορώμεν, τη όψει κρίνομεν και το σκότος και το φως, αλλ' ουχ ωσαύτως. έτι δε και το ορών έστιν ως κεχρωμάτισται το γαρ αισθητήριον δεκτικών του αισθητού άνευ
της ύλης έκαστον· διό και απελθόντων των αισθητων ένεισιν $ 4 αι αισθήσεις και φαντασίαι εν τοις αισθητηρίοις. ή δε του 25
αισθητου ενέργεια και της αισθήσεως ή αυτή μέν έστι και μία, το δ' είναι ου ταυτον αυταίς: λέγω δ' οίον ψόφος και κατ' ενέργειας και ακοή ή κατ' ενέργειαν· έστι γαρ ακοήν έχοντα: μη ακούειν, και το έχον ψόφον ουκ αεί ψοφεί. όταν δ' ενεργή το δυνάμενον ακούειν και ψοφή το δυνάμενον ψοφεϊν, τότε 30 η κατ' ενέργειαν ακοή άμα γίνεται και ο κατ' ενέργειαν ψό
φος, ών είπειεν αν τις το μεν είναι άκουσιν το δε ψόφησιν. 426 $ 5 ει δ' έστιν η κίνησης και η ποίησις και το πάθος εν τω ποιου
15. ή Ε. Tor., om. ceteri. τ6. ανεισιν LUWΧ.
17. ποιητέον] coni. Tor. θετέον, vel δοτέον, ego τούτ' οίητέον. 27. ου το αυτό αυταίς EL. Tor. (1 οίον ο ψόφος ο ΕLW. Tor. 426" 1. ών] ώστ' TW. Η φήσομεν SUVX. 2. ει δη δη ELSTUVXy. .
see either by means of eye-sight itself or by some other sense. In the latter case, however, there will be one and the same sense relating to the eye-sight and to the colour which is its object : and thus there must either be two senses concerned with one and the same object or the sense must itself possess the perception of itself. And, further, even if the sense which thus perceives sight were different from sight itself, this would either involve another sense ad infinitum or there must at last be a sense which perceives its own action. We must, therefore, ascribe this faculty of sense-perception to the original sense itself.
Here, however, a difficulty meets us. To perceive anything by sight is, it may be said, to see: and it is colour, or what possesses colour, that is seen. Hence, it may be thought, the original sense must, in order to perceive the seeing organ, possess colour also. The difficulty so raised shews that perception by sight is not used in one single sense; even when we see nothing we are still able to distinguish by the eye-sight both darkness and light, though not, it is true, in the same manner. Further, however, there is a sense in which the organ of sight may be said to be coloured : because the perceptive organ is in each case suited to receive the object of sense without the matter of which it is composed. Hence in fact the reason why, even after the objects of sense have passed away, the perceptions and the images which represent them continue to subsist within the perceptive organs.
The object of sense is in fact, at the moment when it is perceived, identical with the actual exercise of sense-perception, although it is true the aspect which the former presents to us is different from that of the latter. Thus it is, for example, with sound as actually expressed and hearing as actually exercised: one possessed of the sense of hearing need not actually hear, and that which is capable of producing sound need not be always actually sounding : it is only when that which is capable of hearing actually realizes itself, and that which is capable of sounding actually expresses sound, that at one and the same time hearing in full activity and sound in full activity are attained, so that there would be said to be hearing on the one side, sounding on the other. Now, if it be in the object as it is