objects, it is evident that the mere fleshly organism is not the ultimate organ of sense-perception: because in that case the discriminating faculty would have to distinguish on merely coming into contact with the sensible object. Thus then it is impossible for the senses taken apart from one another, to decide that what is (say) sweet is different from what is white: on the contrary, both the qualities must be exhibited to some one faculty. It is just in fact as if I were to perceive the one and you the other; it would then be evident that our two perceptions are different from one another: but still it would be necessary to have some one referee to assert the difference: and just in the same way as such an assertion is made, do thought and perception also operate. It is clear then that the separate senses cannot apart pass judgment on separate perceptions. Nor, further, can such a judgment be passed at different times. Just as it is one and the same principle which asserts that the good and bad are different, so further when it maintains the one to be different it also at the same time maintains the other to be so also. Nor is this identity of time simply incidental: it is not, that is, as if its assertion were merely like saying "I at present assert the difference," without adding also that "the difference holds good at present"-rather the one principle, which thus distinguishes both, maintains at present the difference, and maintains it to hold good at present: that is to say, it makes the two statements simultaneously; so that its judgment is inseparable, and made in a single inseparable moment of time. But, it may be said, the same thing, cannot as undivided and within an undivided point of time be at one and the same time moved with contrary movements. Yet if a quality be sweet it moves sense or thought in such and such a manner, while what is bitter does so in a contrary manner, and what is white must do so in a manner different from both. Must not then the discriminating faculty be simultaneously on the one hand numerically one and undivided, but on the other hand separated in the mode of its existence? The truth is, there is a sense in which this distinguishing principle perceives what is divided as divided, while in another sense it does so as one un 10 § 14 εἶναι μὲν γὰρ διαιρετόν, τόπῳ δὲ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον. ἢ 5 οὐχ οἷόν τε; δυνάμει μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τἀναντία, τῷ δ ̓ εἶναι οὔ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνεργεῖσθαι διαιρετόν, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν εἶναι, ὥστ ̓ οὐδὲ τὰ εἴδη § 15 πάσχειν αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ νόησις. ἀλλ ̓ ὥσπερ ἣν καλοῦσί τινες στιγμήν, ᾗ μία καὶ ᾗ δύο, ταύτῃ καὶ διαιρετή. ᾗ μὲν οὖν ἀδιαίρετον, ἓν τὸ κρῖνόν ἐστι καὶ ἅμα, ᾗ δὲ διαιρετὸν ὑπάρχει, δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ χρῆται σημείῳ ἅμα. ᾗ μὲν οὖν δυσὶ χρῆται τῷ πέρατι, δύο κρίνει καὶ κεχωρι σμένα ἔστιν ὡς κεχωρισμένῳ· ᾗ δ ̓ ἕν, ἑνὶ καὶ ἅμα. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ᾗ φαμὲν τὸ ζῷον αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι, διω- 15 ρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. III. Ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο διαφοραῖς ὁρίζονται μάλιστα τὴν ψυχήν, κινήσει τε τῇ κατὰ τόπον καὶ τῷ νοεῖν καὶ τῷ κρίνειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι εἶναι· ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι ἡ 20 ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων· καὶ οἱ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρο 6. διαιρετὸν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον UWy Ald. Sylb. Tor. τινες στιγμήν coni. Trend. 10. ὥσπερ ἐν καλοῦσι II. καὶ ἀδιαίρετος καὶ διαιρετή· ἡ κ.τ.λ. Tor. 13. ὡς δυσί, coni. Trend. Tor. ὑπάρχει, οὐχ ἓν δὶς γὰρ Ald. Sylb. Tor. κεχωρισμένω ELT, ως κεχωρισμένων VS. 16. ορίσθω Ε. 12. 14. divided faculty; because while it is divided in its application or its mode of being, it is in regard of its seat of action and as viewed numerically one single undivided principle. Or is this really impossible? Potentially, it may be said, the same subject, and that one undivided, may present opposite qualities: but this cannot be the case with its definite existence; in its operation and working these characteristics are divided. The same thing, in fact, cannot be at once black and white: and so, if perception and thought be nothing but a passive reception of such qualities, they cannot be impressed at one and the same time with the forms which represent these contraries. To this objection it may be replied that the matter stands just as with the point (as some describe it), which, so far as it is one, may be regarded as undivided, while so far as it is two, it is divided. So far then as the principle of judgment is undivided, so far it is one single faculty acting in one moment: so far as it shows itself divided, it uses the same point twice at two simultaneous times. So far then as our faculty of discrimination makes use of the termination of this point as two, it distinguishes two qualities, and the objects are separated as the faculty is separated; while so far as it is one single faculty, it judges by one single act and within a single point of time. Thus much on the principle through which, according to our view, the living being is endowed with powers of senseperception. CHAPTER III. Two differentiae are chiefly used to characterize the soul-local movement on the one hand, thought discrimination and perception on the other. The popular mind thus comes to look at thought and understanding as a kind of sense-perception, on the ground that at once in thought and in sense the soul distinguishes and cognizes things. And in fact the older thinkers actually identify νεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εμπεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε “ πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώ ποισιν” καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις “ ὅθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται.” τὸ δ ̓ αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται καὶ τὸ Ὁμή- 15 § 2 ρου “ τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστίν.” πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τε καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ ̓ ἀρχὰς λόγοις διωρίσαμεν. καίτοι ἔδει ἅμα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἠπατῆσθαι αὐτοὺς λέγειν οἰκειότερον γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις, 427 καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖ ἡ ψυχή. διὸ ἀνάγκη ἤτοι ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου θίξιν ἀπάτην εἶναι τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνωρίζειν· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη καὶ : § 3 ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐ τόν ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν, φανερόν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσι μέτεστι, τοῦ δὲ ὀλίγοις τῶν ζῴων. ἀλλ ̓ οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς, τὸ μὲν ὀρθῶς φρόνησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα ἀληθής, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς τἀναντία τούτων· οὐδὲ τοῦτο δ ̓ ἐστὶ ταὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθής, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, διανοεῖσθαι δ ̓ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψευδῶς, καὶ § 4 οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει ᾧ μὴ καὶ λόγος· φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ 25. βούλεται τούτοις STUVWy. 26. τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων 4275 2. 11. ταὐτὸν L. τὸ αὐτὸ STUVWX. ἀνθρώπων, οἷον ἐπ ̓ ἦμαρ ἄγησι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε Ald Sylb. thought with sense-perception. Thus, for example, Empedocles maintains: "Wisdom increases to men according to what they experience." And in another passage he observes : "Hence variation of thought presents itself ever before them." To similar effect also are the words of Homer: "Of such kind is the reason." All these writers, in fact, understand thought to be something bodily, just like sense-perception: and they suppose perception and thought lie in the apprehension of the like by the like, as was laid down at the beginning of this treatise. They should, however, before thus identifying sense and thought, have discussed the nature of error and misconception, a state which is somewhat distinctively [in opposition to inanimate things which cannot err] the condition of living beings, and in which the soul continues for a considerable length of time. Thinkers, then, who thus identify sense and thought must either, as some do, maintain all presentations of the senses to be true, or they must explain misconception through contact on the part of the dissimilar, this being the opposite of knowing like by like. But this latter explanation is entirely at variance with the ordinary view, that in reference to contraries the knowledge and the misapprehension of them are one and the same. Manifestly, then, thought is not the same as sense-perception. The latter is possessed by all animals without exception: the former is the property of but a few. But neither again is thought as a process leading to results now correct, now incorrectcorrect thought being understanding, scientific knowledge, and true opinion, incorrect thought their opposites-neither is this process of thought identical with sense-perception. The perception of the qualities peculiar to each sense is always true, and is an attribute of every animal: thought, on the contrary, may be false as well as true, and is possessed by no animals that do not have as well intelligible language. [Imagination, indeed, the animal does have,] but this is different at once from sense-perception and from understanding: W. AR. ΙΟ |