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ple, bears the image of being but a foot in its diameter, while at the same time the observer is convinced that it is larger than the earth. Here, then, [imagination and opinion are at variance, and if imagination be opinion] one of two things must result. Either, we must say, the man, in having this imagination, must have thrown off the true opinion which he had in presence of the fact while it remained unaltered, unless we are to suppose that he has forgotten or been led to change his views, or if he still preserves his opinion, then it follows necessarily that the same opinion is true and false. (Of course, it might be said that an opinion previously true would become false, in case the object were to alter in its character without our cognizance.)

Imagination, then, is not to be identified with any of these faculties, nor is it the result of their combination. It is, however, a law of nature that whenever one object is moved, another is moved by it. Now imagination is thought to be a form of movement, and is believed to be dependent on the senses so far as to arise only in those who perceive, and relatively to the objects of perception. And while such movement must result from sense as actually realized, and must itself be like the senseperception, this movement, it follows, can neither exist without sense-perception nor can it be the property of any that do not have perceptive powers. It follows, further, that the possessor of this faculty may be both active and receptive in many ways regarding it, and the imagination itself may be both true and false. This results from the following considerations. The perception of the particular qualities of sense is true or marked by falsity only to the smallest possible degree. But, secondly, there is the perception of the concomitance of these qualities. And here error is possible: for while sense is never mistaken in that the object is for instance white, it may be mistaken as to whether it is this thing or some other object that is white. Thirdly, we must note the perception of the common sensibles —that is, of those properties which are associated with the objects to which the particular qualities belong—such objects, namely, of perception as movement and magnitude, which are concomitants of sensible phenomena, and with respect to which it is particularly possible to be deceived in our perception. Such,

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IV. Περί δε του μορίου του της ψυχής και γινώσκει τε η ψυχή και φρονεί, είτε χωριστού όντος είτε και μη χωριστού

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then, being the varying degrees of truth in sense-perception, there will be a difference in the movement which results from the exercise of each of these three perceptive faculties. Thus the movement in the first instance is true while the perception itself is present: the movements in the other two cases might be both in the presence and in the absence of the sensation possibly false: and this especially in any case in which the object of sensation is far distant from its organ.

Thus, then, if there be nothing but imagination which possesses the attributes that have been mentioned, and this be the faculty we have described, imagination will be a movement resulting from the actual operation of the faculty of sense. And, further, since it is the eye-sight that is the most important sense, imagination has received its name from 'light,' because without light it is impossible to see. And because the pictures of imagination continue to subsist in a way resembling the perceptions of the senses, animals act frequently in accordance with the pictures which imagination offers, some (as is the case with brute beasts) because they have no faculty of reason, others because their reason is at times obscured by passion, or disease, or sleep, as is the case with man. And here we conclude our account of the nature and conditions of imagination.

CHAPTER IV.

We must next discuss the cognitive and thinking part of soul, whether it be separated from our other mental faculties or whether it is not separated physically, but be so only by thought and abstraction, and inquire what is the specific character of thought, and how it is that at some stage or another thought begins to operate.

Thinking, we may assume, is like perception, and, if so, consists in being affected by the object of thought or in something else of this nature. Like sense then, thought or reason must be not entirely passive, but receptive of the form—that is, it must be potentially like this form, but not actually identical with it: it will stand, in fact, towards its objects in the same relation as

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