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to be an object of thought not through anything outside itself, but simply in and by itself, and supposing that the object of thought is always something homogeneous: or it must have some element compounded with it which makes it capable of being thought like other real things. Or may we not rather hold that the receptivity of reason is possible only in virtue of some common element ? And hence it has been already said that reason is in a way potentially one with the ideas of reason, though it is actually nothing but a mere capacity before the exercise of thought. We must suppose, in short, that the process of thought is like that of writing on a writing-tablet on which nothing is yet actually written.
Thus the reason can be thought just in the same way as can objects of thought generally. [For such objects of thought are either immaterial or material.] Now in the case of immaterial objects, the subject thinking and the object thought are one and the same: just as speculative science is equivalent to the objects and ideas of speculative knowledge (a fact, it is true, which leaves the question-why we do not always think, to be investigated). In the case, on the contrary, of those objects which are imbedded in matter, each of the ideas of reason is present, if only potentially and implicitly. And thus reason is not to be regarded as belonging to and governed by the things of sense (reason being a faculty independent of the matter of such objects), but the world of thought must be regarded as belonging to and regulated by reason.
The same differences, however, as are found in nature as a whole must be characteristic also of the soul. Now in nature there is on the one hand that which acts as material substratum to each class of objects, this being that which is potentially all of them: on the other hand, there is the element which is causal and creative in virtue of its producing all things, and which stands towards the other in the same relation as that in which art
προς την ύλην πέπoνθεν, ανάγκη και εν τη ψυχή υπάρχειν ταύτας τας διαφοράς, και έστιν ο μεν τοιούτος νους τα πάντα γίνεσθαι, ο δε τα πάντα ποιείν, ως έξις τις, οίον το φως 15 τρόπον γάρ τινα και το φως ποιεί τα δυνάμει όντα χρώ
ματα ενεργεία χρώματα, και ούτος ο νούς χωριστος και 8 2 αμιγής και απαθής, τη ουσία ών ενεργεία. αεί γαρ τιμιώτερον
το ποιούν του πάσχοντος και η αρχή της ύλης. το δ' αυτό έστιν ή κατ' ενέργειαν επιστήμη τα πράγματι η δε κατά δύναμιν χρόνω προτέρα εν τω ενί, όλως δε ουδέ χρόνω. αλλ' ουχ οτε μεν νοεί οτέ δ' ού νοεί. χωρισθείς δ' έστι μόνον τούθ' όπερ εστί, και τούτο μόνον αθάνατον και αίδιον. ου μνημονεύομεν δε, ότι τούτο μεν απαθές, ο δε παθητικός νούς φθαρτός, και άνευ τούτου ούθεν νοεί.
VI. Η μεν ούν των αδιαιρέτων νόησις εν τούτοις, περί α ουκ έστι το ψεύδος εν οις δε και το ψεύδος και το αληθές, σύνθεσίς τις ήδη νοημάτων ώσπερ εν όντων, καθάπερ Εμπεδοκλής έφη “η πολλών μεν κόρσαι άναυχενες εβλάστησαν,”
έπειτα συντίθεσθαι τη φιλία. ούτω και ταύτα κεχωρισμένα 30 8 2 συντίθεται, οίον το ασύμμετρον και η διάμετρος. αν δε γενο
18. απαθής και αμιγής EL. Trend. Βekk. 1 ενεργεία] ενέργεια Tor.
19. το δ' αυτό] αυτό δ' STUVWXy. 21. ουδε χρονώ] ου χρ. EL. Trend. Βekk. 22. ουχ om. Wy. Tor.
31. συντίθεται] συντίθεσθαι STVWy. Η διάμετρος ή το σύμμετρον και η διάμετρος W. Tor. Simplic. Η γενομένων] γινομένων VWX Trend. .
stands towards the materials on which it operates. Thus reason is, on the one hand, of such a character as to become all things, on the other hand of such a nature as to create all things, acting then much in the same way as some positive quality, such as for instance light: for light also in a way creates actual out of potential colour.
This phase of reason is separate from and uncompounded with material conditions, and, being in its essential character fully and actually realized, it is not subject to impressions from without: for the creative is in every case more honourable than the passive, just as the originating principle is superior to the matter which it forms. And thus, though knowledge as an actually realized condition is identical with its object, this knowledge as a potential capacity is in time prior in the individual, though in universal existence it is not even in time thus prior to actual thought. Further, this creative reason does not at one time think, at another time not think: [it thinks eternally :) and when separated from the body it remains nothing but what it essentially is: and thus it is alone immortal and eternal. Of this unceasing work of thought, however, we retain no memory, because this reason is unaffected by its objects; whereas the receptive passive intellect (which is affected) is perishable, and can really think nothing without the support of the creative intellect.
With regard then to the exercise of reason, the thinking of isolated single terms falls within a sphere in which there is no falsity: when, on the other hand, we find both falsity and truth, there we reach a certain combination of ideas as constituting one conception : much in the same way as Empedocles said : “Thereupon many there were whose heads grew up neckless entirely:" but were afterwards brought together by friendship. In a corresponding fashion is it that those notions which are originally separate are afterwards connected, as is, for instance, the case with the two notions incommensurate and
μένων ή έσομένων, τον χρόνον προσεννοών και συντιθείς. το 43o γαρ ψεύδος έν συνθέσει αεί και γαρ αν το λευκόν μη λευκόν, το μή λευκόν συνέθηκεν. (ενδέχεται δε και διαίρεσιν φάναι πάντα.) αλλ' ούν έστι γε ου μόνον το ψεύδος ή αληθές,
ότι λευκός Κλέων εστίν, αλλά και ότι ήν ή έσται. το δε εν 5 8 3 ποιούν, τούτο ο νους έκαστον. το δ' αδιαίρετον έπει διχως, ή
δυνάμει η ενεργεία, ούθεν κωλύει νοείν το αδιαίρετον, όταν νοή, το μήκος (αδιαίρετον γαρ ενεργεία) και ένα χρόνο αδιαιρέτων ομοίως γαρ ο χρόνος διαιρετός και αδιαίρετος το μήκει. ούκουν έστιν ειπείν εν τω ημίσει τι ενόει εκατέρω: ου το γάρ έστιν, αν μη διαιρεθή, αλλ' ή δυνάμει. χωρίς δ' εκάτερον νοών των ημίσεων διαιρεί και τον χρόνον άμα τότε
δ' οιονεί μήκη. ει δ' ως εξ αμφούν, και εν τω χρόνω τω 8 4 επ' αμφοίν. το δε μή κατά ποσον αδιαίρετον αλλά το εί
δει νοεί εν αδιαιρέτω χρόνω και αδιαιρέτο της ψυχής: 15 κατά συμβεβηκός δέ, και ουχ ή εκείνα διαιρετά, ω νοεί και εν ω χρόνω, αλλ' ή αδιαίρετα ένεστι γαρ κάν τούτοις τι αδιαίρετον, αλλ' ίσως ου χωριστόν, ο ποιεί ένα τον χρόνον και το μήκος, και τούθ' ομοίως έν άπαντί έστι τω συνεχεί
το μή λευκόν λευκών σ. Trend.
4. πάντα] ταύτα coni. Το.
ενόει L. Tor., εννοεί SVX, ενόεις y,
το αδ.] το διαιρετόν ή αδιαίρετον conj. Tor. εννοείν ΤUW.
13. μήκει STV.
diagonal. Should the notions in question be, however, related to the past or to the future, thought then adds on the idea of time to that of mere connection. Falsehood, in fact, always involves combination and connection: even in asserting the white to be not white we bring not-white into a combination. It should be added, at the same time, that all this process might be described, not as combination, but rather as disjunction or division. Anyhow it follows that truth or falsehood is not limited to saying that “Cleon is white,” but includes the judgment that he was or will be: and the process of thus reducing our ideas into the unity of a single judgment is in each case the work of reason.
Further light is thrown upon this unity of thought by considering that the indivisible and continuous presents itself before us in two forms, either as potential or as actual. There is therefore nothing to prevent us conceiving extended and thus divisible space, at the time when we think it, as indivisible (because as it actually exists it is thus indivisible): and also doing so within an indivisible moment of time, because time, just as extended length, may be conceived of either as divided or as undivided. And therefore it is impossible to state what was thought in each of the two halves of time: because, unless it be divided, there is no such half existing actually, but only potentially: although, in so far as the reason thinks of the two halves separately, it divides the time likewise, and thinks it just as two lengths. If, on the other hand, the reason think its object as consisting of two halves, then it thinks them also in a time which is spread over two halves.
With respect to what is indivisible, not quantitatively but specifically, this the reason thinks within an undivided space of time and with the undivided action of the soul [and this not as an essential property of the object which is indivisible], but as an incidental concomitant of the mental process, and thus not in so far as the mental action and the time are divisible, but rather in so far as they are indivisible. For in such objects also there is something which is indivisible, though perhaps it cannot be separated from its setting—something which makes the time and the length into one ; and this also is the case with everything