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hand, contraries, such as black and white (which do thus belong to one and the same conception]. [Consider, then the question, first of all, relatively to homogeneous objects and conceptions.] Whatever be the relation in which A (the objective quality white) stands to B (objective black); C and D [the idea of white and the idea of black] will stand to one another in the same relation as the former pair. (Hence, of course, also alternando: A will stand to C as B to D.) If, then, C and D attach themselves to some one act of mind, they will hold themselves just as A and B-that is, they will be one and the same, though their aspect or mode of existence differs; and the sameness and unity which thus attaches to them will be simply like that of the actual concrete qualities. And the same proportion would result were we to make A represent the sweet and B the white.
Thus then the reason, while employing as its materials the images of sense, grasps from among them general ideas; and in the same manner as it determines for itself within these images what is to be pursued and what avoided, so also outside the actual perception of these objects it is, when engaged merely with the images of sense, stirred up to action. [Thus then the practical reason, in dealing with the perceptions and the images of sense, translates them into ideas of what is good and evil] much in the same way as a man on perceiving a torch-light, which sense presents to himself simply as a fire, comes, by the action of the central sense, when he sees it moved, to know that it signifies the approach of an enemy. Similarly also, when dealing with mere images or notions in the mind, we calculate as if we had the facts before our eyes, and deliberate upon
the future in relation to the present. And, further, when the reason in the speculative sphere asserts something to be pleasant or painful, within the practical sphere it pursues it or avoids it, and, in a word, steps forth into action. Independently, however, of action, truth and falsehood are of the same character as good and evil: but they differ in so far as the two former are absolute, the two latter relative to some person or object.
As for so-called abstractions, the mind thinks them just as it might snubnosedness: for just as qua snubnosed the mind cannot conceive this abstractedly and by itself, but qua hollow can by
ου κεχωρισμένως, η δε κοίλον, εί τις ενόει ενεργεία, άνευ
της σαρκός άν ενόει εν ή το κοίλον. ούτω τα μαθηματικά 15 8 8 ου κεχωρισμένα ως κεχωρισμένα νοεί, όταν νοή εκείνα. όλως
δε ο νους έστιν και κατ' ενέργειαν τα πράγματα νοών. άρα δ' ενδέχεται των κεχωρισμένων τι νοείν όντα αυτον μη κεχωρισμένος μεγέθους, ή ού, σκεπτέον ύστερον.
VIII. Νύν δε περί ψυχής τα λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαντες, είπωμεν πάλιν ότι η ψυχή τα όντα πώς έστι πάντα. ή γαρ αισθητά τα όντα ή νοητά, έστι δ' η επιστήμη μέν
τα επιστητά πως, ή δ' αίσθησις τα αισθητά πως δε τούτο, 8 2 δει ζητειν. τέμνεται ούν η επιστήμη και η αίσθησις εις τα
πράγματα, η μεν δυνάμει εις τα δυνάμει, ή δ' εντελε- 25 χεία εις τα εντελεχεία. της δε ψυχής το αισθητικών και το επιστημονικών δυνάμει ταυτά έστι, το μεν επιστητον το δε αισθητόν. ανάγκη δ' ή αυτά και τα είδη είναι. αυτα μεν γαρ δή ου ου γαρ ο λίθος εν τη ψυχή, αλλά το είδος ώστε η ψυχή ώσπερ η χείρ έστιν" και γαρ η χειρ 432
όργανόν έστιν οργάνων, και ο νους είδος ειδών και η αϊ8 3 σθησις είδος αισθητών. έπει δε ουδέ πράγμα ουθέν έστι
παρα τα μεγέθη, ως δοκεί, τα αισθητά κεχωρισμένον, εν τους είδεσι τοις αισθητοίς τα νοητά έστι, τά τε εν αφαι- 5
15. έν ή om. SUV. 16. Altera a Simplicio lectio traditur : où kexw ρισμένως ως κεχωρισμένως. 17. νοών om. LU.
24. εις om. EL. || εις τα πρ.] coni. Tor. ώσπερ και τα πρ. 25. τα δυνάμει] δυνάμεις L. Tor. et
26. τα έντ.] εντελεχείας L. pr. E. Tor. 27. το ante επ. om. ELSUVX Η ταύτα STUVWXy ταυτόν Βekk., έστι, το μεν επιστημονικόν το επιστητών και δε αισθητικόν το αισθητόν Tor.
an effort of thought conceive it without the flesh in which the hollowness inheres; so in like manner the mind, in thinking of mathematical forms, conceives them, though not really separated from objects, as if they were so separated. And in general, in fact, reason is the faculty which thinks things in their reality and truth. But as to whether the reason can think anything that is abstract unless it be itself abstract and independent of magnitude—that is a question which must be discussed at a
We will now sum up the conclusions we have made about the soul. The soul, we have seen, is in a way all existing things. For the objects of existence are either objects of sense or objects of thought: and while science is in a way identical with the objects of thought, sense again is one with the objects of sense.
How this comes about is a point we must investigate.
Scientific thought and sense-perception thus spread themselves over objects, potential sense and science relating to things potential, actual to things actual. Now the sensitive and the scientific faculty in the soul are potentially these objects—that is to say, the objects of scientific thought on the one hand, the objects of sense on the other. It must be then either the things themselves or their forms with which they are identical. The things themselves, however, they are not: it is not the stone, but simply the form of the stone, that is in the soul. The soul, therefore, is like the hand: for just as the hand is the instrument through which we grasp other instruments, so also reason is the form through which we apprehend other forms, while sense-perception is the form of the objects of sense.
[The forms of reason are not however something different from the things of sense.] As there is, according to the common opinion, no object outside the magnitudes of sense, it follows that the ideas of reason are contained in the forms of sense, both the so-called abstract conceptions and the various qualities and
ρέσει λεγόμενα, και όσα των αισθητων έξεις και πάθη. και διά τούτο ούτε μη αισθανόμενος μηθεν ούθεν αν μάθοι ουδε ξυνίου: όταν τε θεωρή, ανάγκη άμα φάντασμα τι θεωρείν" τα γαρ φαντάσματα ώσπερ αισθήματά έστι, πλην άνευ ύλης. έστι δ' η φαντασία έτερον φάσεως και το αποφάσεως συμπλοκή γαρ νοημάτων εστι το αληθές ή ψεύδος. τα δε πρώτα νοήματα τίνι διοίσει του μη φαντάσματα είναι και η ουδε τάλλα φαντάσματα, αλλ' ουκ άνευ φαντασμάτων.
IX. Επει δε η ψυχή κατά δύο ώρισται δυνάμεις ή των 15 ζώων, τω τε κριτική, και διανοίας έργον εστι και αισθήσεως, και έτι τα κινείν την κατά τόπον κίνησιν, περί μεν αισθήσεως και νού διωρίσθω τοσαύτα, περί δε του κινούντος, τί ποτέ εστι της ψυχής, σκεπτέον, πότερον έν τι μόριον αυτής χωριστον όν ή μεγέθει ή λόγω, ή πάσα η ψυχή, 26
κάν ει μόριόν τι, πότερον ίδιόν τι παρά τα ειωθότα λέγε$ 2 σθαι και τα ειρημένα, ή τούτων έν τι. έχει δε απορίαν
ευθύς πως τε δεί μόρια λέγειν της ψυχής και πόσα. τρόπον γάρ τινα άπειρα φαίνεται, και ου μόνον α τινες λέγουσι διορίζοντες, λογιστικών και θυμικών και επιθυμητι- 25 κόν, οι δε το λόγον έχον και το άλογον κατά γαρ τας
4324 5. εν οm. ELSUV. το. και αποφάσεως om. SUV.
8. ξυνιή LSXy. ξυνείη Tor. ξυνίου ETUVWX. 13. ουδε ταύτα φαντ. Αld. Tor.
attributes that determine sensible phenomena. And further without the aid of sense-perception we never come to learn or understand anything: and whenever we consider something in the mind, we must at the same time contemplate some picture of the imagination: for the pictures of the imagination correspond to the impressions of the senses, except that the former are without material embodiment.
At the same time imagination is something different from affirmation and negation, for it is only by a combination of ideas that we attain to truth and falsehood. But, it may be asked, in what respect will our primary ideas differ from mere images of sense? And to this, perhaps, we may reply that they are, as little as other ideas which we frame, mere images of sense, although never framed without the help of such representative images.
The soul of animals is, as we have seen before, characterized by two capacities on the one hand, the cognitive discriminative faculty as shared by understanding and by sense, on the other hand, the faculty of local movement. The nature of sense and intellect has been so far settled: we must now investigate the motive faculty of the soul, and ask whether it is some distinct part of it, separable either actually or by abstraction, or whether, on the contrary, it be the soul taken as a whole: and further, if it be some one part of the soul, whether it be some special part different from these usually recognised and enumerated, or whether, on the contrary, it is some one of these which have been stated.
An immediate question which arises is—in what sense are we to speak of parts of the soul, and how many are there of them. From one point of view such parts appear innumerable, and not confined merely to the “rational," "spirited,” and “appetitive” parts which some distinguish, or the rational and irrational which others enumerate. The characteristics, on the ground of which they distinguish these, shew also other parts further dis