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which guides them. Both then reason and desire are fitted to produce and lead to local movement. The reason which is here intended is that which calculates for some purpose—that is, it is the practical reason, distinguished from the speculative by its end. As for desire, it is always directed to some object : in fact, it is the object at which desire aims that forms the startingpoint of the practical reason, although it is some particular detail which forms the beginning of the action.
It is then on good grounds that people have viewed as springs of action these two faculties of desire and practical intellect: for the faculty of desire has itself a motive force, and the intellect excites to action just in so far as the object of desire supplies it with a starting-point: just as, similarly, imagination when it moves to action does not do so independently of desire.
The spring of action thus resolves itself into one single thing, viz. the object of desire. For if there were two faculties acting as springs to action-reason on the one hand, desire on the otherthey would have to move in virtue of some common character they shared. Now reason, it is found, does not act as a spring of action independently of desire : for settled wish is a form of desire, and when a man is led to act according to his reasonable conviction he is moved also in a manner corresponding to his wish. Desire, however, excites to action contrarily to reason, appetite, which so acts, being one of the forms of desire. And thus, then, it would seem, reason is always true and right, whereas desire and imagination may be both right and not right.
It is then always the object of desire that moves to action : and this is either the good or the apparent good-not good, however, as a whole, but simply that form of it which relates to action--that is, which is contingent and admits of being other than it is.
Evidently, therefore, it is such a faculty of the soul, the socalled principle of desire, which moves to action. Those, then, that divide the soul into different parts must, if a difference of powers be the basis of their separation, recognise a great variety of such parts—the nutrient, sentient, rational, deliberative, and,
σθητικόν, νοητικόν, βουλευτικόν, έτι ορεκτικόν: ταύτα γαρ
πλέον διαφέρει αλλήλων και το επιθυμητικόν και θυμικόν. και 6 έπει δ' ορέξεις γίνονται εναντίαι άλλήλαις, τούτο δε συμ- :
βαίνει όταν ο λόγος και η επιθυμία εναντίαι ώσι, γίνεται δ' εν τοις χρόνου αίσθησιν έχουσιν (ο μεν γαρ νους δια το μέλλον ανθέλκειν κελεύει, ή δ' επιθυμία για το ήδη φαίνεται γαρ το ήδη ηδυ και απλώς ηδυ και αγαθόν απλώς, δια το μη οράν το μέλλον), είδει μεν έν αν είη το κινούν το το ορεκτικόν, η ορεκτικόν, πρώτον δε πάντων το ορεκτόν (τούτο
γαρ κινεί ου κινούμενον τώ νοηθήναι η φαντασθήναι), αριθμό $ 7 δε πλείω τα κινούντα. επειδή δ' έστι τρία, εν μέν το κινούν,
δεύτερον δ' ώ κινεί, τρίτον το κινούμενον· το δε κινούν διττόν, το μεν ακίνητον, το δε κινούν και κινούμενον έστι δε το μεν 15 ακίνητον το πρακτον αγαθόν, το δε κινούν και κινούμενον το ορεκτικόν (κινείται γαρ το ορεγόμενον η ορέγεται, και η όρεξις κίνησίς τίς έστινή ενέργεια), το δε κινούμενον το ζώον ω δε κινεί οργάνω η όρεξις, ήδη τούτο σωματικόν έστιν· διό
εν τους κοινούς σώματος και ψυχής έργοις θεωρητέον περί 10 8 8 αυτού. νύν δε ως έν κεφαλαίω ειπείν, το κινούν οργανικώς
όπου αρχή και τελευτή το αυτό, οίον ο γιγγλυμός ενταύθα γαρ το κυρτών και κοίλον το μεν τελευτη το δ' αρχή διό το μεν ηρεμεί το δε κινείται, λόγω μεν έτερα
4336 9. ήδη om. Ε. 16. το post κιν. om. ELSUV. 17. όρεγόμενα] κινούμενον ELSUVW Bekk. .
18. τις om. TWXy. 1 η ενέργεια] ή ενεργεία Tor.
22. γινγλυμός Ε. γιγλυμός Χ. γιγλυσμός STV. γιγγλυμός, Βekk. Tor.
further, the conative or desiring-all these being separated by wider differences from one another than are the principle of appetite and that of spirited indignation.
The very opposition of desires itself attests the oneness of the motive faculty. Such opposition happens when the reason and the appetite come together into conflict and displays itself in beings with a sense of time. With such beings, reason, from its perception of the future, enjoins resistance on the mind, while appetite is influenced by a present which is vanishing : for that which is momentarily pleasant appears both absolutely pleasant and absolutely good, because the future is unseen. Now, such a conflict of desires requires that the motive agent, the principle of desire, as such, should be specifically but one: and the most primary of all is the object of desire, for this, without being itself moved, creates movement by being made an object of thought or presented before us by imagination. Numerically, however, the motive agents may be several. Now, there are three elements in motion, one being the object which produces movement, the second that by which it moves, and the third the object which is moved. Now, of these three, the object which produces movement is two-fold, being on the one hand itself unmoved, and on the other hand not only moving but also moved. That then which while it produces movement remains itself unmoved is the good as applied to action : the element which at once sets and is set in movement is the faculty of desire (for the subject desiring is moved, in so far as it desires, and desire itself is a form of movement so far as it manifests itself in action): the object which is moved is the living being.
As for the organ through which desire produces movement, that is necessarily of corporeal nature: and must therefore be investigated among the functions common to the body and the soul. If we may, however, speak for the present summarily on the subject, that which moves instrumentally must be such that in it beginning and end coincide, as is the case, for instance, with the pivot of a joint: for there both convex and concave meet together, the one acting as end, the other as beginning. Hence, while the one part is at rest, the other is in movement —that is, the two, while different in their purpose or idea, are in real mag
όντα, μεγέθει δ' αχώριστα πάντα γαρ ώσει και έλξει κινεί- 25
ται. διό δεί ώσπερ εν κύκλο μένειν τι, και εντεύθεν άρ$ 9 χεσθαι την κίνησιν. όλως μεν ούν, ώσπερ είρηται, η ορεκτικών
το ζώον, ταύτη αυτου κινητικόν: ορεκτικόν δε ουκ άνευ φαντασίας φαντασία δε πάσα ή λογιστική και αισθητική. ταύτης μεν ούν και τα άλλα ζώα μετέχει.
ΧΙ. Σκεπτέον δε και περί των ατελών, τί το κινούν εστίν, οις αφή μόνον υπάρχει αίσθησις, πότερον ενδέχεται φαν- 434 τασίαν υπάρχειν τούτοις, ή ού, και επιθυμίαν. φαίνεται γαρ λύπη και ηδονή ενούσα. ει δε ταύτα, και επιθυμίαν ανάγκη.
φαντασία δε πως αν ενείη ; ή ώσπερ και κινείται αορίστως, 8 2 και ταύτ' ένεστι μέν, αορίστως δ' ένεστιν. η μεν ουν αισθητική και
φαντασία, ώσπερ είρηται, και εν τοις άλλοις ζώοις υπάρχει, η δε βουλευτική εν τοις λογιστικούς πότερον γαρ πράξει τόδε ή τόδε, λογισμού ήδη εστίν έργον και ανάγκη ενί
μετρεϊν το μείζον γαρ διώκει. ώστε δύναται εν εκ πλειό
νων φαντασμάτων ποιείν. και αίτιον τούτο του δόξαν μη, δοκείν έχειν, ότι την έκ συλλογισμού ουκ έχει, αύτη δε εκεί
31. ατελών] άλλων L.
4348 4. αόριστος LTUVWXy. αλόγους TWy. 7. λογικούς WXy.
nitude inseparable: for all movement is the result of impulse or attraction, and there must be therefore always something which remains fixed, like the centre of a circle, as the source from which movement may begin.
Generally then it is, as has been said, in so far as the animal is endowed with the faculty of desire that it is capable of moving itself. But no animal can be provided with the faculty of desire unless it have imaginative power. Now, all such power is connected either with the reason or the senses : and in it other animals besides men participate.
[Desire then, thus depending on the power of representing images of sense], it falls to us to ask, besides, what is the motive force in those imperfect animals which possess no sense but that of touch, and see whether it is or is not possible for imagination and appetite to belong to them. Pleasure and pain they do indeed evidently feel: and if these belong to them, then appetite, it follows, must be there as well. But it is difficult to see how they can have imagination. Perhaps, however, we may say that just as their movements are vague and indeterminate, so also they possess the powers in question, although merely in a vague and imperfect manner.
The simple power of representing images of sense exists, as we have already said, in other animals as well as man. The power, on the contrary, of representing images for deliberation is confined to animals that reason. For the question whether this or that is to be done is work that calls for reason and reflection : and since it is the stronger and the more preferable which desire pursues, it must always measure by one standard, and so it is enabled to form one conception out of several images which represent sensations. Hence the reason why animals, while possessing the faculty of representing images of sense, are not thought to have opinion. They do not possess the kind of desire which forms itself as the conclusion of syllogism, while at the same time such deliberate desire always involves the posses