Page images




The character, method, and problems of psychology constitute the subject-matter of this chapter. Beginning (§ 1) with a statement of the superiority of psychology to other sciences and a short notice of the questions it investigates, the writer passes (§ 2) to a discussion of the method by which psychology should be studied. This question is of course almost inseparable from the character of the problems to be investigated and leads again ($ 4) to the nature of psychological problems and, through the mixed character of the feelings ($$ 9—11), brings the writer to consider the relation between the physiological and the dialectical' aspect of psychology.

§ 1. 402 2. î kar åkpißecav] The significance of this ground of the superiority of psychology to other sciences is to be found by a consideration of Aristotle's general conception of arpißera. The chief passages bearing on this are the following :

Αnal. Post. 1. 24, 86% 17, ή μάλλον εξ αρχής της ήττον ακριβεστέρα απόδειξις. έστι δε τοιαύτη ή καθόλου μάλλον. Μetaph. Α. 2. 982% 25, ακριβέσταται δε των επιστημών αι μάλιστα των πρώτων εισίν αι γαρ εξ ελαττόνων ακριβέστεραι των εκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων, οίον αριθμητική γεωμετρίας. So in Eth. VI. 5, 1141" 16, σοφία is said to be ακριβεστάτη των επιστημών : and in Metaph. Α. 9958 15, we have την δ' ακριβολογίαν την μαθηματικών ουκ εν άπασιν απαιτητέον αλλ' εν τοις μη έχουσιν ύλην. διόπερ ου φυσικός ο τρόπος-a statement rather in contradiction with the present treatise's inclusion of psychology in puoiký. And indeed in De Coelo, 111, 1, physic is given as an instance of τα εκ προσθέσεως, and contrasted with τα εξ αφαιρέσεως of mathematics. In claiming therefore åkpißeca for the science which he is constructing, Aristotle means that it deals with and rests upon elementary truths which may be said to be the basis and starting-point (ορμητήριον in Themistius) for the other sciences : and still more perhaps that the science is self-contained: so in Eth. 111. 5, 11125 1, we have ακριβείς και αυτάρκεις των επιστημών. Psychology in fact like every mental science is more or less independent of external facts : the observer is also the observed, the subject and the object coincide. The physicist has to go outside himself for the materials of his study, the psychologist finds them within himself. Thus the expression does not mean the ingenii acumen required for the study of the science as Trendelenburg supposes : it refers to the fact that yoxs being the prius in the phenomena of life, the αρχή των ζώων, as Aristotle almost immediately remarks, the science which investigates it reaches nearer to the real truth of things than is the case with more concrete sciences. Psychology in fact holds the same primary relation to Ethics, Politics, &c., as Arithmetic according to Meta. A. 2, does to Geometry. The commentators take the passage in somewhat of this sense. Themistius, e.g., paraphrases, τω μεν ακριβεί διότι και ταϊς άλλαις επιστήμοις παρά ψυχής η ακρίβεια, το θαυμασίω δε ότι σχεδόν διά πάντων διήκει των όντων και της ψυχής φύσις από της εσχάτης άρχομένη της φυσικής μέχρι της πρώτης. Simplicius notes, ακριβεστέρα δε γνώσεις και αναγκαία και απαράλειπτος και η οικεία το yuworợ, and insists specially on the affinity between the subject knowing and the object known, the fact of ovvalo Onous and the é lotpoon of the soul upon itself implied in psychology.

4028 3. τήν της ψυχής ιστορίαν] Torstrik reads περί της ψυχής on the ground that otopía means not cognitio but investigatio, and that the preposition is therefore necessary. On the meaning of loropía as equivalent to enquiries or researches, De Quincey has some happy remarks (Essay on Philosophy of Herodotus). Cp. Introduction, p. xxiv.

4028 7. επιζητούμεν δε θεωρήσαι] With this statement of the sphere and questions of psychology, compare and contrast Plato, Phaedrus, 271 A, δηλον άρα ότι ο Θρασύμαχός τε και ος αν άλλος σπουδή τέχνην ρητορικήν διδα πρώτον πάση ακριβεία γράψει τε και ποιήσει ψυχήν ιδείν, πότερον εν και ομοίον πέφυκεν, ή κατά σώματος μορφήν πολυειδές, κ.τ.λ.

402* 6. έστι γαρ οίων αρχή των ζώων] This view of the importance of Vuxn in the study of animal life is especially emphasized in the Treatise on the Parts of Animals: so, e.g., Ι. 1, 6, απελθούσης γούν (ψυχής) ουκέτι ζωόν έστι. For the meaning of αρχή in Aristotle, see Metaph. Δ. 1, 1o13, where Aristotle distinguishes six senses in which åpxń may be used and concludes 10138, 17, πασών μεν ουν κοινόν των αρχών το πρώτον είναι όθεν ή έστιν η γίγνεται η γιγνώσκεται. Cf. also De Gen. Anim. V. 7, 7888 14, τούτο γάρ έστι το αρχήν είναι το αυτήν μεν αιτίαν είναι πολλών, ταύτης δ' άλλο άνωθεν μηδέν. See also Cope's Rhetoric, Vol. 1. p. 126. Its use in the present passage is almost identical with that of the De Coelo, ΙΙ. 2, 284 26, άρχάς γάρ ταύτας λέγω όθεν έρχονται πρώτον αι κινήσεις τους έχουσιν. And still more closely does it agree with Meta. Κ. Ι, ιο6ο 1, αρχή γάρ το συναναιρούν: that is the

soul is so much the condition of animal life, that its removal involves also the destruction of the animal.

4025 7. τήν τε φύσιν αυτής και την ουσίαν] Notwithstanding that in Meta. Δ. 4, 10I45, φύσις is said to be sometimes equivalent to ή των φύσει όντων ουσία, and that further πάσα ουσία φύσις λέγεται, a distinction would seem here to be intended to be drawn between the two terms, and Trendelenburg is probably right in referring púors to the external, ovoia to the internal aspect of the soul : or rather perhaps we may say púois refers to the genetic account, the explanation of the process by which the soul passes from merely vegetative functions to the intellectual stage, while ovoia refers to the essential characteristic (that viz. of a first entelechy) which constitutes it equally in all its stages. So in fact the word would seem to be taken by Simplicius who refers púors to the investigations of the physical philosopher, ovoia to the enquiries of the metaphysician.

4022 8. είθ' όσα συμβέβηκε περί αυτήν] By the συμβεβηκότα we must understand not so much the merely accidental attributes of soul but rather what the modern logician would call its properties—those qualities, i.e., which are not immediately connoted by soul but are derivatives and consequences of it. See Metaph. Δ. 30, 10252 30, λέγεται δε και άλλως συμβεβηκός οίον όσα υπάρχει εκάστω καθ' αυτό μη εν τη ουσία όντα, οίον τω τριγώνω το δύο ορθάς έχειν. Similarly in Anal. Post. I. 7, 75" 42 science is said to involve a útokelpe vov táon cai xaể avrà TouBancora ônàoi LT686Ệs. Cp. Cope's Rhetoric, I. 2, $ 1, p. 27.

402* 9. Óv pèr idia maon] Here, as Trendelenburg remarks, there is at first sight no real opposition: and we must understand the antithesis to mean that while some properties belong to the mind in and by itself others attach to the soul in connection with the body (fộov). By the idla záðn we must understand particularly thought: by the second class pleasure, pain, sense-perceptions, &c., as Themistius explains.

και 2. 4029 12. λέγω δε του περί την ουσίαν και το τί εστι] The words would seem practically to mean--the specific and the general character: but perhaps the distinction is not meant to be so sharply drawn as Trendelenburg supposes. By the ti dori Aristotle would seem to understand the general or generic conception of anything--the statement mainly of its genus—while ovoia is probably used here particularly in the sense of ri v cival and refers to this general conception embodied in the unity of a single type. Thus we have το πρώτον ενυπάρχον και λέγεται εν τω τί εστι τούτο γένος, Meta. Δ. 28, 10245: το δε γένος βουλεται το τι εστι σημαίνειν και πρώτον υποτίθεται των εν τω ορισμό λεγομένων, Top. VI. 5, 1420 28.

402* 15. των κατά συμβεβηκός ιδίων] By ίδια κατά συμβεβηκός Aristotle would seem to mean relative properties : qualities which attach to something when viewed in reference to something else. V. Top. V. 1, 128b 10, átoðidotai δε το ίδιον ή καθ' αυτό και αεί, ή προς έτερον και ποτέ, οίον καθ' αυτό μέν ανθρώπου το ζώον ήμερον φύσει, προς έτερον δε οίον ψυχής προς σώμα, ότι το μεν προστατικών το δ' υπηρετικόν έστι. Supremacy that is to say is not a property of soul in and by itself but it is so relatively to body, and thus an ίδιον κατά συμβεβηκός. So again it is an ίδιον of man relatively to horse to be a biped.

402" 18. Apayuarevdîvai] Cope, Rhet. I. 1, § 3, notes “The primary sense of doing business or occupying oneself about anything passes to the more limited or special significations of an intellectual pursuit and thence of a “special study,' a systematic treatment of a particular subject of investigation or practice.” Trendelenburg compares Meta. B. 2, 9976 21, K. I, 1059$ 10, K. 7, 1064* 3.

402 19. πότερον απόδειξίς τίς έστιν ή διαίρεσις] The difference between the two methods is that between the logical methods of Aristotle and Plato. For Aristotle's conception of åródecţLS the following passages are of importance: Post. Αnal. Ι. 13, 81° 40, μανθάνομεν ή επαγωγή ή αποδείξει. έστι δ' η μεν απόδειξις εκ των καθόλου, ήδεπαγωγή εκ των κατά μέρος. But while eraywyn

' is thus an important source of knowledge, it is wanting in the necessity and explanation-giving character of stóðerfis. Thus Aristotle writes, Post. Αnal. II. 5, 91b 32, ουδε γαρ ο επάγων ίσως αποδείκνυσιν, αλλ' όμως &ndoi Tl. But this weakness of induction which discovers merely a matter of fact uniformity is removed by the cogency of proof which attaches to åróδειξις. For απόδειξις is a συλλογισμός δεικτικός αιτίας και του διά τί (Post. Αn. I. 24, 85623); it is tæv åvayxaiov and ét åvaykalwv, and it cannot possibly attach to individual sensible things as such- των ουσιών των αισθητών των καθ' έκαστα ουκ έστιν απόδειξις (Meta. Z. 15, 1039' 28). But while απόδειξις thus tries to educe the laws of facts from the general conception which overlies them, it does not do so by any instantaneous leap—it invariably passes from the universal to the particular dià toù pérov: through the help of the less general conception which will form the link of transition and be the cause which explains the particular phenomenon- το μεν γαρ αίτιον το μέσον, έν άπασι δε τούτο ζητείται (Post. Αnal. ΙΙ. 2, 90' 7). Διαίρεσις is defective just in wanting this gradual descent from the universal to the individual. As conceived by Plato and illustrated in the Sophist it was the method by means of which we determined the specific character of an object and found out its ti coti by bringing it under some general conception and then by successively dividing it, by a lengthy process of dichotomy, caught it (to keep up Plato's metaphor) in the member or members of the division which exactly fitted it. Hence Aristotle regards the Platonic division as involving throughout a petitio principii. So he expresses himself in Prior. Anal. 1. 31, 46*31, POTI γαρ η διαίρεσις οιον ασθενής συλλογισμός και μεν γαρ δεί δείξαι αιτείται, συλλογίζεται δ' αεί τι των άνωθεν......έν μεν ουν ταϊς αποδείξεσιν, όταν δεη τι συλλογίσασθαι υπάρχειν, δει το μέσον, δι' ου γίνεται ο συλλογισμός, και ήττον αεί είναι και μη καθόλου του πρώτου των άκρων η δε διαίρεσις τουναντίον βούλεται το γάρ καθόλου λαμβάνει μέσον. And in another passage he directs particular attention to the fact that in such dichotomy the difficulty as to why the subject of our enquiry must fall under one rather than another member of the division turns up at each single stage of the process. Post. Anal. 11.

« PreviousContinue »