dent does not involve the denial of the consequent. Nor does Themistius' 'apology' (Spengel, p. 10) seem to get over this objection. The objector (says Themistius) would seem to forget that the additional word "would be possible" (to be separated) involves not a necessary consequence in regard to which the denial of the consequent involves the denial of the antecedent, but a contingent consequence, in which the result is the reverse-ǹ yàp ȧvaipeσis τοῦ ἡγουμένου συναναιρεῖ τὸ ἑπόμενον.

403 14. οὐ μέντοι γ ̓ ἅψεται τούτου χωρισθὲν τὸ εὐθύ] τούτου it might be thought admits of being taken either with averaι or with xwpiodév. With the former construction however, there is the awkwardness of Toúrov in the neuter or masculine while referring to opaîpa, a feminine; with the latter construction (in which roúrou is taken with xwpio0év) we may understand the genitive as equal to either xaλkov or, in the more general sense adopted by Philoponus and Simplicius, тоû ÚTOKELμévoν. Bonitz (Hermes, VII. 416) reads with Ε οὕτω (i. e. κατὰ στιγμὴν) in place of τούτου and understands the passage altogether as follows: The straight line as such is possessed of many qualities, as for instance that of touching a brazen circle at some point or other but it does not follow from this that the straight line as independently existing, and considered abstractedly, touches in this manner: it possesses in short no independent reality since it is continually connected with some body or another.

403 18. ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα] Torstrik regards this clause as the marginal addition of a copyist.

403 25. λόγοι ἔνυλοι] Trendelenburg aptly compares the λόγοι σπερματι καὶ of the Stoics : and Philoponus paraphrases as εἴδη ἐν ὕλῃ τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα καὶ οὐ χωριστά.

§ 11. 403 27. ñdn þvσikoû] "dŋ would seem to mean 'without adding any further arguments.' With this inclusion of psychology in quoikń, may be compared the significant words of Plato, Phaedrus, 270 C, vuxns our prow ἀξίως λόγου κατανόησαι οἴει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως.

403b 7. Tis ovv å øvσikòs Toútwv ;] Here, as Trendelenburg observes, we must understand by voikós, the physicist as he ought to be-qualis esse debet ut rei naturam vere exponat. With the general sentiment cp. the Metaph. Ζ. 11. 1037" 16, οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τῆς ὕλης δεῖ γνωρίζειν τὸν φυσικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ μᾶλλον: and for Aristotle's conception of voký and its relation to psychology, see the Introduction, p. xxvii.

403 9. ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τις ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ὕλης τὰ μὴ χωριστά, μηδ' ᾗ χωριστὰ K.TA.] The translation will probably itself indicate the sense in which I think this passage is to be understood. According to this interpretation, Aristotle, after pointing out that the true voikós is he who combines at once the material and the ideal explanation of phenomena in his explanation of them, finds himself obliged to ask about the province to be assigned to each of these two separate ways of studying nature (ἐκείνων δὲ δὴ τίς ἑκάτερος ;). And to this he replies that there is really no observer who deals with the material side of nature as such—the pure materialist is an unreal abstraction:

the φυσικός deals with body in its general and its formal aspect (τοιουδὶ σώματος, τοιαύτης ύλης) and differs only in the degree of his idealism from the mathematician and the metaphysician. Taking this view of the passage we must lay particular emphasis on τοιουδί and on τοιαύτης and regard the clause ὁπόσα δὲ μὴ ᾖ τοιαῦτα, ἄλλος...τέκτων ἢ ἰατρός as parenthetical. The parenthesis as I take it simply notices incidentally the special artist as working in a more circumscribed and less general held than the true φυσικός. Altogether Aristotle distinguishes four methods of dealing with nature:

(1) That of the special artist who deals with the particular qualities of some particular kind,

(2) That of the true Physicist who deals with the general qualities of generic groups of natural objects,

(3) That of the Mathematician who deals with the quasi-abstract qualities of all objects, and

(4) That of the Metaphysician who deals with the most abstract and transcendent qualities of things.

This explanation of the passage corresponds more or less closely with the paraphrase given by Philoponus.

εἰπὼν κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν διαλεκτικοῦ μὲν εἶναι τὸν ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ὁρισμόν, φυσικοῦ δὲ τὸν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης, εἶτα προελθὼν καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι φυσικοῦ ἐστιν ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀποδιδόμενος ὁρισμός, ζητεῖ εἰκότως περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δύο ὁρισμῶν, τοῦ τε ἐκ τῆς ὕλης μόνης καὶ τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους, τίνος ἂν εἴη τεχνίτου ἑκάτερος ὁρισμός. καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους μόνου ὅτι ἐστὶ διαλεκτικοῦ οὐδὲν λέγει. ἤδη γὰρ εἶπεν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης μόνης λέγει ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία τέχνη περὶ ὕλην μόνην καταγινομένη. πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη εἶδος ἐπιθεῖναι βούλεται τῇ ὑποβεβλημένῃ ἑαυτῇ ὕλῃ...διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰπεῖν περὶ “ πάντα” διακρίνει αὐτὸν (i. e. τὸν φυσικὸν) τοῦ καθ ̓ ἕκαστον τεχνίτου ἐκείνων γὰρ ἕκαστος περὶ μερικόν τι ἔχει. διὰ δὲ τοῦ εἰπεῖν τοῦ “ τοιούτου σώματος” ἐχώρισεν αὐτὸν τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ.

66

Trendelenburg explains the passage as meaning that no one treats of matter and its properties which cannot be separated and so far as they cannot be separated, with the exception of the physicist engaged in studying all the qualities which attach to a certain kind of body and a certain kind of matter. He proposes therefore as a possible but unnecessary simplification of the text that we should read ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τις ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ὕλης τὰ μὴ χωριστά, μηδ' ᾗ χωριστά, ἄλλος· ἀλλ' ὁ φυσικὸς περὶ ἅπανθ' κ.τ.λ.

The interpretation given by Trend. agrees with the paraphrase of Themi stius and Simplicius: but it would seem to fail to answer the question with which Aristotle sets out as to what is the place of the pure materialist and the metaphysician in explaining nature. According to Trendelenburg's view Aristotle simply draws the distinction given in the Metaphysics between the physicist, the mathematician and the metaphysician: according to the view followed in the translation the writer first points out that undiluted materialism is a mere fiction of philosophy.

403 15. ᾗ δὲ κεχωρισμένα, ὁ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος] Cp. Meta. E. 1, 1026 12, ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν ἀλλ ̓ οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἔνια περὶ

ακίνητα μέν, οὐ χωριστὰ δ ̓ ἴσως, ἀλλ ̓ ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα.

403 19. καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον] Simplicius comments: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπίπεδον ὡς τὸ κοίλον ἔχει ἄνευ ῥινὸς ἐπινοούμενον· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς ὡς τὸ σιμόν τὸ γὰρ σιμὸν ἡ ἐν ῥινὶ κοιλότης, ὡς ἡ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως ἐν τῇ ζέσει τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος.

CHAPTER II.

The second chapter begins that historical retrospect of previous psychological investigations which Aristotle thinks a useful preliminary to his own exposition of the character of mind. Two mental properties he finds have been especially attributed to the soul: motive and active powers on the one hand, perceptive and cognitive powers on the other. (i) The active and motive powers have been emphasized by Democritus and Leucippus (§§ 3, 12), certain particular Pythagoreans (§ 4), Anaxagoras whose views however attach particularly to Reason (§ 5), Thales (§ 14), and Alcmaeon (§ 17). (ii) The cognitive side of mind is prominent in Empedocles (§ 6), Plato (§ 7), Xenocrates (§ 8)—all of whom hold that knowledge involves correspondence between the subject knowing and the object known and therefore resolve mind into the Elements whether one or many which their philosophical analysis recognises as generally entering into things. A third class of thinkers unite the cognitive with the motive powers-a phase of thought to be seen in Anaxagoras (§ 13), Diogenes (§ 15), Heraclitus (§ 16).

§ 1. 403 23. ὅπως τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰρημένα λάβωμεν] For the motive of Aristotle's résumé of past opinions on a subject, cp. De Coelo, I. 10, ἅμα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη πιστὰ τὰ μέλλοντα λεχθήσεσθαι προακηκούσι τὰ τῶν ἀμφισ βητούντων λόγων δικαιώματα· τὸ γὰρ ἐρήμην καταδικάζεσθαι δοκεῖν ἧττον ἂν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχοι· καὶ γὰρ δεῖ διαιτητὰς ἀλλ ̓ οὐκ ἀντιδίκους εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας τἀληθὲς κρίνειν ἱκανῶς : and see also De Respir. 470 11 and Metaph. Β. 1, 995 27, ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλώς. Trendelenburg and most of the editors place in 21 the comma before προελθόντας: Torstrik places it after προελθόντας and construes it with εὐπορεῖν δεῖ.

§ 3. 404* 1. ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων σχημάτων] Cp. De Coelo, III. 4, 303" 13, ποῖον δὲ καὶ τί ἑκάστου τὸ σχῆμα τῶν στοιχείων οὐδὲν ἐπιδιώρισαν ἀλλὰ μόνον τῷ πυρὶ τὴν σφαῖραν ἀπέδωκαν αέρα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι διεῖλον, ὡς οὖσαν αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν οἷον πανσπερμίαν πάντων τῶν στοιχείων : also III. 8, 305 32, and De Gen. 1. 8.

The psychology of Democritus lay in a particular application of his general atomic theory. That theory reduced all existence to a void (κενὸν) on the one hand, a fixed space (πλήρες) on the other, this last consisting of an infinite multitude of atoms or particles qualitatively similar. To such

atoms everything was finally reducible: and the different shapes assumed by objects depended simply on the figure, order, and relative position of those infinitely small and homogeneous particles. Cp. Μεία. Α. 4, καὶ καθάπερ οἱ ἓν ποιοῦντες τὴν ὑποκειμένην οὐσίαν τἆλλα τοῖς πάθεσιν αὐτῆς γεννῶσι, τὸ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν ἀρχὰς τιθέμενοι τῶν παθημάτων, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ οὗτοι τὰς διαφορὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἄλλων εἶναί φασιν, ταύτας μέντοι τρεῖς εἶναι λέγουσι, σχημά τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ θέσιν διαφέρειν γάρ φασι τὸ ὂν ῥυσμῷ καὶ διαθιγῇ καὶ τροπῇ μόνον. τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν ῥυσμὸς σχῆμά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ διαθιγὴ τάξις, ἡ δὲ τροπὴ θέσις. This Aristotle illustrates by the letters of the alphabet, διαφέρει τὸ μὲν Α τοῦ Ν σχήματι, τὸ δὲ ΑΝ τοῦ ΝΑ τάξει, τὸ δὲ Ζ τοῦ Ν θέσει). The soul therefore had to be conceived from this same atomic standpoint: and Democritus found an explanation in assimilating soul to heat. Now heat, like every other sensible quality, could be expressed in terms of an atomic configuration, and such a configuration Democritus found in spherical particles, not unlike the motes we see in streaming sunlight. For these, he argued, have most of the penetrating power and motive force which distinguishes the soul. And the life of man meant just a continuous movement of these fiery particles'-a continuous ingress and egress of these spherical-shaped atoms. The outward environment as Democritus conceived, was continually contracting the body and expelling the particles which thus constituted the soul, and simultaneously inspiration introduced a new relay of similar particles, and life continued to subsist. Life in fact was to Democritus just coextensive with the power which the body had to replace new spherical atoms in lieu of those which the weight of the outer atmosphere had squeezed out of the body. In qua, adds Trendelenburg, etsi rudi sententia id inest veri quod individuum quoad vivit sua vi pugnam quandam sustinet.

404 7. ῥυσμούς] ῥυσμὸς λέξις ἐστὶν ̓Αβδηρική, σημαίνει δὲ τὸ σχῆμα. Philoponus, 7b.

§ 4. 404" 20. ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ δὲ φέρονται] αινίττεται εἰς Πλάτωνα καὶ Ζενοκράτην καὶ ̓Αλκμαίωνα. Philop. Cp. particularly Plato, Phaedrus, 245 C, μὴ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχήν, and Laws, 895 A, where ψυχή is defined as τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν.

§5. 404" 29. διὸ καλῶς ποιῆσαι τὸν Ομηρον] Cp. Meta. Γ. 5, 100g 28, φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ομηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἕκτορα ὡς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς κεῖσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα. Aristotle would seem to quote from memory—at least no passage exactly corresponding to his reference can be found, though somewhat similar expressions are to be found in Iliad, XXIII. 698, and XXII. 337. Cp. Theophrastus, De Sensu, § 58, περὶ δὲ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἴρηκεν ὅτι γίνεται συμμέτρως ἐχούσης τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν· ἐὰν δὲ περίθερμός τις ἢ περίψυχρος γένηται μεταλλάττειν φησί. διότι καὶ τοὺς παλαιοὺς καλῶς τοῦθ ̓ ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀλλοφρονεῖν.

404 1. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸν νοῦν λέγει] Cp. Metaph. Α. 3, where Aristotle says of Anaxagoras νοῦν δή τις εἰπὼν εἶναι καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης οἷον νήφων ἐφάνη παρ ̓ εἰκῆ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον--and the words which

Diogenes Laertius, II. 6, quotes from the beginning of his treatise: návra χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε. Anaxagoras' conception of vous—a conception which, as will be seen in the third book, coloured to no slight extent the Aristotelian view of a creative reason-was apparently not unlike that of the Alexandrian λóyos. So at least it would seem necessary to interpret the lengthy passage which Simplicius quotes in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics (f. 33) as occurring v T TрŃтη Tŵν ovakav [partly extracted in Preller, Histor. Phil. § 123 (5th ed.), § 53 (4th ed.)] and particularly the words καὶ τὰ συμμισγόμενά τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς· καὶ ὁποῖα ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὁποῖα ἦν καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἐστι, καὶ ὁποῖα ἔσται πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς. With Anaxagoras' ascription of vous to all animate and living objects, cp. the spurious repì purŵv, 815b 11, ó dè ̓Αναξάγορας καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδόκλης καὶ νοῦν καὶ γνῶσιν εἶπον ἔχειν τὰ φυτά.

§ 7. 404 18. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ μèv Tò (ŵOV, K.T.λ.] I have ventured not without some misgivings to interpret this passage in a sense somewhat different to that in which it is generally understood. Ordinarily the avrò rò (@ov with which the passage opens is supposed to be the intelligible world, the universe as an object of thought, as conceived in its essential permanent characteristics. And this sense it must ! be allowed is not only that given by the older commentators-Simplicius and Themistius, but is also in harmony with the use of the expression in the Timaeus itself. Timaeus, 30 B, οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι Tрóvoιav.) The passage is then interpreted to mean that the parallelism between the object and the subject is so complete that while on the one hand the world as thought, the universe conceived of in its essential relations—the κόσμος νοητός as the commentators explain αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον—may be resolved into the ideas of unity, of length, of breadth, and depth; the mind on the other hand may also be resolved into four faculties-reason, understanding, opinion, and sense. Thus then there are four primary characteristics on the part of the object, four primary on the part of the subject. But further, those four are exactly fitted to one another: the action of reason being essentially unity, that of understanding essentially duality: and just in virtue of such correspondence between the ideal qualities of mind and the ideal qualities of things is knowledge possible.

The chief objection to this interpretation is the difficulty in explaining rà δ ̓ ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως. If the αὐτὸ ζῷον be the universe as an object of thought, the aλλa must be also universal ideas, but it is difficult to see what they can be or how in fact, outside the universe, any idea can be left to be explained. Simplicius however, it should be noted, by rà aλλa understands rà ἐπιστητά, τὰ δοξαστά and τὰ αἰσθητά, the αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον itself being equivalent to voŋrá: while Philoponus less symmetrically and altogether less satisfactorily explains them as τὰ νοητά, τὰ φυσικά and τὰ αἰσθητά.

It seems better in the face of such divergencies of view to treat rà d'