Thus, with the one exception of the earth, all the elements have gained a vote. The earth however has been adduced by no one except indeed in such cases as some thinker has explained the soul as formed from all the elements or has actually identified it with them all. Each in fact of the three attributes which we may say are generally used to characterise the soulmovement, perception and incorporeal existence—is supposed to characterize the principles of being. And for this very reason all those who define soul by its capacity for knowledge make it either an element or one of the elements, using (with the exception of one of their number) almost identical expressions respecting it. Like, in short, they say, is known by like; and since the soul knows all things, they constitute it out of all the elements. Thus then those thinkers who admit only some one cause and some one element identify the soul also with some one thing such as fire or air: those, on the other hand, who regard the primary elements of existence as more than one, resolve the soul also into several such elements. Anaxagoras/ alone says that the reason is not subject to modification from without and has nothing in common with anything beside itself. How being such it is to acquire knowledge and why this is so is a subject on which Anaxagoras has said nothing, nor does the general tenour of his writings help to make it plain. As many further as posit opposites among their primary elements of being constitute the soul also out of contraries; while those who maintain the one or other among contraries-as for example hot or cold or something of this character-resolve the soul also in a corresponding manner into some one or other of these elements. Hence further such thinkers follow etymologies: some maintaining soul to be the 'hot' because it is from the name of heating or 'seething' that the word to live is etymologically derived others holding soul to be the 'cold' because it is from respiration and cooling that the word for soul has been constructed.

Such then are the opinions which have been handed down respecting soul, as also the grounds on which they rest.

ΙΙΙ. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν περὶ κινήσεως· ἴσως γὰρ οὐ μόνον ψεῦδίς ἐστι τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς τοιαύτην εἶναι οἵαν φασὶν οἱ λέγοντες ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ ἢ δυνάμενον 4068 κινεῖν, ἀλλ ̓ ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κίνησιν. § 2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κινοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, πρότερον εἴρηται. διχῶς δὲ κινουμένου παντός (ἢ γὰρ καθ' ἕτερον ἢ καθ' αυτό· καθ ̓ ἕτερον δὲ λέγομεν, ὅσα κινεῖται τῷ ἐνς κινουμένῳ εἶναι, οἷον πλωτήρες· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως κινοῦνται τῷ πλοίῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθ ̓ αὑτὸ κινεῖται, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ εἶναι. δῆλον δ ̓ ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων· οἰκεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι κίνησις ποδῶν βάδισις, αὕτη δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων· οὐχ ὑπάρ χει δὲ τοῖς πλωτῆρσι τότε) διχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ κινεί το σθαι, νῦν ἐπισκοποῦμεν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰ καθ' αὐτὴν κι § 3 νεῖται καὶ μετέχει κινήσεως. τεσσάρων δὲ κινήσεων οὐσῶν,

φορᾶς ἀλλοιώσεως φθίσεως αὐξήσεως, ἢ μίαν τούτων κινοῖτ ̓ ἂν ἢ πλείους ἢ πάσας. εἰ δὲ κινεῖται μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, φύσει ἂν ὑπάρχοι κίνησις αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ 15 τόπος· πᾶσαι· γὰρ αἱ λεχθεῖσαι κινήσεις ἐν τόπῳ, εἰ δ ̓ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κινεῖν ἑαυτήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβε

9. βάσις περισκοπούμεν ν.

32. ψεῦδος] ψευδές W. 4068 1. αὐτὸ UW. 3. οὐκ om. 5. U. | καὶ om. U. το. διχῶς δὲ] δισσῶς Ε, διχῶς δὴ Sus. 13. φθίσεως om. pr. E.

11.

CHAPTER III.

Before proceeding further we must investigate the subject of movement. The truth may be that it is not only false to say that the essential substance of soul is of the character assigned to it by those who assert that soul is that which moves itself or is capable of producing movement: it may be an actual impossibility that movement should be a predicate of soul.

That that which causes motion need not itself be in motion is an opinion which has been previously stated. But further there are two senses in which everything that is in motion may be said to be so. The movement may be either directly its own or it may be communicated through something else. The latter expression is applied to all those things that are moved through being within something which is moved, as is for instance the case with sailors in a ship: the sailors not being moved in the same sense as the vessel, because while the vessel is in movement by itself the sailors are so through being in an object that is moved. This becomes evident when we apply it to the limbs. Walking for instance is a movement which belongs distinctively to the feet, it is also a movement which belongs to man as such, and yet it is not true of the sailors at the time when we are considering them.

There are then two senses in which we may say a thing is in motion and we must now enquire with reference to soul whether in itself it is moved and participates in movement. Now there are four forms of movement-locomotion, alteration, decomposition and augmentation. The motion of the soul must be therefore either one of these four forms, or several of them, or all of them taken together. But further this movement of the soul, if it be not merely an accidental concomitant, must proceed from nature: and, if this be so, space will be an attribute of it, inasmuch as all the movements which we have mentioned occur in space. [But the soul's movement is no mere accidental concomitant.] If it be its very essence to set itself in motion, it will not be merely in an incidental sense that

βηκὸς αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπάρξει, ὥσπερ τῷ λευκῷ ἢ τῷ τριπήχει· κινεῖται γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ᾧ γὰρ ὑπάρχουσιν, ἐκεῖνο κινεῖται, τὸ σῶμα. διὸ καὶ το οὐκ ἔστι τόπος αὐτῶν· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔσται, εἴπερ φύσει § 4 κινήσεως μετέχει. ἔτι δ ̓ εἰ φύσει κινεῖται, κἂν βίᾳ κινηθείη· κἂν εἰ βίᾳ, καὶ φύσει. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἠρεμίας· εἰς ὃ γὰρ κινεῖται φύσει, καὶ ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τούτῳ φύσει· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς ὃ κινεῖται βίᾳ, καὶ ἠρεμεῖ ἐν 25 τούτῳ βίᾳ. ποῖαι δὲ βίαιοι τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις ἔσονται καὶ § 5 ἡρεμίαι, οὐδὲ πλάττειν βουλομένοις ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι.

ἔτι δ ̓

εἰ μὲν ἄνω κινήσεται, πῦρ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κάτω, γῆ· τούτων γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων αἱ κινήσεις αὗται. ὁ δ ̓ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ § 6 περὶ τῶν μεταξύ. ἔτι δ ̓ ἐπεὶ φαίνεται κινοῦσα τὸ σῶμα, 30 ταύτας εὔλογον κινεῖν τὰς κινήσεις ἃς καὶ αὐτὴ κινεῖται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀντιστρέψασιν εἰπεῖν ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἣν τὸ σῶμα κινεῖται, ταύτην καὶ αὐτή. τὸ δὲ σῶμα κινεῖται φορᾷ 4068 ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μεταβάλλοι ἂν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἢ ὅλη ἢ κατὰ μόρια μεθισταμένη. εἰ δὲ τοῦτ ̓ ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἐξελθοῦ σαν εἰσιέναι πάλιν ἐνδέχοιτ ̓ ἄν· τούτῳ δ ̓ ἕποιτ ̓ ἂν τὸ ἀνί§ 7 στασθαι τὰ τεθνεῶτα τῶν ζῴων. τὴν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 5 κίνησιν κἂν ὑφ ̓ ἑτέρου κινοῖτο· ὠσθείη γὰρ ἂν βίᾳ τὸ ζῷον.

18. υπάρχει Ε. pr. E.

ἐνδέχοιτο STVW. om. SWX Bz.

23. κἂν εἰ] εἰ om. pr. E.

406 2. μεταβάλλοι ἂν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα] μ. α. κατὰ τόπον Βι.

εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐνδέχοιτ ̓ ἂν καὶ ἐξ. εἰσ. πάλιν Βz.

καὶ φύσει] κατὰ φύσιν

3.

4· ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν

motion will belong to it, as is for instance the case with the movement of white colour or three cubits length. These last are moved indeed, but they are so simply incidentally, in so far as the body in which they inhere is moved; and thus space is no attribute connected with them. Such space however will be an attribute of the soul if it be the case that the soul participates in movement by its very nature.

Further, if the soul be in motion by its inherent nature, it should also admit of being put in motion by external force: and supposing it to be moved by force, it should also admit of being moved by nature. So also is it with respect to rest: for when an object is moved by nature into some state or other, it also rests in this by nature, just as when an object is moved into any state by external force it also rests in this state by force. But even the most vivid imagination will find a difficulty in explaining what would be the character of the forced movements and reposes of the soul.

Again, if the movement of the soul be upward it will be composed of fire, if downward, of earth; such being the directions in which these bodies naturally move. And the same holds good also of the intermediate elements.

But fourthly, since the soul according to all appearance sets the body in motion, we may reasonably suppose that it originates in the body the same movements as those by which it is itself in movement. But if this be so, then it follows by conversion that whatever be the movement with which the body is moved, such also is that with which the soul itself is moved. Now the movement of the body is a local movement. It follows therefore that the soul would also change its position in respect of the body, executing these changes either in its entirety or in its several parts. But were this possible it would further follow that the soul would be able after passing out of the body to enter it again: and this in turn would involve the absurd conclusion that animals after having died can rise again.

With regard on the other hand to accidental movement, it is true that the soul could be thus moved incidentally at the hand of something else: the animal in which the soul is contained may be pushed on by external force: and so the soul