In line 18 ὀρεκτικόν, which is read by the majority of MSS., would seem to be more correct than opekтóv (read by Trend. and Torstrik), as shewing that both opeğis and diávoia enter into action; and a word denoting the faculty seems more appropriate than one which denotes the object. § 3. 433 22. κατὰ κοινὸν ἄν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος] Themistius paraphrases : ἄλλη ἄν τις δύναμις ὑπῆρχεν ἀμφοτέροις κοινή, ἧς ἀμφότερα κοινωνοῦντα ἐκίνει τὸ ζῶον ὡς τῷ δίποδι καὶ τῷ τετράποδι τὸ πόδας ἔχειν. And Aristotle's argument would seem to be to the following effect: voûs and opeĝıs are not two separate faculties in producing action, because, if so, they would have to involve a common centre, they would have to exhibit a community of action in producing their results. But such community does not exist. Reason, indeed, involves desire, and action, κατὰ λογισμον, is also κατὰ βούλησιν : but ὄρεξις, or at least ἐπιθυμία, shews no community of action with λόγισμος-in fact, the two are frequently in conflict. 433 25. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς τις ἐστίν] Cp. Topics, vi. 3, 14ο 27, ἡ ἐπι θυμία ὄρεξις τοῦ ἡδέος, and De Motu Anim. 7oo 22, βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὄρεξις· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως· ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητόν. § 4. 433 28. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν] Cp. Eth. Nic. III. 41 where it is shewn that absolutely it is real good which is the object of wish, but relatively to individuals it is the apparent or phenomenal. Themistius explains that it is the ἀληθινὸν ἀγαθόν which excites νοῦς, the φαινόμενον that influences ἐπιθυμία and θυμός: and adds, καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ τηνικαῦτα φαίνεται ἀγαθόν, ὅταν κινῇ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ τὸν θυμόν. 433 29. πρακτὸν δ ̓ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον] Cp. Εth. VI. 2, 1139" 13, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. 433 8. ἡ δ ̓ ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη] As Trendelenburg remarks, there is a distinct significance in using dŋ instead of vuv. 'Cupido enim non temporis punctum quod adest, sed quod instat intuetur.' on, in fact, implies that the object of appetite is so temporary that it has passed out of the present as soon as it has come within it. §7. 433 13. ἐπειδὴ δ ̓ ἐστὶ τρία ἓν μὲν τὸ κινοῦν] The same analysis of movement is to be found in Phys. VIII. 5, 256 14. 433 15. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν] Cp. Μetaph. Α. 7, 1072 26: τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητὸν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὂν καλόν. De Motu Anim. 6, 700 35, τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἡ δ ̓ ὄρεξις καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν κινούμενον κινεῖ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον τῶν κινουμένων οὐκ ἀνάγκη κινεῖν οὐδέν. 433 16. κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ ὀρεγόμενον ᾗ ὀρέγεται] κινούμενον is read by ELSUVW Bekk., but ὀρεγόμενον, the reading of TX, seems required and is accepted by Trendelenburg. 433 20. διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ] This refers most probably to the treatise De Motu Animalium. Rose, however (De Arist. Libr. Ordine, p. 163), thinks the allusion is to the Parva Naturalia. § 8. 433 22. ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός] By the γιγγλυμός must be understood a ball-and-socket-joint, like that, for instance, of the elbow. There, beginning and end, are one-the forward movement in reaching forward starts just where the stationary centre ends-and similarly in moral action the moral category of the reason, the universal principle of conduct serves as the centre from which desire reaches forward to its end. Cp. De Motu Animalium, I, 698" 14, φανερὸν γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ὅτι ἀδύνατον κινεῖσθαι μηδενὸς ἠρεμοῦντος, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ζῴοις. δεῖ γὰρ ἂν κινῆταί τι τῶν μορίων, ἠρεμεῖν τι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἱ καμπαὶ τοῖς ζῴοις εἰσίν. ὥσπερ γὰρ κέντρῳ χρῶνται ταῖς καμπαῖς, καὶ γίνεται τὸ ὅλον μέρος, ἐν ᾧ ἡ καμπή, καὶ ἐν καὶ δύο, καὶ εὐθὺ καὶ κεκαμμένον, μεταβάλλον δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, διὰ τὴν καμπήν. 43325. πάντα γὰρ ὤσει καὶ ἕλξει κινεῖται] Impulse on the one hand, attraction on the other, constitute the elements of movement. Cp. De Motu Anim. 730 20: τὰ δ ̓ ἔργα τῆς κινήσεως ὦσις καὶ ἕλξις, ὥστε δεῖ τὸ ὄργανον αὐξάνεσθαί τε δύνασθαι καὶ συστέλλεσθαι. CHAPTER XI. This chapter connects itself closely with the preceding, and Philoponus rightly transcribes it without anything of the break which our traditional method of division renders necessary. φαντασία—the presentation of an idea to the mind-is, the tenth chapter had pointed out, the pre-supposition of a motive faculty: the present chapter asks how is this possible in the case of imperfect animals, and how does the mind compare and decide upon its different impressions. §1. 4344. ἡ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῖται ἀορίστως] Philoponus explains : ἀόριστον δὲ καλεῖ τῶν ζωοφύτων τὴν κίνησιν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως συστέλλεσθαί τε καὶ διαστέλλεσθαι. § 2. 4349. ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν] The point then of this section would seem to be that the conceptions and images of the mind are but the materials of will: we must further recognise an inward unity which compares and weighs the different impressions in our experience. 434 10. καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμού οὐκ ἔχει, αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην] Torstrik thinks the words omni cum reliquis nexu carent.' This, however, is not really the case. Aristotle is shewing that the formation of an ὄρεξις as opposed to an ἐπιθυμία in man, implies that same power of comparison and judgment which he had already in c. 7 shewn to be an indispensable pre-supposition of attaining to the conception of good and evil, just as of true and false. Here, then, after shewing that the pursuit or choice of the stronger motive or preferable course of conduct involves such a synthetic power, he adds, parenthetically it is true but still in intimate connection with what precedes, that the animal as such displays none of this work of comparison, it never out of a number of present impressions forms a general conception which shall be the major premise of a practical syllogism: it simply follows the impression of the moment and so, while it displays a certain amount of reasonableness in its action, it is not credited with the possession of dogá which implies the construction of generalities. 434 12. νικῇ δ ̓ ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν] This passage, which is very obscure, is amended by Torstrik as follows—νικᾷ δ ̓ ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται· ὅτε δ ̓ ἐκείνη ταύτην· ὅτε δ ̓ ὥσπερ σφαίραν σpaîpa, ǹ öpeğis Tηv öpeği. The passage can, however, I think, be translated as it stands, and the rpeis popaì made out without any alteration of the text. The nominative to νικᾷ must be αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία : ἐκείνη ταύτην must be used quite generally and explained by ὄρεξις ὄρεξιν, while the third φορά must be that of φύσει δ ̓ ἀεὶ ἡ ἄνω. It is true that ἀκρασία is not in strict Aristotelian terminology applied to the conflict of successive desires: but Aristotle, we may suppose, could without any inconsistency describe the state of unsatisfied desire under the general name ȧxpaσía. 43413· ὁτὲ δ ̓ ἐκείνη ταύτην ὥσπερ σφαῖρα] Themistius explains the passage as if it referred to the astronomical conception of a higher sphere or circle of constellations as influencing the movement of a lower cycle. His words are : νικᾷ δ ̓ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ποτὲ μὲν ἡ ἄλογος τὴν λογικὴν, ποτὲ δὲ τοῦμ παλιν, κινεῖ δὲ ἡ κρατοῦσα τὴν κρατουμένην, οὐ παύουσα τῆς ὁρμῆς ἀλλὰ συμπεριάγουσα ἑαυτῇ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς σφαίρας τῆς οὐρανίας ἡ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν τῶν πλανήτων οὐχ ἵστησιν ἀλλὰ κινουμένη ἰδίαν κίνησιν ὁμοίως ἑαυτῇ συμπεριάγει. Trendelenburg understands the passage in the same manner. According, then, to this explanation, Aristotle means that Bouλnois or Boulevσis overcomes and regulates peis or émisvμía much in the same way as the higher orbit among heavenly bodies transforms and governs the movements of a lower sphere. To this interpretation, however, several objections suggest themselves. 1. The metaphor, if this be its meaning, is unreasonably obscure. Even Aristotle's brevity could hardly have expected so much to be made out of a single word and if the phrase is to bear Trendelenburg's meaning, we must at least read with Torstrik ὥσπερ σφαῖραν σφαῖρα. 2. So taken, it is not relevant-it does not explain the phenomena which Aristotle apparently intends it to illustrate. These phenomena are the characteristics of dκparía, in which one desire succeeds and overcomes another ad infinitum, so that the incontinent is the plaything as it were of continually crossing and re-crossing influences. Trendelenburg only gets a suitable meaning out of the metaphor by taking it closely with the ἀρχικωτέρα which follows. 3. The explanation of opaîpa as heavenly orbit is not consistent with Aristotle's use of the same expression in another chapter of the Psychology. In 11. 8, 419 27, Aristotle writes, ἠχὼ γίνεται ὅταν πάλιν ὁ ἀὴρ ἀπωσθῇ ὥσπερ opaîpa. In this passage it is undoubtedly to the rebound of a ball that an echo is compared. The probability, then, is that in our present passage also it is a ball, which is the subject of the metaphor: and the meaning would seem to be that in the incontinent man, wanting as he is in all powers of self-control and moral government, impulse follows impulse, appetite takes the place of appetite, just in the same way as the ball passes from the hand of one player to another. So Plato in Euthydemus, 277 B, speaks of womeр opaipav ἐκδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον. §4. 43416. ἐπεὶ δ ̓ ἡ μὲν καθόλου υπόληψις] Cp. De Motu Animal. 7, 7018: Eth. VII. 3, 1147a 25. CHAPTER XII. The twelfth and thirteenth chapters appear at first sight out of place after the chapters on thought and will which have preceded. In reality, however, they form a natural conclusion to the treatise on Psychology. Regarding everything from the point of view of its end or final causes, Aristotle after an analysis of the separate mental powers naturally comes to consider the mutual relation of those powers to one another and their fitness for the conditions of human life. The writer accordingly begins by shewing (§ 1) that the lowest form of soul is necessary for mere vitality, that sense-perception necessarily attaches to the animal, and ends by pointing out at greater length how the several senses contribute to the needs of life. § 3. 434 32. εἰ οὖν πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικὸν μὴ ἔχον αἴσθησιν] Trendelenburg suggests that we should here read exo, ei otherwise having no finite verb to which it may be referred, and the change is so slight that it ought perhaps to be adopted. Torstrik maintains that Aristotle is not refuting the supposition that any animal πopevτɩkóv can be without sense, but that any animals without sense are πορευτικά. He thinks accordingly that for πᾶν, εἴη or yévoto should be substituted. § 4. 434 4. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει;] This passage has caused considerable difficulty to the commentators. Taken directly, the sequence of ideas would seem to be the following. Every body which possesses soul and reason possesses also sense. This proposition is at first limited to body, which is yévnтov, possessed of a beginning in time but it is instantly suggested that the remark may be extended to the ȧyévrov—the uncreated bodies of the heavens-because there is nothing to shew why they should not equally possess the faculties of sense. But here comes in the difficulty that Aristotle would not appear otherwise to assign the faculty of sense-perception to the stars. Trendelenburg accordingly regards oudé as accommodated more to the sense than to the laws of grammar, and so equivalent to ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον αἴσθησιν ἔχει. He translates the sentence accordingly: Nullum corpus, quod movetur, si anima gaudet et W. AR. 19 mente, sensu caret, nisi immortalia eaque cœlestia corpora, quibus, si animantia sunt, sensus neque ad corporis neque ad mentis usum quicquam valeret. Similarly also Simplicius after noting, φαίνεται δὲ ὁ ̓Αριστοτέλης μηδαμοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπὶ τῶν οὐρανίων προσιέμενος, goes on to accept the explanation of Alexander that with ἀγέννητον we should supply αἴσθησιν : κάλλιον οἶμαι, ὁ ̓Αλέξανδρος ἐξηγεῖται, τό, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον, ἀξιῶν ἀκούειν πρὸς τὸ αἴσθησιν ἔχειν—ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν ἔχειν. τισι The words are certainly awkward, and might be profitably removed. They are found in all our MSS., but the note of Simplicius-ev tioi dè àvtiypáφοις πρόσκειται τὸ ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον—points to MSS. in his day in which they were absent. It would seem, therefore, that Torstrik is not improbably right in regarding the clause as the addition of an interpolator who doubted whether Aristotle's limitation of the connection of sense with reason to the yévvηrov was altogether tenable; or the words may be an unformed suggestion on the part of Aristotle himself. Whether we regard the words as an integral part of the argument, or as a mere suggestion raised to be forgotten, there is at least no doubt that the correct reading in what follows must be, διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει as in TUVWy. For if we retain ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον, Aristotle asks why the uncreated should not have sense, and shews that the absence of sense cannot benefit it either in soul or body : if we reject the words ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον, or view them as strictly parenthetical, the words dià rí still ask, why should the yévvηrov not possess aïo Onois in the way the previous sentence has maintained. Torstrik in supplying νοῦν κριτικόν to διὰ τί γὰρ ἕξει would seem to miss the drift of Aristotle's reasoning. § 9. 434 31. καὶ τὸ ὦσαν ἕτερον ποιεῖ ὥστε ὠθεῖν] Torstrik here conjectures Tò wơbév, and adds―ridicule profecto rò wσav: nam postquam pepulit, non jam pellit. The alteration somewhat simplifies the passage, but the vulgate can be defended if we regard repov as the accusative of dσav, and then repeat ἕτερον after ποιεῖ. 4351. πλὴν ὅτι μένοντα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ ἀλλοιοῖ] Bekker and Torstrik here read μένοντος. If μένοντος be accepted, we must supply τοῦ μέσου: μένοντα should be taken as accusative (with μέσα supplied) after αλλοιοῖ (Scil. TIs). 4355. διὸ καὶ περὶ ἀνακλάσεως βέλτιον ἢ τὴν ὄψιν ἐξιοῦσαν ἀνακλάσθαι] The opinion in question is that of Empedocles and Plato. They, as we learn further from De Sensu, 2, 437o 11, Timaeus, 45 C, explained vision as due to the fact that the eye was endowed congenitally with a fire, which after streaming from the eyes and mingling by its similarity of nature with the light of outward objects was finally again returned to the mind. Vision, then, was with these thinkers, the result of ȧvákλaois-the fire of the eye was after contact with the fire of things thrown back again upon the organ of perception. Aristotle flatters himself that his own theory is much simpler. He conceives that the original object of vision makes an impression on some medium or other, and that thereafter this impression is transmitted in the |
