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The probability, then, is that in our present passage also it is a ball, which is the subject of the metaphor: and the meaning would seem to be that in the incontinent man, wanting as he is in all powers of self-control and moral government, impulse follows impulse, appetite takes the place of appetite, just in the same way as the ball passes from the hand of one player to another. So Plato in Euthydemus, 277 B, speaks of otep opaipav εκδεξάμενος τον λόγον, .
$ 4. 434" 16. έπει δ' η μεν καθόλου υπόληψις] Cp. De Motu Animal. 7, 7018: Eth. VII. 3, 11478 25.
The twelfth and thirteenth chapters appear at first sight out of place after the chapters on thought and will which have preceded. In reality, however, they form a natural conclusion to the treatise on Psychology. Regarding everything from the point of view of its end or final causes, Aristotle after an analysis of the separate mental powers naturally comes to consider the mutual relation of those powers to one another and their fitness for the conditions of human life. The writer accordingly begins by shewing (§ 1) that the lowest form of soul is necessary for mere vitality, that sense perception necessarily attaches to the animal, and ends by pointing out at greater length how the several senses contribute to the needs of life.
8 3. 4342 32. ει ούν παν σώμα πορευτικών μη έχον αίσθησιν] Trendelenburg suggests that we should here read čxor, ei otherwise having no finite verb to which it may be referred, and the change is so slight that it ought perhaps to be adopted. Torstrik maintains that Aristotle is not refuting the supposition that any animal Topeutikóv can be without sense, but that any animals without sense are πορευτικά. He thinks accordingly that for πάν, είη or yévoito should be substituted.
$ 4. 434 4. αλλά μην ουδε αγέννητον διά τί γαρ ουχ έξει ;] This passage has caused considerable difficulty to the commentators. Taken directly, the sequence of ideas would seem to be the following. Every body which possesses soul and reason possesses also sense. This proposition is at first limited to body, which is yévvntov, possessed of a beginning in time : but it is instantly suggested that the remark may be extended to the dyévvntor—the uncreated bodies of the heavens-because there is nothing to shew why they should not equally possess the faculties of sense. But here comes in the difficulty that Aristotle would not appear otherwise to assign the faculty of sense-perception to the stars. Trendelenburg accordingly regards oùdé as accommodated more to the sense than to the laws of grammar, and so equivalent to αλλά μην ουδε αγέννητον αίσθησιν έχει. . He translates the sentence accordingly : Nullum corpus, quod movetur, si anima gaudet et W. AR.
mente, sensu caret, nisi immortalia eaque cælestia corpora, quibus, si animantia sunt, sensus neque ad corporis neque ad mentis usum quicquam valeret. Similarly also Simplicius after noting, palvetat dè ó 'Aplototéns μηδαμου την αίσθησιν επί των ουρανίων προσιέμενος, goes on to accept the explanation of Alexander that with αγέννητον we should supply αίσθησιν : κάλλιον oίμαι, ο Αλέξανδρος εξηγείται, το, αλλά μην ουδε αγέννητον, αξιών ακούειν προς το αίσθησιν έχειν- αλλά μην ουδε αγέννητον αναγκαίον αίσθησιν έχειν.
The words are certainly awkward, and might be profitably removed. They are found in all our MSS., but the note of Simplicius—ēv TIOL dè arriypáφοις πρόσκειται το αλλά μην ουδε αγέννητον-points to MSS. in his day in which they were absent. It would seem, therefore, that Torstrik is not improbably right in regarding the clause as the addition of an interpolator who doubted whether Aristotle's limitation of the connection of sense with reason to the yévvntov was altogether tenable; or the words may be an unformed suggestion on the part of Aristotle himself.
Whether we regard the words as an integral part of the argument, or as a mere suggestion raised to be forgotten, there is at least no doubt that the correct reading in what follows must be, 8à Tí yàp oủx étel as in TUVWy. For if we retain αλλά μην ουδε αγέννητον, Aristotle asks why the uncreated should not have sense, and shews that the absence of sense cannot benefit it either in soul or body : if we reject the words αλλά μην ουδε αγέννητον, or view them as strictly parenthetical, the words dià Tí still ask, why should the yéventov not possess ato Onous in the way the previous sentence has maintained. Torstrik in supplying νούν κριτικόν to διά τί γάρ έξει would seem to miss the drift of Aristotle's reasoning.
$ 9. 434031. kai tò doar érepov Trolei wote wewv) Torstrik here conjectures Tò Wo6év, and adds—ridicule profecto rò soav: nam postquam pepulit, non jam pellit. The alteration somewhat simplifies the passage, but the vulgate can be defended if we regard frepov as the accusative of woav, and then repeat έτερον after ποιεί. .
435" 1. πλήν ότι μένοντα εν τω αυτω τόπω άλλοιoi] Bekker and Torstrik here read μένοντος. If μένοντος be accepted, we must supply του μέσου : mévovta should be taken as accusative (with peoa supplied) after alloroi (scil. tis).
435° 5. διό και περί ανακλάσεως βέλτιον ή την όψιν έξιούσαν ανακλάσθαι] The opinion in question is that of Empedocles and Plato. They, as we learn further from De Sensu, 2, 437" 11, Timaeus, 45 C, explained vision as due to the fact that the eye was endowed congenitally with a fire, which after streaming from the eyes and mingling by its similarity of nature with the light of outward objects was finally again returned to the mind. Vision, then, was with these thinkers, the result of iváklaois—the fire of the eye was after contact with the fire of things thrown back again upon the organ of perception. Aristotle flatters himself that his own theory is much simpler. He conceives that the original object of vision makes an impression on some medium or other, and that thereafter this impression is transmitted in the second instance to the eye, which is fitted to receive it (aio Ontikòv ein to εκείνο μεν υπό του αισθητού πάσχειν και κινείσθαι αυτό δ' υπ' εκείνου). Thus the operation of perception is not unlike that of producing an impression in wax : only whereas the impression in wax does not continue to propagate itself after the object which produces the impression is removed, air is much more susceptible to impressions, and étè Theotov kiveirai. Thus then, Aristotle concludes, we may compare the manner in which a visible object communicates its impressions through the air to the eye, to an impression in wax which passes through the wax to the outer surface of it, and leaves its final stamp upon the paper or other material on which the wax is placed (ώσπερ αν εί το εν τω κηρό σημείον διεδίδοτο μέχρι του πέρατος).
This chapter sums up the results of the Psychology by shewing how the sense of touch is what determines ultimately the sensitive organism. It is touch ($ 1) which shews that the animal organism cannot consist of one element only: it is touch alone among the senses which coincides in its annihilation with the annihilation of life in general.
δ Ι, 4358 11. ότι δ' ουχ οιόν τε απλούν είναι το του ζώου σώμα, κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle's argument is to the following effect. Touch is requisite to animal existence: touch cannot be reduced to one single element (earth): therefore the animal body cannot be resolved into one single element. The main point of the argument lies, of course, in shewing that touch cannot, as might at first be thought, consist of only one element. To do this, Aristotle points out that all the other elements have been already used up in explaining the composition of the other organs of sense, which, however, produce perception mediately. Touch, however, produces perception by immediate contact : and therefore would have to be ascribed to earth alone. But earth alone is insufficient to explain its operation : it receives and perceives not only the difference of earth (hard and soft, &c.) but also the qualities of hot and cold. Thus then touch, the essential condition of animal life, cannot be composed of earth alone : and consequently the animal body cannot consist of one single element.