ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY. BOOK FIRST. CHAPTER I. The acquisition of knowledge is, we conceive, always something high and honourable: but one form of knowledge is superior to another either in virtue of the self-contained simplicity of its truths or by the greater dignity and wondrousness of its contents: and on both these grounds the investigation of the soul might with justice claim a foremost place. And, besides, the knowledge of it is thought to have important bearings on truth generally and especially on nature : for soul is as it were the prime factor in animal existence. The object of our enquiry is to observe and to discover both the historical development and the essential nature of the soul, and further to find out the phenomena occurring in connection with it-phenomena of which some are thought to be affections peculiar to the soul itself, others, while owing their existence to the soul, are thought to belong to the animal nature taken as a whole. By far in every way the greatest difficulty connected with it is that of reaching some certainty about it. The object of investigation is, it is true, the same here as it is in many other subjects—it is, that is, the question of the essential notion and of the generic character. It might therefore be supposed that there is some one one common method applicable to all objects of which we wish to οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, 15 ὥστε ζητητέον ἂν εἴη τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι μία τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι· δεήσει γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τίς ὁ τρόπος. ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν ᾖ, πότερον ἀπόδειξίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ διαίρεσις ἢ καί τις ἄλλη μέθοδος, ἔτι πολλὰς 20 ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ πλάνας ἐκ τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν· ἄλλαι γὰρ § 3 ἄλλων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἐπιπέδων. πρῶτον δ' ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστι, λέγω δὲ πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ καί τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν· ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν 25 δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά τις διαφέρει γὰρ οὔ τι § 4 σμικρόν. σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον 4025 ὁμοειδὴς ἅπασα ψυχὴ ἢ οὔ· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδής, πότερον εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ γένει. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης ἐοίκασιν ἐπι§ 5 σκοπεῖν. εὐλαβητέον δ ̓ ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὁ λόγος 5 αὐτῆς ἐστί, καθάπερ ζῴου, ή καθ ̓ ἕκαστον ἕτερος, οἷον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἡ ὕστερον· ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο κατηγοροῖτο. § 6 ἔτι δ ̓ εἰ μὴ πολλαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀλλὰ μόρια, πότερον δεῖ ζη 17. περὶ τὸ] περὶ τοῦ STUWX. 15. ἀπόδειξιν Bekk. SUWX. 19. ὅταν SUW. τις om. TUWX E. 26. μᾶλλον] μόνον Ε. (Buss.). 402 4. μόνον 20. 6. ἑκάστην pr. E Tor. 8. κατηγορεῖται Tor. discover the essential nature, just as deductive argument traces out the properties dependent on the genus: and in this case we should have to seek the method in question. But if there be no one common method for finding out the generic character, our procedure becomes still more difficult, as it will then be necessary to. settle with regard to each subject of investigation what is the method of enquiry which is appropriate to it. And even if it were clear whether some deductive argument or Platonic division or some other method were the right one to apply, yet even so the question from what points we should begin our enquiry is one which offers many difficulties and leaves much room for divergent views, because different conceptions have different fundamental principles, as we see in the difference between the elementary ideas of arithmetic and those of geometry. The first point however which demands our attention is to determine in which of the higher classes soul is included and what is its generic character-whether, in other words, it is an individual thing and real substance or a quality or quantity or any other of the categories as they have been distinguished. We must further ask whether it belongs to the class of potentialities or is rather a completed actuality— two conceptions between which there is no small difference. Another question, we shall have to ask, is whether it is divisible or free from parts, and whether again all souls are homogeneous or not; and if not homogeneous, whether it is specifically or generically that they differ: for at present writers who investigate the soul seem to confine their observations to the soul of man alone. Special care must be taken to discover whether there is one definition comprehending all the different forms of soul just as the definition of animal applies to all particular animals, or whether the definition is different in respect of each individual species: just as if for example we were to allow a definition of horse, dog, man and God, but should assert that the universal 'animal' either signifies no actually existing thing or is posterior to the particular species, this also holding good of any other common term. Should it however be ascertained that there are not τεῖν πρότερον τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἢ τὰ μόρια. χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ το τούτων διορίσαι ποῖα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ πότερον τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ ή νοεῖν ἢ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὁμοίως § 7 δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἄν 20 τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερον τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον 15 § 8 τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοητικοῦ. ἔοικε δ ̓ οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι τί τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ καμπύλον ἢ τί γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν πόσαις ὀρθαῖς αἱ τοῦ τριγώνου γωνίαι ἴσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέγα μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστιν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἕξομεν λέγειν κάλλιστα· πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τί 15 ἐστιν, ὥστε καθ' ὅσους τῶν ὁρισμῶν μὴ συμβαίνει τὰ συμβεβηκότα γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ μηδ ̓ εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐμα-403 ρές, δῆλον ὅτι διαλεκτικῶς εἰρηνται καὶ κενῶς ἅπαντες. § 9 ἀπορίαν δ ̓ ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστί τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον δέ. φαίνεται 5 15. πρότερα ES. 403 2. κενώς] several souls, but merely different parts in the soul, the question rises whether we should begin by investigating the whole soul or should start rather with the parts. And here again it is difficult to determine which of them are really different from one another, and whether we should first of all investigate the parts or their functions-whether we should for instance investigate the act of reasoning or the faculty of reason, the act of sensation or the faculty of sense: and so also in other And supposing we determine to examine first of all the functions, still the further question may be raised whether we should beforehand treat of the objects which are their counterpart-treat, that is, of the object of sense before the faculty of sense, and of the object of thought before the faculty of thought. cases. The truth however seems to be that it is not only a knowledge of the generic character of anything which helps towards detecting the causes of the properties of substancesas in mathematics the knowledge of straight and curved or the generic character of what is a line or superficies assists us in seeing to how many right angles the angles of the triangle are equal-but even conversely the knowledge of the properties contributes in great measure to a knowledge of the 'what' or the generic notion. When, in fact, we are able to present to the mind's eye all or most of the properties which appear to be connected with an object, we shall be in a position to speak as well as may be about the thing itself: although the starting point of all demonstration consists in knowing what a thing is. And thus all definitions that do not convey a knowledge of the properties attending on an object and do not even render it easy to frame a conjecture regarding them are evidently mere empty phrases such as transcendentalists alone would use. It is a further question whether the affections of the soul are also all shared along with the soul by the body which contains it, or whether there is in addition something peculiar to the soul itself. This is a question which it is necessary and yet not easy to answer. It appears at any rate that in the great majority of cases the soul is neither active nor passive |