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it follows that reason would be the circle of which such a revolution constitutes thought. And again the soul will be continually involved in thought, since (as is asserted in the Timaeus) circular movement is everlasting. [This however is opposed to all experience:] in the case of processes of thought leading to action there are certain ends which limit them, all being for the sake of something else, and thoughts applied to speculation only are limited in the same manner as the reasoned explanations which they involve. Now every explanation resolves itself into either a definition or a deductive demonstration. But as for demonstrations, they both start froin a principle as a beginning and have as it were a termination in the syllogism or the conclusion; and even if they do not reach a termination, still they do not turn back again to the beginning, but, employing always a fresh middle term and an extreme, proceed forward in a straight line, whereas a circular movement always returns back to the beginning. The same thing holds good also of definitions: they are all limited and determined. Besides, if the same revolution takes place a great many times, it will be necessary to think the same thing frequently. Further, thought bears a greater similarity to rest and stoppage than to motion : and so also is it likewise with syllogism.
Happiness, again, cannot be an attribute of that which is acted on by force and does not happen with ease : and if, to obviate this difficulty, it be held that movement does not constitute the soul's essential nature, its movement would be contrary to nature. It is burdensome also for the soul to be united with the body without possibility of release from it: and not only so, but such union is even something which is to be if possible avoided, supposing it to be better for the reason to be independent of the body, as is usually said and widely believed.
There is an obscurity also as to the reason why the heavens are carried in a circle ; for it is not the essential nature of the soul which is the reason of its being carried in a circle, this movement being merely incidental to it: nor is it the body which is the cause, the soul being rather the cause which produces movement in the body. Nor indeed is it asserted that the soul moves in this manner because it is its better course. W. AR.
δια τούτο τον θεόν κύκλω ποιείν φέρεσθαι την ψυχήν, ότι το βέλτιον αυτή το κινείσθαι του μένειν, κινείσθαι δ' ούτως ή
άλλως. έπει δ' έστιν ή τοιαύτη σκέψις ετέρων λόγων οικειο8 22 τέρα, ταύτην μεν άφώμεν το νύν. εκείνο δε άτοπον συμ
βαίνει και τούτω τω λόγω και τους πλείστοις των περί ψυχης συνάπτουσι γαρ και τιθέασιν εις σωμα την ψυχήν, ουθέν προσδιορίσαντες διά τίν' αιτίαν και πως έχοντος του σώματος. καίτοι δόξειεν αν τούτ' αναγκαίον είναι δια γαρ την κοινωνίαν το μεν ποιεί το δε πάσχει και το μεν κινείται το
δε κινεί, τούτων δ' ούθεν υπάρχει προς άλληλα τους τυχούσιν. 8 23 οι δε μόνον επιχειρούσι λέγειν ποιόν τι η ψυχή, περί δε του 20
δεξoμένου σώματος ούθεν έτι προσδιορίζουσιν, ώσπερ ενδεχό-
τέχνην χρήσθαι τους οργάνοις, την δε ψυχήν τω σώματι. SI IV. Και άλλη δε τις δόξα παραδέδοται περί ψυχής,
πιθανή μεν πολλοίς ουδεμιάς ήττον των λεγομένων, λόγους
16. προδιορίσαντες S. Philop. 18. ποιεί τι το STVWX. σώμα και Ε.
28. λόγους] λόγον conj. Tor. I λεγομένοις λόγοις W. Αld. Philop. . 30. αυτήν τινες λ. VW.
God however must have made the soul to be moved in this circular fashion for no other reason than that it was better for it to be in movement than to remain at rest, and, further, better to be moved in this manner than in any other. Such an investigation however can be more appropriately discussed in other fields of study, and may be therefore for the present left aside.
There is however one peculiar inconsistency which we may note as marking this and most other psychological theories. They place the soul in the body and attach it to the body without trying in addition to determine the reason why or the condition of the body under which such attachment is produced. This would seem however to be a real question calling for solution: in so far as it is by reason of this communion that the one factor is active the other passive, and that the one sets in motion the other is in motion : and relations of this kind are never found in cases of mere juxtaposition. The thinkers however to whom we are referring attempt to state the nature of the soul only: with regard to the nature of the body which is to receive the soul they determine nothing in particular. And thus, although every body seems to possess a distinctive form and character, they act as if it were possible for any soul to clothe itself in any body, after the manner of the tales which Pythagoreans tell of transmigration. Their account in fact is much like speaking of the carpenter's art as clothing itself in flutes: the truth being that just as art makes use of its appropriate instruments, so the soul must make use of its fitting body.
There is still another opinion handed down respecting soul which meets with acceptance at the hands of many no less than any of the views which have been stated, though even in popularly written treatises it has been examined and brought, as it were, to account for its assumptions. The soul is by the doctrine in question regarded as a harmony of some sort. A
νίαν κράσιν και σύνθεσιν εναντίων είναι, και το σώμα συγ8 2 κείσθαι εξ εναντίων. καίτοι γε η μεν αρμονία λόγος τις έστι
των μιχθέντων ή σύνθεσις, την δε ψυχήν ουδέτερον οιόν τ' 8 3 είναι τούτων. έτι δε το κινείν ουκ έστιν αρμονίας, ψυχή δε 8 4 πάντες απονέμουσι τούτο μάλισθ' ως ειπείν. αρμόζει δε μάλ- 4084
λον καθ' υγιείας λέγειν αρμονίαν, και όλως των σωματικων αρετών, ή κατά ψυχής. φανερώτατον δ' εί τις απο
διδόναι πειραθείη τα πάθη και τα έργα της ψυχής αρμο85 νία τινί χαλεπόν γαρ εφαρμόζειν. έτι δ' ει λέγομεν την 5
αρμονίαν εις δύο αποβλέποντες, κυριώτατα μεν των μεγεθών εν τοις έχουσι κίνησιν και θέσιν την σύνθεσιν αυτών, επειδαν ούτω συναρμόζωσιν ώστε μηδέν συγγενές παραδέχεσθαι, εντεύθεν δε και τον των μεμιγμένων λόγον, ουδετέρως μεν ουν εύλογον· η δε σύνθεσης των του σώματος μερών λίαν ευεξέ- το ταστος. πολλαί τε γαρ αι συνθέσεις των μερών και πολλα
χώς τίνος ούν ή πως υπολαβείν τον νούν χρή σύνθεσιν είναι, 8 6 ή και το αισθητικόν ή ορεκτικόν ; ομοίως δε άτοπον και τον
λόγον της μίξεως είναι την ψυχήν ου γαρ τον αυτόν έχει λόγον η μίξις των στοιχείων καθ' ην σαρξ και καθ' ην οστούν. 15 συμβήσεται ούν πολλάς τε ψυχάς έχειν και κατά παν το
σώμα, είπερ πάντα μεν εκ των στοιχείων μεμιγμένων, ο δε 8 7 της μίξεως λόγος αρμονία και ψυχή. απαιτήσεις δ' άν τις τούτο
γε και παρ' Εμπεδοκλέους: έκαστον γαρ αυτών λόγω τινί φησιν είναι πότερον ούν ο λόγος εστίν η ψυχή, ή μάλ
32. γε om. E. Tor.
4086 Ι. απονέμουσιν άπαντες τούτο STVW. φανερωτάτων Ε. 5. λέγουμεν UV. Trend. 12. χρη τον νούν STVW. τον] το VX, το τον λ. Βι.
harmony, it is argued, is a blending and conjunction of opposites: and it is out of opposites that the body is composed.
Harmony however it may be objected (1) is either a certain ratio of composition or an adjustment of bodies : and the soul cannot be described by either of these terms. Besides (2) movement is not a property which can be predicated of a harmony: while it is by almost all thinkers attributed to the soul. Harmony again (3) is a term which may be applied to health and to the bodily excellencies in general with much more propriety than to the soul: as would be (4) very evident if we should attempt to explain the feelings and functions of the soul by resolving them into some special harmony: so difficult is it to make them correspond. It may be added further (5) that in speaking of a harmony we do so with reference to two points. In the strictest sense, the term denotes so closely fitting an adjustment on the part of bodies possessed of movement and position as lets in nothing homogeneous; and hence secondly it is applied also to the ratio which holds between things that are compounded.
In neither of these two senses can the soul be reasonably regarded as a harmony. The adjustment of the parts of the body is very easy to be discovered: there are many such adjustments and they can be effected in a great variety of manners. Of what part then, we may ask, are we to suppose the reason is an adjustment or how are we to suppose it to be effected? or, again, what adjustment is it that forms the sentient or the appetitive nature? It is equally absurd to regard the soul as the expression of the ratio of the composition. The composition of the elements forming flesh is subject to a different ratio or proportion from that which forms bone; and if the soul be merely this ratio of composition then it will follow that we have many souls spread over the whole body, because all the parts of the body are formed from elements combined together and ex hypothesi it is the ratio regulating their composition which constitutes a harmony and therefore soul. This too suggests a question we might put to Empedocles relatively to his statement that each of the bodily parts is determined by a certain ratio. Whether, we might ask, is the soul this ratio, or is it