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Of all psychological theories the most unreasonable is that which describes soul as a number which sets itself in motion. Such a view involves double impossibilities—firstly those resulting from its movement and more particularly those which spring from speaking of it as a number. In what manner for instance, (1) are we to conceive a unit as moved—and by what means and under what conditions is it to be effected-seeing that it is devoid of parts and contains no differences, while if it be at once fitted to produce movement and also subject to movement it must exhibit points of difference? (2) Further, it is a doctrine of the schools that the line when moved produces a superficies, and the point when moved creates a line. Thus then since the point is merely a unit or monad possessing such and such a situation, and the number of the soul is no doubt somewhere and possesses a certain position, it follows that the movements of monads or units will be lines also [not souls or animate existences). Besides (3) if we take away a number or unit from a number, it is another and a different number that is left: whereas plants and many animals live after they have been divided and are held to possess specifically the same and not a different soul. Besides (4) there would appear to be no difference between speaking of monads or of infinitely small particles : if points be formed out of the globules of Democritus and quantity alone remain, still there will be in this as in everything continuous, something moving on the one hand, something moved on the other; as this law is the result not of
difference in size but rests simply on the ground that the one object as the other is a quantity. Thus then there must be something which will set the monads in motion. But if it be soul which produces movement in the animal, it will be soul which does so also in the number : so that the soul is not at once the moving and the moved, but the moving factor only. How then (5) can soul, being thus the moving factor only, be a monad ? Supposing it to be a monad, it must be different from other monads: but what difference can there be between one monadic point and another except position ? Thus then (6) if, on the one hand, the monads as also the points of the body are different from one another, still the monads will be in the same space as the latter–because
καθέξει γαρ χώρας στιγμής. καίτοι τί κωλύει εν τω αυτό
είναι, ει δύο, και απείρους ; ων γαρ ο τόπος αδιαίρετος, 8 21 και αυτά.
ει δ' αι εν τω σώματι στιγμαι ο αριθμός και της 15 ψυχής, ή εί ο εκ των εν τω σώματι στιγμών αριθμος η
ψυχή, δια τί ου πάντα ψυχήν έχουσι τα σώματα και στιγμαι 8 22 γαρ εν άπασι δοκούσιν είναι και άπειροι. έτι δε πως οιόν τε
χωρίζεσθαι τας ψυχάς και απολύεσθαι των σωμάτων, ει
γε μη διαιρούνται αι γραμμαι εις στιγμές και $ 1 V. Συμβαίνει δε, καθάπερ είπομεν, τη μεν ταυτό λέγειν
τοις σώμά τι λεπτομερές αυτην τιθείσι, τη δ' ώσπερ Δημόκριτος κινείσθαι φησιν υπό της ψυχής, ίδιον το άτοπον 4ος είπερ γάρ έστιν η ψυχή εν παντί τω αισθανομένω σώματι, αναγκαίον εν τω αυτα δύο είναι σώματα, ει σωμά τι η ψυχή: τοις δ' αριθμόν λέγουσιν, εν τη μια στιγμη πολλας στιγμής η παν σώμα ψυχήν έχειν, ει μή διαφέρων και
τις αριθμός εγγίνεται και άλλος τις των υπαρχουσών εν $ 2 τω σώματι στιγμών. συμβαίνει τε κινείσθαι το ζώον υπό
του αριθμού, καθάπερ και Δημόκριτον έφαμεν αυτό κινείν τί γαρ διαφέρει σφαίρας λέγειν σμικράς ή μονάδας μεγά
λας, η όλως μονάδας φερομένας και αμφοτέρως γαρ αναγS 3 καίον κινείν το ζώον τω κινείσθαι ταύτας. τοϊς δη συμπλέ
ξασιν εις το αυτο κίνησιν και αριθμόν ταυτά τα συμβαίνει και πολλά έτερα τοιαύτα' ου γαρ μόνον ορισμός ψυχής αδύνατον τοιούτον είναι, αλλά και συμβεβηκός. δηλον δ' εί
23. κωλύσει VW. Trend.
24. ών γάρ] ών δε conj. Sus. στιγμας VWX Tor. 4096 7. τοις σώμασιν E. Tor. Βekk. E., αυτάς STUVWX Trend.
29. ψυχ.] ταύτας Tor.
each monad will occupy the room of a point. But if two can be in the same place, what is there to prevent an endless number from being also in the same place? This, however, is absurd; those objects of which the space is indivisible are themselves also indivisible. If, on the other hand, the points in the body constitute the number of the soul, or if the soul be the number arising from the points in the body, why is it that all bodies do not possess a soul: seeing that there seems to be points in all of them even innumerable? And further we may ask, (7) how is it possible for souls to be separated and released from the body, considering at any rate that lines cannot be resolved into their points?
There are then, as we have said, two consequences of this doctrine of the soul. On the one hand its supporters are brought to maintain a view identical with those who regard soul as some subtle body, while, on the other hand, they are landed in the peculiar absurdity which Democritus fell into in explaining how the body is moved by the soul. For if there be a soul in every sentient body, there must be two bodies within the same body, supposing the mind is a body of some sort or other : those, on the other hand, who say it is a number must either allow many points to exist within one point or else allow every body to possess a soul, unless the number be introduced as differing from other numbers and from the points existing in the body. It follows also that the living creature is moved by number much in the same way as we said Democritus moved it. For what difference does it make whether we speak of the movement of small globes or of large monads or of monads generally in movement? In either case the movement of the animal must be the result of the moving of these elements.
These and many other like consequences meet those who have combined together movement and number into one conception. Such a conception can not only not be the definition of soul : it cannot even be regarded as a concomitant attribute
τις επιχειρήσειεν εκ του λόγου τούτου τα πάθη και τα έργα 15 της ψυχής αποδιδόναι, οίον λογισμούς, αισθήσεις, ηδονάς,
λύπας, όσα άλλα τοιαύτα' ώσπερ γαρ είπομεν πρότερον, 8 4 ουδε μαντεύσασθαι ράδιον εξ αυτών. τριών δε τρόπων παρα
δεδομένων καθ' ους ορίζονται την ψυχήν, οι μεν το κινητικώτατον απεφήναντο τα κινείν εαυτό, οι δε σωμα το λεπ- 10 τομερέστατον ή το ασωματώτατον των άλλων. ταύτα δε
τίνας απορίας τε και υπεναντιώσεις έχει, διεληλύθαμεν 8 5 σχεδόν. λείπεται δ' επισκέψασθαι πως λέγεται το εκ των
στοιχείων αυτών είναι. λέγουσι μεν γάρ, ίν' αισθάνεται το των όντων και έκαστον γνωρίζη, αναγκαίον δε συμβαίνειν 25 πολλά και αδύνατα τω λόγω. τίθενται γαρ γνωρίζεις το ομοίω το όμοιον, ώσπερ αν εί την ψυχήν τα πράγματα
τιθέντες. ουκ έστι δε μόνα ταύτα, πολλά δε και έτερα, 8 6 μάλλον δ' ίσως άπειρα τον αριθμόν τα εκ τούτων. εξ ών
μεν ούν έστιν έκαστον τούτων, έστω γινώσκειν την ψυχήν και 30
η δε χθών επίηρος εν ευστέρνους χοάνοισιν
τέσσαρα δ' Ηφαίστοιο' τα δ' οστέα λεύκ' εγένοντο. ουδέν ούν όφελος είναι τα στοιχεία εν τη ψυχή, ει μη και οι λόγοι ενέσονται και η σύνθεσις" γνωριεί γαρ έκαστον το όμοιον, το δ' οστούν ή τον άνθρωπον ουθέν, ει μη και ταυτ' 18. μαντεύεσθαι STUVW.
31. τίνι-ή] 41ο Ι. άλλο οτιούν Tor. Βekk. Ε. οτιούν άλλο STUVWX. 5. τω] των STUX, τα Ε. Trend., τω Tor. conj., τας W. Η μοιράων UVW. λευκά γένοντο ETVW Tor. 7. ενείναι E. Tor.
24. αίσθηται TW.
of it. This is evident when we attempt to explain by reference to such a notion the feelings and functions of the soul, as for instance, its ratiocinations, perceptions, pleasures, pains, &c. : as we said before, it is not even easy by the help of the imagination to conjecture from it what would be their character.
Thus then we have gone through the difficulties and objections which may be raised against two of the three methods of defining soul which have been transmitted to us. Some we have seen have regarded it as the most mobile element because it possesses the power of moving itself: others have viewed it as a body of the subtlest and the finest parts or as the most incorporeal of all other bodies. It remains to examine the sense in which it is said to be compounded of the different elements.
The object of this conception of the soul is, say its supporters, to explain how it can perceive the objects of existence and gain knowledge of each individual thing. A number of impossibilities, however, necessarily follow on this doctrine. It assumes, to begin with, that like is known by like, thus identifying, as it were, the soul with the things it knows. Our objects of knowledge however include not only elements but many other things besides, and, what is perhaps still more worthy of notice, the things compounded of these elements are unlimited in number. Now granting that the soul knows and perceives in the way described the elements from which each of these is formed, still, we may ask, by which will it know or perceive the concrete whole, as for example what is God or man or flesh or bone, and similarly any composite object? The different elements do not seem to compose each of these objects in any way whatever but according to a certain ratio and adjustment, as Empedocles himself says with respect to bone.
Then did the earth the productive within the huge furnace primeval
Four parts came from the fire; and the bones white came to existence. Obviously then there is no good in the elements being present in the soul, unless the ratios and the different adaptations be present also; for although each element may recognise its similar, still it will acquire no knowledge of a bone or of a human being,