Of all psychological theories the most unreasonable is that which describes soul as a number which sets itself in motion. Such a view involves double impossibilities-firstly those resulting from its movement and more particularly those which spring from speaking of it as a number. In what manner for instance, (1) are we to conceive a unit as moved-and by what means and under what conditions is it to be effected-seeing that it is devoid of parts and contains no differences, while if it be at once fitted to produce movement and also subject to movement it must exhibit points of difference? (2) Further, it is a doctrine of the schools that the line when moved produces a superficies, and the point when moved creates a line. Thus then since the point is merely a unit or monad possessing such and such a situation, and the number of the soul is no doubt somewhere and possesses a certain position, it follows that the movements of monads or units will be lines also [not souls or animate existences]. Besides (3) if we take away a number or unit from a number, it is another and a different number that is left: whereas plants and many animals live after they have been divided and are held to possess specifically the same and not a different soul. Besides (4) there would appear to be no difference between speaking of monads or of infinitely small particles: if points be formed out of the globules of Democritus and quantity alone remain, still there will be in this as in everything continuous, something moving on the one hand, something moved on the other; as this law is the result not of any difference in size but rests simply on the ground that the one object as the other is a quantity. Thus then there must be something which will set the monads in motion. But if it be soul which produces movement in the animal, it will be soul which does so also in the number so that the soul is not at once the moving and the moved, but the moving factor only. How then (5) can soul, being thus the moving factor only, be a monad? Supposing it to be a monad, it must be different from other monads: but what difference can there be between one monadic point and another except position? Thus then (6) if, on the one hand, the monads as also the points of the body are different from one another, still the monads will be in the same space as the latter-because καθέξει γὰρ χώραν στιγμῆς. καίτοι τί κωλύει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, εἰ δύο, καὶ ἀπείρους; ὧν γὰρ ὁ τόπος ἀδιαίρετος, § 21 καὶ αὐτά. εἰ δ ̓ αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμαὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῆς 15 ψυχῆς, ἡ εἰ ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν ἀριθμὸς ἡ ψυχή, διὰ τί οὐ πάντα ψυχὴν ἔχουσι τὰ σώματα; στιγμαὶ § 22 γὰρ ἐν ἅπασι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄπειροι. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἷόν τε χωρίζεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, εἴ γε μὴ διαιροῦνται αἱ γραμμαὶ εἰς στιγμάς; SI 30 V. Συμβαίνει δέ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸ λέγειν τοῖς σῶμά τι λεπτομερὲς αὐτὴν τιθεῖσι, τῇ δ' ὥσπερ Δη μόκριτος κινεῖσθαί φησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἴδιον τὸ ἄτοπον· 409 εἴπερ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ σώματι, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δύο εἶναι σώματα, εἰ σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή· τοῖς δ ̓ ἀριθμὸν λέγουσιν, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ στιγμῇ πολλὰς στιγμὰς ἢ πᾶν σῶμα ψυχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ διαφέρων 5 τις ἀριθμὸς ἐγγίνεται καὶ ἄλλος τις τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν ἐν § 2 τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν. συμβαίνει τε κινεῖσθαι τὸ ζῷον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καθάπερ καὶ Δημόκριτον ἔφαμεν αὐτὸ κινεῖν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει σφαίρας λέγειν σμικρὰς ἢ μονάδας μεγάλας, ἢ ὅλως μονάδας φερομένας; ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ἀναγ- το § 3 καῖον κινεῖν τὸ ζῷον τῷ κινεῖσθαι ταύτας. τοῖς δὴ συμπλέξασιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ κίνησιν καὶ ἀριθμὸν ταῦτά τε συμβαίνει καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὁρισμὸν ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβεβηκός. δῆλον δ ̓ εἴ 23. κωλύσει VW. Trend. στιγμὰς VWX Tor. 24. ὧν γὰρ] ὧν δὲ conj. Sus. 409 7. τοῖς σώμασιν E. Tor. Bekk. E., avrás STUVWX Trend. II. 29. ψυχ.] ταύτας Tor. each monad will occupy the room of a point. But if two can be in the same place, what is there to prevent an endless number from being also in the same place? This, however, is absurd; those objects of which the space is indivisible are themselves also indivisible. If, on the other hand, the points in the body constitute the number of the soul, or if the soul be the number arising from the points in the body, why is it that all bodies do not possess a soul: seeing that there seems to be points in all of them even innumerable? And further we may ask, (7) how is it possible for souls to be separated and released from the body, considering at any rate that lines cannot be resolved into their points? CHAPTER V. There are then, as we have said, two consequences of this doctrine of the soul. On the one hand its supporters are brought to maintain a view identical with those who regard soul as some subtle body, while, on the other hand, they are landed in the peculiar absurdity which Democritus fell into in explaining how the body is moved by the soul. For if there be a soul in every sentient body, there must be two bodies within the same body, supposing the mind is a body of some sort or other those, on the other hand, who say it is a number must either allow many points to exist within one point or else allow every body to possess a soul, unless the number be introduced as differing from other numbers and from the points existing in the body. It follows also that the living creature is moved by number much in the same way as we said Democritus moved it. For what difference does it make whether we speak of the movement of small globes or of large monads or of monads generally in movement? In either case the movement of the animal must be the result of the moving of these elements. These and many other like consequences meet those who have combined together movement and number into one conception. Such a conception can not only not be the definition of soul it cannot even be regarded as a concomitant attribute τις ἐπιχειρήσειεν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα 15 τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδιδόναι, οἷον λογισμούς, αἰσθήσεις, ἡδονάς, λύπας, ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν πρότερον, § 4 οὐδὲ μαντεύσασθαι ῥᾴδιον ἐξ αὐτῶν. τριῶν δὲ τρόπων παραδεδομένων καθ' οὓς ορίζονται τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ μὲν τὸ κινητι κώτατον ἀπεφήναντο τῷ κινεῖν ἑαυτό, οἱ δὲ σῶμα τὸ λεπ- 20 τομερέστατον ἢ τὸ ἀσωματώτατον τῶν ἄλλων. ταῦτα δὲ τίνας ἀπορίας τε καὶ ὑπεναντιώσεις ἔχει, διεληλύθαμεν § 5 σχεδόν. λείπεται δ ̓ ἐπισκέψασθαι πῶς λέγεται τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων αὐτὴν εἶναι. λέγουσι μὲν γάρ, ἵν ̓ αἰσθάνηταί τε τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἕκαστον γνωρίζῃ, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ συμβαίνειν 15 πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα τῷ λόγῳ. τίθενται γὰρ γνωρίζειν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μόνα ταῦτα, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα, § 6 μᾶλλον δ ̓ ἴσως ἀπειρα τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ἐκ τούτων. ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἔστω γινώσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ 30 αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τίνι γνωριεῖ ἡ αἰσθήσεται, οἷον τί θεὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ σάρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν ; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν συνθέτων· οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντα τὰ στοι- 4104 χεῖα τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινὶ καὶ συνθέσει, καθάπερ φησὶ καὶ Εμπεδοκλῆς τὸ ὀστοῦν. ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐστέρνοις χοάνοισιν τὼ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων λάχε νήστιδος αἴγλης, τέσσαρα δ' Ηφαίστοιο· τὰ δ ̓ ὀστέα λεύκ ̓ ἐγένοντο. οὐδὲν οὖν ὄφελος εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, εἰ μὴ καὶ οἱ λόγοι ἐνέσονται καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις· γνωριεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὸ ὅμοιον, τὸ δ ̓ ὀστοῦν τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐθέν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ταῦτ ̓ 18. μαντεύεσθαι STUVW. οὐ οὐδ ̓ WX. 24. αἴσθηται TW. 31. τίνι—ἢ] 410a I. ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν Tor. Bekk. Ε. ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο STUVWX. 5. τω] τῶν STUX, τὰ E. Trend., τῶ Tor. conj., τὰς W. || μοιράων UVW. λευκὰ γένοντο ETVW Tor. 7. ἐνεῖναι Ε. Tor. 6. 5 of it. This is evident when we attempt to explain by reference to such a notion the feelings and functions of the soul, as for instance, its ratiocinations, perceptions, pleasures, pains, &c.: as we said before, it is not even easy by the help of the imagination to conjecture from it what would be their character. Thus then we have gone through the difficulties and objections which may be raised against two of the three methods of defining soul which have been transmitted to us. Some we have seen have regarded it as the most mobile element because it possesses the power of moving itself: others have viewed it as a body of the subtlest and the finest parts or as the most incorporeal of all other bodies. It remains to examine the sense in which it is said to be compounded of the different elements. The object of this conception of the soul is, say its supporters, to explain how it can perceive the objects of existence and gain knowledge of each individual thing. A number of impossibilities, however, necessarily follow on this doctrine. It assumes, to begin with, that like is known by like, thus identifying, as it were, the soul with the things it knows. Our objects of knowledge however include not only elements but many other things besides, and, what is perhaps still more worthy of notice, the things compounded of these elements are unlimited in number. Now granting that the soul knows and perceives in the way described the elements from which each of these is formed, still, we may ask, by which will it know or perceive the concrete whole, as for example what is God or man or flesh or bone, and similarly any composite object? The different elements do not seem to compose each of these objects in any way whatever but according to a certain ratio and adjustment, as Empedocles himself says with respect to bone. Then did the earth the productive within the huge furnace primeval Gain out of eight parts two of the liquid transparently crystal; Four parts came from the fire; and the bones white came to existence. Obviously then there is no good in the elements being present in the soul, unless the ratios and the different adaptations be present also; for although each element may recognise its similar, still it will acquire no knowledge of a bone or of a human being, |