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A general account has thus been given of the nature of the soul: it is, we have seen, a real substance which expresses an idea. Such a substance is the manifestation of the inner meaning of such and such a body. Suppose, for example, that an instrument such as an axe were a natural body: then its axehood or its being an axe would constitute its essential nature or reality, and thus, so to speak, its soul; because were this axehood taken away from it, it would be no longer an axe, except in so far as it might still be called by this same name. The object in question, however, is as matter of fact only an axe; soul being not the idea and the manifestation of the meaning of a body of this kind, but of a natural body possessing within itself a cause of movement and of rest.
The theory just stated should be viewed also in reference to the separate bodily parts. If, for example, the eye were possessed of life, vision would be its soul: because vision is the reality which expresses the idea of the eye. The eye itself, on the other hand, is merely the material substratum for vision : and when this power of vision fails, it no longer remains an eye, except in so far as it is still called by the same name, just in the same way as an eye carved in stone or delineated in painting is also so described. Now what holds good of the part must be applied to the living body taken as a whole: for perception as a whole stands to the whole sensitive body, as such, in the same ratio as the particular exercise of sense stands to a single organ of sense.
The part of our definition which speaks of something as "potentially possessed of life” must be taken to mean not that which has thrown off its soul, but rather that which has it: the seed and the fruit is such and such a body potentially. In the same way then as cutting is the full realization of an axe, or actual seeing the realization of the eye, so also waking may be said to be the full realization of the body: but it is in the sense in which vision is not only the exercise but also the implicit capacity of the eye that soul is the true realization of the body. The body on the other hand is merely the material to which soul gives reality: and just as the eye is both the pupil and its vision, so also the living animal is at once the soul and body in connection.
$ 12 ότι μεν ούν ουκ έστιν η ψυχή χωριστή του σώματος, ή μέρη
τινά αυτής, ει μεριστη πέφυκεν, ουκ άδηλον ένίων γαρ η 5 εντελέχεια των μερών έστιν αυτών· ου μην αλλ' ένιά γε
ούθεν κωλύει, δια το μηθενός είναι σώματος εντελεχείας. $ 13 έτι δε άδηλον ει ούτως εντελέχεια του σώματος η ψυχή
ώσπερ πλωτήρ πλοίου. τύπο μεν ούν ταύτη διωρίσθω και
υπογεγράφθω περί ψυχής. SI ΙΙ. Επει δ' εκ των ασαφών μεν φανερωτέρων δε γίγνε
ται το σαφές και κατά τον λόγον γνωριμώτερον, πειρατέον πάλιν ούτως επελθείν περί αυτής: ου γαρ μόνον το ότι δει τον οριστικών λόγον δηλούν, ώσπερ οι πλείστοι των όρων λέγουσιν, αλλά και την αιτίαν ενυπάρχειν και εμφαίνε. 15 σθαι. νύν δ' ώσπερ συμπεράσματ’ οι λόγοι των όρων εισίν: οιον τι εστι τετραγωνισμός και το ίσον έτερομήκει ορθογώνιον είναι ισόπλευρον. ο δε τοιούτος όρος λόγος του συμπεράσμα
ο δε λέγων ότι εστίν ο τετραγωνισμός μέσης εύρεσις, $ 2 του πράγματος λέγει το αίτιον. λέγομεν ούν αρχήν λαβόν- 20
τες της σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι το έμψυχον του αψύχου το ζην. πλεοναχώς δε του ζην λεγομένου, κάν έν τι τούτων ενυπάρχη μόνον, ζην αυτό φαμεν, οίον νους, αίσθησις, κί
νησις και στάσις ή κατά τόπον, έτι κίνησις η κατα τρο8 3 φών και φθίσιν τε και αύξησιν.
διο και τα φυόμενα 25 πάντα δοκεί ζην» φαίνεται γαρ εν αυτοίς έχοντα δύναμιν
17. έστιν ο τετρ. ESTUX. 18. λόγος om. ETV. 20. λέγωμεν ΤW. σκέψεως] σκέψεως του πράγματος SUWΧ. 25. φθισις τε και αύξησις Βekk. Tor. ETV.
It is not then difficult to see that soul or certain parts of it (if it naturally admit of partition) cannot be separated from the body: for in some cases the soul is the realization of the parts of body themselves. It is however perfectly conceivable that there may be some parts of it which are separable and this because they are not the expression or realization of any particular body. And indeed it is further matter of doubt whether soul as the perfect realization of the body may not stand to it in the same separable relation as a sailor to his boat.
This much may suffice as a description and sketch of the nature of the soul.
It is however by proceeding from that which in the order of nature is indistinct, but is relatively to us more obvious and manifest, that we reach what is clear and more intelligible in the order of thought. We must therefore make a fresh attempt to discuss soul in this manner. For a definition should not, as most definitions do, merely assert the existence of an object and say what it is: it should also contain and express the cause or reason of the object. But, as usually framed, the terms of definitions are merely like conclusions. Thus, for example, let us ask—What is squaring ? Squaring, it will be answered, is the construction of a rectangular equilateral figure equal to another figure with unequal sides. Now such a definition is merely like the statement of a conclusion. To say, on the other hand, that squaring is the discovery of a mean proportional is to state the cause which explains the result.
It may serve as a fresh beginning for our inquiry to say that the animate is distinguished from the inanimate or soulless by the fact of life. There are a number of ways in which a thing is said to live ; yet should it possess only one of them as for example, reason, sense-perception, local movement and rest, and further movement in respect of nutrition as well as of decay and growth-we say it lives. Hence it is that all plants are thought to live; because they manifestly contain within W. AR.
και αρχήν τοιαύτην, δι' ής αύξησιν
σώματος, ή μέρη βάνουσι κατά τους εναντίους τόπους: ού γι... ενίων γαρ ή και ται κάτω δ' ού, αλλ' ομοίως επ' άμφω και
τρέφεται και ζη δια τέλους, έως αν δύνηται ένιά γε 8 4 τροφήν χωρίζεσθαι δε τούτο μεν των άλλων δυνα:νείας.
δ' άλλα τούτου αδύνατον εν τοις θνητούς. φανερον δ' των φυoμένων» ουδεμία γαρ αυτοις υπάρχει δύναμις άλλη ψυχής. το μεν ούν ζήν διά την αρχήν ταύτην υπάρχει τους 413 ζωσι, το δε ζωον δια την αίσθησιν πρώτως και γαρ τα
μη κινούμενα μηδ' αλλάττοντα τόπον, έχοντα δ' αίσθησιν $ 5 ζώα λέγομεν και ου ζην μόνον. αισθήσεως δε πρώτον υπάρ
χει πάσιν αφή. ώσπερ δε το θρεπτικών δύναται χωρίζε- 5 σθαι της αφής και πάσης αισθήσεως, ούτως ή αφή των άλλων αισθήσεων θρεπτικόν δε λέγομεν το τοιούτον μόριον της ψυχής ου και τα φυτά μετέχει τα δε ζωα πάντα
φαίνεται την απτικήν αίσθησιν έχοντας δι' ήν δ' αιτίαν $ 6 εκάτερον τούτων συμβέβηκεν, ύστερον έρούμεν. νύν δ' επί το
τοσούτον ειρήσθω μόνον, ότι εστίν η ψυχή των ειρημένων του
των αρχή και τούτοις ώρισται, θρεπτικό, αισθητική, διανοη$ 7 τικό, κινήσει. πότερον δε τούτων έκαστόν έστι ψυχή ή μόριον
ψυχής, και ει μόριον, πότερον ούτως ώστ' είναι χωριστον
λόγω μόνον ή και τόπω, περί μεν τινών τούτων ου χαλεπόν 15 8 8 ιδεϊν, ένια δε απορίαν έχει. ώσπερ γαρ επί των φυτών ένια
διαιρούμενα φαίνεται ζωντα και χωριζόμενα απ' αλλήλων, ως ούσης της εν τούτοις ψυχής έντελεχεία μεν μιάς εν εκάστω φυτώ, δυνάμει δε πλειόνων, ούτως δρώμενα και περί ετέρας διαφοράς της ψυχής συμβαίνον επί των εντόμων εν τοις 20 διατεμνομένοις· και γαρ αίσθησιν εκάτερον των μερών έχει
29. πάντοτε και τρέφεται Trend. Tor. Βekk. πάντη εκτρέφεται τε και SUX, πάντη όσα αεί τρέφεται τε και ET. 413 8. φυόμενα ETVW Tor.
15. τούτων om. SUWX.
Ι8. αυτοις SUVX.
It is not then di ch a power and principle as enables them to (if it naturally ar' th and undergo decay in opposite directions; for the body: for i-ót while growing upwards not grow downwards but parts of bod-w in both directions and on all sides, and they that there we to live so long as they can assimilate nourishment. because this faculty of nutrition may be separated from the culs.ner functions; but in the case of mortal creatures the
other faculties cannot exist apart from this, as indeed is evident from plants which possess no other psychic power except this faculty of growth.
It is then through this principle of nutrition that life is an attribute of all living things. At the same time the animal strictly so called only begins when we reach sensation : for even those objects which do not move themselves nor change their position but possess sensation are said to be animals and not merely to be living. Among the senses themselves, it is touch which is the fundamental attribute of all animal forms. And just as the nutritive function may exist apart from touch and every form of sense, so also may touch exist without any of the other senses. Thus while nutritive is the name given to that part of the soul in which plants share as well as animals, all animals are found to possess the sense of touch. Why each of these faculties is so allotted we shall state hereafter : here it niay be enough to say that the soul is the source and centre of the various states here mentioned and is determined and defined by those powers of nutrition, sensation, understanding and movement.
With regard to these several functions, whether each is the soul or a part of the soul; and if a part, whether so as only to be separable in thought or actually in space—with regard to some of these questions it is not difficult to see the answer, while others present difficulties. For just as, in the case of plants, some parts when divided are found to live even when separated from one another--a fact which seems to shew that the soul within them exists as actually one though it is potentially several; so also do we see it happen with respect to another specific aspect of the soul in the case of insects which have been divided. In such a case, each of the divided parts possesses sensation and