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CHAPTER III.

Of the powers of soul which have been mentioned, some organisms, as has been said, possess all, others again a few, while a third class possesses one only. The powers in question are those of nutrition, of sensation, of desire, of local movement and of reasoning. Plants possess the function of nutrition only: other creatures have this and also the faculty of sensation; and if this latter, then they must also have the faculty of desire : for desire includes appetite and passion and wish. Animals however without exception possess one at least among the senses-viz, touch : and wherever a faculty of sense is present it is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure and pain, and an object which is pleasant or painful. But where these are present, there appetite is also: for appetite is the desire of what is pleasant.

Besides, all animals have a sense for nourishment—viz, touch --for it is by means of things dry and moist, hot and cold, that all animals are fed : and touch is the sense which directly perceives these. As for the objects of other senses, on the contrary, it is only incidentally that they are fed by them; for neither sound nor colour nor smell directly contribute to food. Flavour again is included under the class of things that are tangible. Now hunger and thirst, which attach to taste, are forms of appetite, hunger being concerned with what is hot and dry, thirst with what is cold and moist, while flavour is as it were their seasoning.

These subjects we must afterwards discuss with more detail. Meanwhile it need only be asserted that those animals which possess the sense of touch have also the attribute of desire. Whether in addition they possess imagination is an obscure subject which must be investigated afterwards. Some animals possess, beside such faculties, the power of local movement also: others, as for instance men or other beings similar or superior to them, if there be any such, possess also understanding and reason.

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85 είτι τοιούτον έτερόν έστιν ή και τιμιώτερον. δηλον ούν ότι τον

αυτόν τρόπον εις αν είη λόγος ψυχής τε και σχήματος. ούτε γαρ εκεί σχήμα παρά το τρίγωνόν έστι και τα εφεξής, ούτ' ενταύθα ψυχή παρά τας ειρημένας. γένοιτο δ' αν και επί των σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, δς εφαρμόσει μεν πάσιν, ίδιος δ' ουδενός έσται σχήματος. ομοίως δε και επι ταις ειρημέναις ψυχαίς. διο γελοίον ζητείν τον κοινόν λόγον και επί τούτων και εφ' ετέρων, δς ουδενός έσται των όντων ίδιος

λόγος, ουδε κατά το οικείον και ατομον είδος, αφέντας τον 86 τοιούτον. παραπλησίως δ' έχει τα περί των σχημάτων και

τα κατά ψυχήν· αει γαρ εν τω εφεξής υπάρχει δυνάμει το πρότερον επί τε των σχημάτων και επί των εμψύχων, 30 οίον εν τετραγώνω μεν τρίγωνον, εν αισθητικό δε το θρεπτι

κόν. ώστε καθ' έκαστον ζητητέον, τις εκάστου ψυχή, οίον τίς $ 7 φυτού και τις ανθρώπου ή θηρίου. δια τίνα δ' αιτίαν τω έφε

ξης ούτως έχoυσι, σκεπτέον. άνευ μεν γαρ του θρεπτικού το 4152 αισθητικών ουκ έστιν του δ' αισθητικου χωρίζεται το θρεπτικον εν τοις φυτούς. πάλιν δ' άνευ μεν του απτικού των άλλων αισθήσεων ουδεμία υπάρχει, αφή δ' άνευ των άλλων υπάρχει πολλά γαρ των ζώων ούτ' όψιν ούτ' ακοήν έχουσιν 5 ούτ' οσμής αισθησιν. και των αισθητικών δε τα μεν έχει το κατά τόπον κινητικόν, τα δ' ουκ έχει. τελευταίον δε και ελάχιστα λογισμών και διάνοιαν οις μεν γαρ υπάρχει λογισμός των φθαρτών, τούτοις και τα λοιπά πάντα, οις δ' εκείνων έκαστον, ου πάσι λογισμός, αλλά τους μεν το

19. και om. ESTVW.
25. κοινόν] μόνον conj. Sus.

32. ώστε και καθ' κ.τ.λ. Τοr. 4158 2. θρεπτικόν, οίον εν τοις φυτούς. Tor. ex ed. pr.

6. όσμης όλως αίσθ. STUWX, όλως om. Ey. 8. ελάχιστον SUVWX.

It is clear then that there is one general definition of soul neither more nor less than there is one definition of figure. Just as in the latter case there is no figure other than the triangle and the figures which follow on it, so neither in the case of soul is there any form of it beyond those which we have enumerated. No doubt it is possible to have in reference to figures a common definition which will suit all figures and yet be peculiarly characteristic of no one figure in particular, and a like general definition is possible also with respect to the forms of soul which we have named. (But such common definitions are mere abstractions.] And hence it it absurd both in this case and in others to seek for a universal definition which shall be peculiar to no one form of existence nor framed with reference to the particular and individual species, if such common definition makes us neglect particular analysis.

The different forms of soul in fact stand to one another in the same way as do the several species of figure : both in the case of figures and of animate beings, the earlier form always exists potentially in the later. Thus the triangle is contained within the square and similarly in the faculty of sense the function of nutrition is implicitly contained. Thus we must push our inquiry into particulars and ask what is the soul of each form of existence; as for example what is that of a plant or of a man or of some brute beast. We must inquire also why they stand in such an order of succession. The sensitive nature, for instance, is not found without the nutritive: and yet the nutritive is found separated from the sensitive, as in the case of plants. Without the sense of touch, again, none of the other senses is present, while touch itself is found apart from the others : many animals possessing neither sight nor hearing nor the sense of smell. So likewise animals possessed of the faculties of sense sometimes have, sometimes do not have, the faculty of local movement; while finally the smallest class possess also reflection and understanding. And all mortals that possess the faculty of reasoning possess also all the other powers, whereas those that possess each of those others do not in every case possess reflection; some in fact do not even possess imagination

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ουδε φαντασία, τα δε ταύτη μόνη ζωσιν. περί δε του θεωρητικού νου έτερος λόγος. ότι μεν ουν ο περί τούτων εκάστου

λόγος ούτος οικειότατος και περί ψυχής, δηλον. SI IV. Αναγκαίον δε τον μέλλοντα περί τούτων σκέψιν ποιεί

σθαι λαβείν έκαστον αυτων τί έστιν, είθ' ούτως περί των έχο- 15 μένων και περί των άλλων επιζητειν. ει δε χρή λέγειν τί έκαστον αυτών, οίον τί το νοητικόν ή το αισθητικόν ή το θρεπτικόν, πρότερον έτι λεκτέον τι το νοείν και τί το αισθάνεσθαι· πρότεραι γαρείσι των δυνάμεων αι ενέργειαι και αι πράξεις κατά τον λόγον. ει δ' ούτως, τούτων δ' έτι πρότερα τα αντικείμενα

δει τεθεωρηκέναι, περί εκείνων πρωτον άν δέοι διορίσαι δια την $ 2 αυτην αιτίαν, οίον περί τροφής και αισθητού και νοητού. ώστε

πρώτον περί τροφής και γεννήσεως λεκτέον: η γαρ θρεπτική ψυχή και τοις άλλοις υπάρχει, και πρώτη και κοινοτάτη δύναμις έστι ψυχής, καθ' ην υπάρχει το ζην άπασιν. ής έστιν 15 έργα γεννήσαι και τροφή χρήσθαι. φυσικώτατον γαρ των έργων τους ζωσιν, όσα τέλεια και μη πηρώματα, ή την γένεσιν αυτομάτης έχει, το ποιήσαι έτερον οίον αυτό, ζώον μεν ζώον, φυτών δε φυτόν, ίνα του αεί και του θείου μετέχωσιν ή δύνανται πάντα γαρ εκείνου ορέγεται, κακείνου ένεκα πράττει 4155 όσα πράττει κατά φύσιν. [το δ' ου ένεκα διττόν, το μεν ου, το δε ω.] επεί ούν κοινωνείν αδυνατεί του αεί και του θείου τη συνεχεία, διά το μηδέν ενδέχεσθαι των φθαρτών ταυτό και εν αριθμό διαμένειν, η δύναται μετέχειν έκαστον, κοινωνεί και ταύτη, το μεν μάλλον το δ' ήττον και διαμένει ουκ αυτό

25

Π. ταύτη μόνον SUx. 15. τι εστων om. SUX. 19. προτεραι Ε Αld. Sylb., πρότερον STUVWX. Trend., χρήσθαι Βek. Tor. 28. αυτόματον SUW.

16. ή και SUX Trend. 26. χρήσασθαι STUVX

while others live by the aid of this alone. As regards the speculative reason a different account must be given. Meanwhile it is clear that the special definition of each of these powers separately is at the same time the most appropriate account of the soul.

CHAPTER IV.

The investigation of the faculties of the soul demands that we should discover what each of them is and then proceed similarly to consider allied and remaining questions. In order however to state the nature of each of them, as for example the faculty of thought or sense or of nutrition, we must beforehand explain what is thinking and what is the act of perception : for viewed in the light of their essential notion the actions which give expression to a power are prior to the power itself. And if this be so, and it be necessary to consider even before the actions their objects, it will, for the same reason, be our first duty to settle about them, as for instance about food and the object of sense and the object of thought.

Food and generation should therefore be the first subjects of our inquiry : for the nutritive faculty is an attribute of other beings as well as man and is that primary and most common function of the soul in virtue of which life is an attribute of all animals. Its office is to generate and to make use of sustenance. In animals in fact that are perfect and not impaired by any defect or that are not created by spontaneous generation the most natural function is to create another like itself, animal thus producing animal, plant plant, so that they may as far as possible partake of the eternal and divine : for this desire is universal and constitutes the end of all natural action-end,' it should be remembered, meaning not only the person for which but also the purpose at which something is directed. Since then it is impossible to share in the eternal and the divine in the same identical person, because nothing mortal can remain numerically the same and individual, each individual shares in this in the way it can, in some cases to a greater, in others to a less degree, and though not actually the same it continues as

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