CHAPTER III. Of the powers of soul which have been mentioned, some organisms, as has been said, possess all, others again a few, while a third class possesses one only. The powers in question are those of nutrition, of sensation, of desire, of local movement and of reasoning. Plants possess the function of nutrition only: other creatures have this and also the faculty of sensation; and if this latter, then they must also have the faculty of desire : for desire includes appetite and passion and wish. Animals however without exception possess one at least among the senses-viz. touch and wherever a faculty of sense is present it is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure and pain, and an object which is pleasant or painful. But where these are present, there appetite is also: for appetite is the desire of what is pleasant. Besides, all animals have a sense for nourishment-viz. touch -for it is by means of things dry and moist, hot and cold, that all animals are fed and touch is the sense which directly perceives these. As for the objects of other senses, on the contrary, it is only incidentally that they are fed by them; for neither sound nor colour nor smell directly contribute to food. Flavour again is included under the class of things that are tangible. Now hunger and thirst, which attach to taste, are forms of appetite, hunger being concerned with what is hot and dry, thirst with what is cold and moist, while flavour is as it were their seasoning. These subjects we must afterwards discuss with more detail. Meanwhile it need only be asserted that those animals which possess the sense of touch have also the attribute of desire. Whether in addition they possess imagination is an obscure subject which must be investigated afterwards. Some animals possess, beside such faculties, the power of local movement also: others, as for instance men or other beings similar or superior to them, if there be any such, possess also understanding and reason. 20 § 5 εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ καὶ τιμιώτερον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἷς ἂν εἴη λόγος ψυχῆς τε καὶ σχήματος. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνόν ἐστι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς, οὔτ ̓ ἐνταῦθα ψυχὴ παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. γένοιτο δ ̓ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, ὃς ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ ̓ οὐδενὸς ἔσται σχήματος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ψυχαῖς. διὸ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ 15 ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἔσται τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος λόγος, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἄτομον εἶδος, ἀφέντας τὸν § 6 τοιοῦτον. παραπλησίως δ ̓ ἔχει τῷ περὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ τὰ κατὰ ψυχήν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, οἷον ἐν τετραγώνῳ μὲν τρίγωνον, ἐν αἰσθητικῷ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικόν. ὥστε καθ ̓ ἕκαστον ζητητέον, τίς ἑκάστου ψυχή, οἷον τίς § 7 φυτοῦ καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου. διὰ τίνα δ ̓ αἰτίαν τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχουσι, σκεπτέον. ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ 415* αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦ δ ̓ αἰσθητικοῦ χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτι κὸν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ ̓ ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, αφὴ δ ̓ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζῴων οὔτ ̓ ὄψιν οὔτ ̓ ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν 5 οὔτ ̓ ὀσμῆς αἴσθησιν. καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τὰ δ ̓ οὐκ ἔχει. τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς δ ̓ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμός, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν 19. και om. ESTVW. κ.τ.λ. Tor. ὥστε καὶ καθ ̓ 6. όσμης 415 2. θρεπτικόν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. Tor. ex ed. pr. ὅλως αἴσθ. STUWX, ὅλως om. Ey. 8. ἐλάχιστον SUVWX. ΤΟ It is clear then that there is one general definition of soul neither more nor less than there is one definition of figure. Just as in the latter case there is no figure other than the triangle and the figures which follow on it, so neither in the case of soul is there any form of it beyond those which we have enumerated. No doubt it is possible to have in reference to figures a common definition which will suit all figures and yet be peculiarly characteristic of no one figure in particular, and a like general definition is possible also with respect to the forms of soul which we have named. [But such common definitions are mere abstractions.] And hence it it absurd both in this case and in others to seek for a universal definition which shall be peculiar to no one form of existence nor framed with reference to the particular and individual species, if such common definition makes us neglect particular analysis. The different forms of soul in fact stand to one another in the same way as do the several species of figure: both in the case of figures and of animate beings, the earlier form always exists potentially in the later. Thus the triangle is contained within the square and similarly in the faculty of sense the function of nutrition is implicitly contained. Thus we must push our inquiry into particulars and ask what is the soul of each form of existence; as for example what is that of a plant or of a man or of some brute beast. We must inquire also why they stand in such an order of succession. The sensitive nature, for instance, is not found without the nutritive: and yet the nutritive is found separated from the sensitive, as in the case of plants. Without the sense of touch, again, none of the other senses is present, while touch itself is found apart from the others: many animals possessing neither sight nor hearing nor the sense of smell. So likewise animals possessed of the faculties of sense sometimes have, sometimes do not have, the faculty of local movement; while finally the smallest class possess also reflection and understanding. And all mortals that possess the faculty of reasoning possess also all the other powers, whereas those that possess each of those others do not in every case possess reflection; some in fact do not even possess imagination δι οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ ζῶσιν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ ἕτερος λόγος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁ περὶ τούτων ἑκάστου λόγος οὗτος οἰκειότατος καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, δῆλον. IV. ̓Αναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι λαβεῖν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τί ἐστιν, εἶθ' οὕτως περὶ τῶν ἐχο- 15 μένων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιζητεῖν. εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικόν, πρότερον ἔτι λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι· πρότεραι γάρ εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις κατὰ τὸν λόγον. εἰ δ ̓ οὕτως, τούτων δ ̓ ἔτι πρότερα τὰ ἀντικείμενα δεῖ τεθεωρηκέναι, περὶ ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἂν δέοι διορίσαι διὰ τὴν § 2 αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, οἷον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ. ὥστε 20 πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον· ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμίς ἐστι ψυχῆς, καθ ̓ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν. ἧς ἐστὶν 15 ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσθαι. φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα, ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ᾗ δύνανται· πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, κἀκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει 415 ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν. [τὸ δ ̓ οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ δὲ ᾧ.] ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ᾗ δύναται μετέχειν ἕκαστον, κοινωνεῖ ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δ ̓ ἧττον· καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ 11. ταύτη μόνον SUX. 15. τί ἐστιν om. SUX. 28. αυτόματον SUW. 19. πρότεραι Ε Ald. Sylb., πρότερον STUVWX. Trend., χρῆσθαι Bek. Tor. 16. ἢ καὶ SUX Trend. 26. χρήσασθαι STUVX while others live by the aid of this alone. As regards the speculative reason a different account must be given. Meanwhile it is clear that the special definition of each of these powers separately is at the same time the most appropriate account of the soul. CHAPTER IV. The investigation of the faculties of the soul demands that we should discover what each of them is and then proceed similarly to consider allied and remaining questions. In order however to state the nature of each of them, as for example the faculty of thought or sense or of nutrition, we must beforehand explain what is thinking and what is the act of perception: for viewed in the light of their essential notion the actions which give expression to a power are prior to the power itself. And if this be so, and it be necessary to consider even before the actions their objects, it will, for the same reason, be our first duty to settle about them, as for instance about food and the object of sense and the object of thought. Food and generation should therefore be the first subjects of our inquiry for the nutritive faculty is an attribute of other beings as well as man and is that primary and most common function of the soul in virtue of which life is an attribute of all animals. Its office is to generate and to make use of sustenance. In animals in fact that are perfect and not impaired by any defect or that are not created by spontaneous generation the most natural function is to create another like itself, animal thus producing animal, plant plant, so that they may as far as possible partake of the eternal and divine: for this desire is universal and constitutes the end of all natural action-' end,' it should be remembered, meaning not only the person for which but also the purpose at which something is directed. Since then it is impossible to share in the eternal and the divine in the same identical person, because nothing mortal can remain numerically the same and individual, each individual shares in this in the way it can, in some cases to a greater, in others to a less degree, and though not actually the same it continues as |
