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scems to be especially in the case of simple bodies that the contraries stand to one another in the relation of nourishment and nourished. Here, however, a difficulty meets us.

There are some who on the one hand maintain that like is nurtured by the like, just as the like is increased by the like: while others, as we have said, hold on the other hand that the contrary is so by the contrary, because (they say) the like cannot be affected by the like. The nutriment, they maintain, changes and suffers digestion, and change, they add, always tends towards the opposite or the intermediate. And besides, they argue, the nutriment is affected to some extent by the object which it nurtures, while this is not altered by the nutriment, just as the artisan is not affected by the material on which he operates but this material on the contrary by the artist : the workman only transforming it from inertness into actuality.

The real question here is what is to be regarded as the nutriment: and whether nutriment is to be taken as it ultimately reaches the system or in its first form is a matter that is disputed. If it be allowed to be both, but be in the one case digested, in the other case undigested, it might be possible to describe nutriment in terms of both the theories which have been enunciated. So far in fact as the food is undigested, the contrary is nurtured by the contrary : so far as it is digested, the like is nurtured by the like. Evidently then there is a mixture of truth and error in the two views. But as nothing can be fed and nurtured except

it participate in life, it is the animate body as such that V receives nutriment: and thus nutriment is relative to an animate being and is essentially determined by such relation.

There is however a difference between the import of nutriment and that of growth. So far as the animate body is something quantitative, it admits of growth, so far as it is a definite individual substance, it requires nutriment. The food in other words preserves the substance and continues to operate so long as this substance is nurtured: and it produces the generation not of the object nourished but of something else resembling it: for the object nourished already exists as a substance, and nothing generates itself but only maintains its own existence.

Thus then this rudimentary psychic form as we have


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ψυχής αρχή δύναμις έστιν οία σώζειν το έχoν αυτήν η

τοιούτον, η δε τροφή παρασκευάζει ενεργεϊν· διό στερηθέν 8 14 τροφης ου δύναται είναι. επει δ' έστι τρία, το τρεφόμενον

και η τρέφεται και το τρέφον, το μεν τρέφον εστίν η
πρώτη ψυχή, το δε τρεφόμενον το έχoν αυτήν σώμα,
δε τρέφεται, η τροφή. έπει δε από του τέλους απαντα

προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον, τέλος δε το γεννήσαι οίον αυτό, $ 16 είη αν η πρώτη ψυχή γεννητική οδον αυτό. έστι δε ώ τρέ- 25

φεται διττόν, ώσπερ και ο κυβερνά, η χείρ και το πηδάλιον, το μεν κινούν και κινούμενον, το δε κινούν μόνον. πάσαν δ' αναγκαίον τροφήν δύνασθαι πέττεσθαι, εργάζεται δε την πέψιν το θερμόν διο παν έμψυχον έχει θερμότητα. τύπο μεν ούν η τροφή τί έστιν είρηται διασαφητέον δ' 30

έστιν ύστερον περί αυτής εν τοις οικείοις λόγοις. § 1 V. Διωρισμένων δε τούτων λέγωμεν κοινή περί πάσης

αισθήσεως. η δ' αίσθησις εν τω κινείσθαί τε και πάσχειν συμβαίνει, καθάπερ είρηται· δοκεί γαρ αλλοίωσίς τις ειναι. φασί δέ τινες και το όμοιον υπό του ομοίου πάσχειν. 35

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scribed it, is a power adapted for preserving that which possesses this psychic form in so far as it possesses it: and nutriment enables it to act, so that when deprived of nutriment it is unable to exist. Three elements have here then to be recognised: first, the object nourished ; secondly, that with which it is nourished: and thirdly, the power so nourishing it. Of these the last mentioned is the rudimentary or primary soul: the object nourished is the body which contains this soul, while that with which it is nourished is nutriment. (Everything however should be named in reference to the end it realizes, and since the end of this function of the soul is to produce another like itself, the first and rudimentary form of soul would be the generative-generative, that is, of another like itself.) That by which the nutriment is effected is twofold, just as likewise that by which we steer a ship may denote either the hand or the rudder—the one of which is at once moving and moved, the other moving only. Further it is necessary that all nutriment should be able to be digested, and this digestion is produced by heat: and thus everything animate possesses heat.

A sketch has thus been given of the nature of nutriment: it will be necessary however to examine the subject with more detail in the treatise appropriate to it.


The character of sense-perception as a whole is the next subject which it falls to us to discuss. And perception, it was said, takes place as a result of being moved and being impressed: common opinion in fact views it as a sort of qualitative change or alteration. Now it is a doctrine held by some that in an impression like is affected by like. How far this is possible or impossible we have stated in our general discussion on the subject of the active and the passive processes. It suggests however

και των αισθήσεων αυτών ου γίνεται αισθησις, και διά τί άνευ των έξω ου ποιούσιν αίσθησιν, ενόντος πυρός και γης και των άλλων στοιχείων, ών έστιν η αίσθησις καθ' αυτά ή τα 5 συμβεβηκότα τούτοις, δήλον ούν ότι το αισθητικών ουκ έστιν ενεργεία, αλλά δυνάμει μόνον. διό καθάπερ το καυστον ου καίεται αυτό καθ' αυτό άνευ του καυστικου έκαιε γαρ αν εαυτό, και ούθεν εδείτο του εντελεχεία πυρος όντος. επειδη δε το αισθάνεσθαι λέγομεν διχως (το τε γαρ δυνάμει ακούον 1ο και ορών ακούειν και οράν λέγομεν, κάν τύχη καθεύδον, και το ήδη ενεργούν), διχως αν λέγοιτο και η αίσθησις, η μεν

ως δυνάμει, η δε ως ενεργεία. ομοίως δε και το αισθητόν 8 3 τό τε δυνάμει όν και το ενεργεία. πρώτον μεν ούν ως

του αυτού όντος του πάσχειν και του κινείσθαι και του ενεργείν 15 λέγωμεν· και γαρ έστιν η κίνησις ενέργειά της, ατελής μέντοι, καθάπερ εν ετέροις είρηται. πάντα δε πάσχει και κινείται υπό του ποιητικού και ενεργεία όντος. διό έστι μεν ως υπό του ομοίου πάσχει, έστι δε ως υπό του ανομοίου, καθά

περ είπομεν" πάσχει μεν γαρ το ανόμοιον, πεπονθος δ' 20 $ 4 όμοιόν εστιν. διαιρετέον δε και περί δυνάμεως και εντελε

χείας" νυν γαρ απλώς λέγομεν περί αυτών. έστι μεν γαρ ούτως επιστημόν τι ως άν είποιμεν άνθρωπος επιστήμονα, ότι ο άνθρωπος των επιστημόνων και έχόντων επιστήμην· έστι δ'

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at once the question—why is there no perception or sense of the senses themselves, and why do the senses not produce a perception without the help of external objects, when there is contained within them fire and earth and the other elements which are objects of perception either in themselves or in virtue of their properties. Evidently, it follows, the power of sense perception exists not as something actually exercised, but only as something potential. And so the case is parallel to that of combustible material, which is not burnt by itself without the presence of that which can set it on fire : otherwise it would set fire to itself, and there would be no need for the help of actual fire. We must note however that we use the word 'perceive' in two senses. In the case of that which has the power to hear and see, we say it hears and sees, even if it chance to be asleep, just as much as we do in the case of that which is already actually at work. Perception therefore would be similarly used in two senses, on the one hand as in potentiality, on the other hand as in actuality: and this same distinction will in turn apply to the object of perception, which is from one aspect potential, from another actual.

Let us then in the first place agree to regard in our discussion the words "passive impression movement" and "activity" as identical: for movement is a species of realized activity, though, as has been elsewhere said, it is imperfect. Now in every instance things are impressed and set in movement by something which is capable of producing an impression and which exists in full activity. And thus an impression is in one sense made by the like, in another sense by the unlike, as has been already said ; for it is as unlike that anything suffers an impression : after the impression has been made, it is converted into like.

But, in the second place, a distinction must be drawn with reference to potentiality and actuality; at present we are speaking about them as if they admitted of no variations of meaning. For instance any individual may be described as knowing (1) in the sense in which we should describe a man as knowing, because, i.e., man is included in the class of beings that are intelligent and gifted with knowledge; or (2) an individual might be said to know in the sense in which we speak of a person as knowing

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