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ὡς ἤδη λέγομεν ἐπιστήμονα τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν γραμματικήν· 15 (ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δυνατός ἐστιν, ἀλλ ̓ ὁ μὲν ὅτι τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὁ δ ̓ ὅτι βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν, ἂν μή τι κωλύσῃ τῶν ἔξωθεν·) ὁ δ ̓ ἤδη θεωρῶν ἐντελεχείᾳ ὢν καὶ κυρίως ἐπιστάμενος τόδε τὸ Α. ἀμφότεροι μὲν οὖν οἱ πρῶτοι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστήμονες, 30 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν διὰ μαθήσεως ἀλλοιωθεὶς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξ ἐναντίας μεταβαλὼν ἕξεως, ὁ δ ̓ ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν γραμματικήν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δ ̓ εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἄλλον 417 § 5 τρόπον. οὐκ ἔστι δ ̓ ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν

φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου, οὕτως ὡς δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν· θεωροῦν γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ἔχον 5 τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (εἰς αὑτὸ γὰρ ἡ ἐπίδοσις καὶ εἰς ἐντελέχειαν) ἢ ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιώσεως. διὸ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τὸ φρονοῦν, ὅταν φρονῇ, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν οἰκοδόμον ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐντελέχειαν ἄγον ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος κατὰ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ το φρονοῦν οὐ διδασκαλίαν ἀλλ ̓ ἑτέραν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν δίκαιον· τὸ δ ̓ ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος μανθάνον καὶ λαμβάνον ἐπιστήμην ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ διδασκαλικοῦ ἤτοι οὐδὲ πάσχειν φατέον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἢ δύο τρόπους εἶναι ἀλ

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28. ὁ δ ̓ ἤδη] τρίτος δ' ὁ ἤδη θεωρῶν Tor. 30. πρῶτοι 14. ὥσπερ είρηται om. SUX.

only after he has acquired a knowledge of the principles of grammar. Now of these two persons, each possesses the capacity for knowledge in a different sense-the one because the generic character and fundamental nature of man is of this description, the other because if he wished he would be able to apply his knowledge, supposing that no obstacle prevented him. He on the other hand (3) who has advanced so far as to apply his knowledge is in a state of full realization and knows in the strict sense of the word-for instance that this definite thing is A. As compared then with this third, both of these first mentioned possess knowledge only in potentiality: but they do so in different senses, the one because in order to become a man of knowledge he must have been transformed by learning and in many cases changed from the directly contrary state: the other because, while possessing, though not employing (say) perceptive faculties or grammatical principles, he can proceed to use them when he wishes.

Suffering or impression similarly is not used in one single sense. On the one hand, it is equivalent to some sort of destruction by the opposite; on the other hand it is rather the preservation of that which exists potentially by means of the actual and similar, much in the same way in which potential capacity stands to actual reality. That for example which possesses knowledge rises into actual consciousness: and this is either not to be described as alteration (because its advance is towards itself and its own perfect development) or it is a different kind of alteration from that usually signified. Hence it is not correct to say that a thinking being is at the time of thinking undergoing alteration: as little as that the housebuilder is so at the time when he is building. The process therefore which transforms what is potential into what is actual in relation to a reasoning and thinking being should be called not instruction but should be known by some other name; and similarly, with reference to that which, on the basis of what is merely potential, learns and receives knowledge at the hands of that which is actual and capable of teaching, we either must not speak of it as 'suffering' an impression (as has been said) or we must recognise two different forms of alteration, the one a transition into the

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λοιώσεως, τήν τε ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν 15 § 6 καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν. τοῦ δ ̓ αἰσθητικοῦ ἡ μὲν πρώτη μεταβολὴ γίνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννῶντος, ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. καὶ τὸ κατ ̓ ἐνέργειαν δὲ ὁμοίως λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν· διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι τοῦ μὲν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔξωθεν, τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. αἴτιον δ ̓ ὅτι τῶν καθ ̓ ἕκαστον ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ δ ̓ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· ταῦτα δ ̓ ἐν αὐτῇ πώς ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ. διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ ̓ αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθά νεσθαι δ ̓ οὐκ ἐπ ̓ αὐτῷ· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἰσθη- 15 τόν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ ̓ ἔχει καν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὰ αἰσθητὰ τῶν καθ ̓ ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διασαφῆσαι § 7 καιρὸς γένοιτ' ἂν καὶ εἰσαὖθις. νῦν δὲ διωρίσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει λεγομένου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ὥσπερ 30 ἂν εἴποιμεν τὸν παῖδα δύνασθαι στρατηγεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ὡς τὸν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντα, οὕτως ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητικόν. ἐπεὶ δ ̓ ἀνώνυμος αὐτῶν ἡ διαφορά, διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ὅτι ἕτερα καὶ 4183 πως ἕτερα, χρῆσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ὡς κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν. τὸ δ ̓ αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, καθάπερ εἴρηται. πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ ̓ ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν 5 οἷον ἐκεῖνο.

24· ὁπόταν] ὅταν VWX.

31. εἴποιμεν] εἴπωμεν SUX.

merely negative phase of a previous state, the other a transition into the established and natural condition.

In the sensitive subject the first form of transition is effected by the generating parent: after birth however the subject born comes to possess sensation in the further way of an intelligent experience. The actual exercise of sense comes to be used in fact as equivalent to thought, with this difference, however, that in the case of sense the objects which stimulate the faculty into action that is the objects of sight, hearing and of the other senses, come from outside. The reason of this is that sense-perception when in active exercise deals with individual objects, whereas intelligent experience is concerned with universals: and these last are in a way contained within the mind itself. Hence it is within a man's own power to think whenever he wishes but sense-perception is not thus in his own hands: because the object of sense must be beforehand present. The same holds good also of the sciences that deal with sensible phenomena: and this too for the same reason, because the objects of sense are individual and external.

We must however postpone the fuller discussion of this subject to another occasion. At present we may regard this much as settled-that just as what is described as potential is not used in one single sense, but on the one hand in the sense according to which we should speak of the boy as able potentially to be a general and on the other hand in that according to which we should say that the man in prime of life is potentially so able: so also is it with the power of sense-perception. Since however the distinction in question, although we have settled that the two senses are different and also how they are different, is not recognised by language, we must employ the words impression and alteration as current terms. But, as has been said, the faculty of sense-perception is potentially what the object of sense is actually. During the process of perception then the faculty of sense is not similar to its object; but after the impression, it is assimilated and becomes analogous to it.

δι

VI. Λεκτέον δὲ καθ' ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρῶτον. λέγεται δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τριχῶς, ὧν δύο μὲν καθ' αυτά φαμεν αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἓν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. τῶν δὲ δύο τὸ μὲν ἰδιόν ἐστιν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν το § 2 πασῶν. λέγω δ ̓ ἴδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὁ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι, οἷον ὄψις χρώματος καὶ ἀκοὴ ψόφου καὶ γεῦσις χυμοῦ. ἡ δ' ἁφὴ πλείους μὲν ἔχει διαφοράς· ἀλλ ̓ ἑκάστη γε κρίνει περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπατᾶται ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ ̓ ὅτι ψόφος, 15 § 3 ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρωσμένον ἢ που, ἢ τί τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ ποῦ. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἑκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις· καὶ γὰρ ἁφῇ τε κίνησίς § 4 ἐστιν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὄψει. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἰ- 20 σθητόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν εἴη Διάρους υἱός· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τούτου αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε τοῦτο οὗ αἰσθάνεται. διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν πάσχει ᾗ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. τῶν δὲ καθ ̓ αὑτὰ αἰσθητῶν τὰ ἴδια κυρίως ἐστὶν

с

αἰσθητά, καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἡ οὐσία πέφυκεν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως.

η

20.

418 19. πάσαις om. UX || ἁφῇ τε κίνησις] vulg. ἀφῇ κίνησίς τίς, κιν. τε V. post ὄψει editi ante Bekk. καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν αἰσθητὰ ταῦτα. 23. om. SUX.

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