CHAPTER VI.

In dealing with the senses separately we must begin by a description of their objects. The so-called object of sense-perception may mean three different things, of which two are said to be perceived directly in themselves, the third incidentally and with regard to its concomitants. Of the two firstmentioned, one is special and confined to each one of the senses separately, the other is common to them all. By the special is to be understood that which it is impossible to perceive by any other sense than that appropriated to it and with respect to which that sense cannot be deceived. So it is that colour stands to sight, sound to hearing, flavour to taste: touch, however, it must be added, deals with a number of different qualities. Each single sense in fact discerns these different qualities, and is subject to no delusion as to whether it be a colour or whether it be a sound that it perceives: its only doubt is what it is that is coloured or where it is, or what or where is the body that is sounding. Such are the objects of perception which are said to be peculiar to each separate sense.

The common sensibles are movement, rest, number, figure, magnitude; such properties being peculiar to no one single sense but shared in common by them all. Movement for instance is perceived at once by touch and by sight.

By the term incidental sensible I describe such a case as when a certain white object is perceived as the son of Diares: for here there is but an incidental or indirect perception of this object, in so far as the object which is perceived is an incident or property of what is white. Hence then the organ of sense is affected in no way by the object of sense so far as it is such and such a person or thing. But among those objects of sense which are perceived directly in themselves, it is those special to the separate senses that are strictly the objects of perception and those for which the essential nature of each sense is naturally adapted.

§ I

VII. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ ̓ ἐστὶν ὁρατόν. ὁρα τὸν δ ̓ ἐστὶ χρῶμά τε, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν· δῆλον δὲ ἔσται ὁ λέγομεν προελθοῦσι μάλιστα. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα. τοῦτο δ ̓ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ ̓ αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ· καθ ̓ αὑτὸ δὲ οὐ τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ ̓ ὅτι ἐν 30 ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ὁρατόν. πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα κινη τικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, καὶ τοῦτ ̓ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ 4188 ἡ φύσις. διόπερ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἑκάστου χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρατόν. διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρῶτον λεκτέον τί § 2 ἐστιν. ἔστι δή τι διαφανές. διαφανὲς δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔστι μὲν ὁρατόν, οὐ καθ ̓ αὑτὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ; ἀλλότριον χρώμα. τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν στερεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὕδωρ οὐδ ̓ ᾖ ἀὴρ διαφανές, ἀλλ ̓ ὅτι ἐστί τις φύσις ὑπάρχουσα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀϊδίῳ τῷ ἄνω σώματι. φῶς δέ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές. δυνάμει δὲ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ ̓ ἐστί, καὶ τὸ το σκότος. τὸ δὲ φῶς οἷον χρῶμά ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ᾖ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου οἷον τὸ ἄνω σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ τι ὑπάρχει ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν. τί μὲν οὖν τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τί τὸ φῶς, εἴρηται, ὅτι οὔτε πῦρ οὔθ ̓ ὅλως σῶμα οὐδ ̓ ἀπορροὴ σώματος οὐδενός (εἴη γὰρ ἂν σῶμά τι καὶ 15 οὕτως), ἀλλὰ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ· οὐδὲ γὰρ δύο σώματα ἅμα δυνατὸν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι.

CHAPTER VII.

Sight then has for its object what is visible. This visible itself is colour and something which may be described, although there is no one term by which to name it—its nature will be evident as we proceed. Meanwhile, let us repeat, the visible is colour. This is that which diffuses itself over what is visible in itself, meaning by 'in itself' not that it is so in its very conception, but that it contains within itself the reason of its being visible. Now every colour is disposed to set in movement that which is actually pellucid, this being in fact its nature. Hence colour is not visible without light: the colour on the contrary of every object is only visible in light. And accordingly something must be said in the first place about the character of light.

There is then, we may begin by saying, something which is pellucid. And by pellucid is meant something which is visible, not visible by itself (to speak without further qualification), but visible by reason of some foreign colour which affects its neutral pellucidity. Of this character are air and water and also many among solid bodies, water and air being pellucid not in virtue of their qualities as water or air, but because they both contain the same element as constitutes the everlasting empyrean essence. Light then is the expression of this pellucid qua pellucid: and whenever this pellucidity is present only potentially, there darkness also is present. Light is thus almost as it were the colour of the pellucid when it is realized into full pellucidity by fire or something like the upper substance of the heavens, this upper substance possessing one and the same element with fire. Thus then we have described pellucidity and light and have shewn light to be neither fire, nor body generally, nor even the effluvium or emanation from any body (since even in this case it would be a body of a kind) but only the presence of fire or something like it in that which is pellucid: two bodies being unable to exist at one and the same time within the same space.

VII. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ ̓ ἐσ τὸν δ ̓ ἐστὶ χρῶμά τε, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν· δῆλον δὲ ἔσται ὃ λέγομεν λιστα. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα. τοῦτο δ καθ ̓ αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ· καθ ̓ αὑτὸ δὲ οὐ τῷ λα ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ὁρατόν. πᾶν τικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, καὶ τι ἡ φύσις. διόπερ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρατόν. διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρὸ § 2 ἐστιν. ἔστι δή τι διαφανές. διαφανὲς δὲ λ ὁρατόν, οὐ καθ ̓ αὑτὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰ ἀλλότριον χρώμα. τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν ἀὴρ καὶ τῶν στερεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὕδωρ οὐδ ̓ ᾖ ἀὴρ διαφ ἐστί τις φύσις ὑπάρχουσα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν τούτοις ἀ ἐν τῷ ἀϊδίῳ τῷ ἄνω σώματι. φῶς δέ ἐστιν ἡ το τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές. δυνάμει δὲ ἐν ᾧ τοῦ σκότος. τὸ δὲ φῶς οἷον χρῶμά ἐστι τοῦ διαφο ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου ο σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ τι ὑπάρχει ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν. τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τί τὸ φῶς, εἴρηται, ὅτι οὔτε πῦ σῶμα οὐδ ̓ ἀπορροὴ σώματος οὐδενός (εἴη γὰρ ἂν σ οὕτως), ἀλλὰ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία ἐν νεῖ· οὐδὲ γὰρ δύο σώματα ἅμα δυνατὸν ἐν τῷ α

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