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without:' that it does not result from mere physical generation in the way that the faculties for sustaining life—the yuxì OpeTTiKÝ—may be said to do? No doubt as so introduced into the mind this creative reason is only a dúvapis: but the first key to understanding Aristotle is to know that dúvajis and ενέργεια are relative terms: and that what is an ενέργεια from one aspect may be a dúvauis from another. And thus Aristotle may perfectly well say that the different forms of soul must exist in man potentially before they do so in actuality and yet v hold that it is in potential form that reason as an actual or rather an actualizing faculty is present originally in man. Such a view at least is perfectly consistent with the view of reason as a creative faculty which has been here set forth. For the creative reason is just, we have seen, the source of those general forms or categories by which a world of sense becomes a world for intellect. But of course such categories are, to start with, only implicit in experience, they are mere potential forms which can be applied to experience : and the ypaupatelov of the human mind is at first destitute of anything but the forms themselves which, as they first exist in the mind, are indeed potentially all things—able to explain and interpret all the sensations which things can convey—but actually nothing; devoid of any particular content until experience provide them with it.
XII. THE WILL AND PRACTICAL REASON.
The analysis of man as a cognitive and intellectual being is followed immediately in Aristotle by the account of him as an active and conative being: and the theory of knowing determines directly his theory of acting. It might have been expected that
1 De Gen. Am. 11. 3, 736527, λείπεται δε τον νουν μόνον θύραθεν έπεισιέναι και θείον είναι μόνον ούθεν γαρ αυτού τη ενεργεία κοινωνεί σωματική ενέργεια.
an intermediate stage would have been discussed, and that before proceeding to analyze man as an active being he would have treated him as emotional. But neither in the Psychology nor in the Ethics does Aristotle give us any account of the feelings as such. It is the powers and faculties not the susceptibilities of man with which he is occupied : and among such duvápeis no place is left for the táon or emotions. At the beginning indeed of the treatise, these feelings had excited considerable interest in Aristotle : their semi-bodily character had seemed to him to suggest some of the most difficult questions which he would have to discuss. The feelings he saw were always materialized notions (Cóyou čvuloi) and could only be described correctly when explained not merely from the standpoint of the physicist or physiologist, but also from that of the dialectician or metaphysician. But the conception of soul as a first entelechy or perfect realization left, it would seem, no opportunity for treating of the feelings. Man is an emotional being simply in so far as he is a sensitive or perceptive being': and there is no definite phase of life which we can speak of as having a pathetic or emotional soul.
It is to the Rhetoric and Ethics that we must go if we would find out what little Aristotle has said on the subject of the feelings. Even in these treatises what we find is not any systematic exposition of the feelings but simply a description of some aspects of them. What we have in the Rhetoric is a popular delineation of some of the more obvious feelings to which we are subject: the Ethics gives us an analysis of the universal concomitants of all feelings. These concomitants are pleasure and pain : feelings in fact are just the states which are followed by pleasure and pain?. And of pleasure and pain Plato had given a more than usually exhaustive account. Pleasure, he had explained, arose from the wors, the filling up and satisfaction of a preceding state of deficiency; pain on the other hand was just the sense of want and deficiency, čvdela. And though the explanation was suggested by and referred directly to the bodily pleasures it was still held by its author to apply also to the higher pleasures as similarly the answer to a sense of want which was waiting to be replenished by intellectual nourishment. Pleasure accordingly was always a yéveois, a process towards the normal condition of a subject, and therefore as such never in itself an end. And the theory had consequently received a moral application as shewing, by the absence of finality from pleasure, that pleasure, taken by itself, could not be the end of life. It is similarly from a moral point of view that Aristotle analyses pleasure; and his immediate object is to shew that the argument which maintains that pleasure cannot be the summum bonum, because of its being a mere process towards an end, is unsatisfactory. Rather, he maintains, pleasure is an évépyela : it arises from the free play, the unimpeded, unthwarted operation of our faculties: it results from the contact of a perfectly acting organ with an appropriate object just as pain is on the contrary the result of thwarted constrained action on the part of either a sensitive or intellectual faculty'.
1 11. 2, 413b23, όπου μέν γάρ αίσθησις, και λύπη τε και ηδονή, όπου δε ταύτα, εξ ανάγκης και επιθυμία. .
2 Eth. Nic. II. 4, Iosb21, λέγω δε πάθη μεν επιθυμίαν, οργήν, φόβον, θράσος, φθόνον, χαράν, φιλίαν, μίσος, πόθον, ζηλον, έλεον, όλως οις έπεται ηδονή ή λύπη.
Of such pleasure and pain the importance in the economy of man's nature is that it is just through them that man passes from the state of a merely cognitive and intellectual and begins to be a moral and active being: "it is when the sense perceives something as pleasant or painful that the mind affirms or denies it—that it pursues it or avoids it?" Aristotle in fact is fond
1 Eth. Nic. VΙΙ. 12, 1153813, διό και ου καλώς έχει το αισθητήν γένεσιν φάναι είναι την ηδονήν, αλλά μάλλον λεκτέον ενέργειας της κατά φύσιν έξεως, αντί δε του αισθητήν ανεμπόδιστον. Cp. Eth. Nic. Χ. 4, 1174920: κατά πάσαν αίσθησίν έστιν ηδονή, ομοίως δε και διάνοιαν και θεωρίαν, ήδίστη δ' ή τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ή του ευ έχοντας προς το σπουδαιότατον των υφ' αυτήν. Τhe Rhetoric contents itself with the popular theory criticised in the Ethics, v. Rhet. I. II, 1369633 : Útokeloow ở ruiv cival thy ridovno κίνησίν τινα της ψυχής και κατάστασιν αθρόαν και αισθητήν εις την υπάρχουσαν φύσιν,
, λύπην δε τουναντίον. .
ΙΙΙ. 7, 2, 43 188, το μεν ούν αισθάνεσθαι όμοιον το φάναι μόνον και νοείν όταν δε ήδυ η λυπηρόν, οίον καταφάσα ή αποφάσα διώκει ή φεύγει.
of pointing out the correspondence between the practical and the speculative side of human nature. What is in the speculative intellectual sphere truth and error, is in the moral and practical good and evil: what is in the one affirmation and negation is in the other pursuit and avoidance'. Pleasure and pain in fact form distinctively the field of Ethics : and the especial weakness in Socrates' intellectual apprehension of Ethics is just the fact that he left no room for the effect of the man in influencing conduct?
But while our feelings of pleasure and pain are thus the phenomena on which our moral and active life reposes, they do not enter into our life as mere feelings, as mere natural tendencies or unformed susceptibilities. The same constructive work, as intellectually translates a mere sensitive impression into a real object of cognition, displays itself also in building up the motives which ultimately constitute our wills, and the practical reason is shortly nothing but the intellectual reason applied to explain and create action. The sensuous images of pavtao la which suggest our action are really little else than mere sensations; it is only when the mind proceeds to view them as good or evil that it pursues or avoids them. Thus the sensitive or emotional capacities of our nature are but the material substratum, the úrn of our moral experience. To construct a moral world we must translate the sensitive into the rational, the phenomenal into the real, just as we require to do in order to build up an intelligible world; we must think the materials which sense supplies and discover in them the general forms or ideal truths which underlie them. And though the practical reason never carries on its work without the help of images of sense, these images themselves are no
1 Eth. VΙ. 2, 1139821, έστι δ' όπερ εν διανοία κατάφασις και απόφασις, τούτ' έν δρέξει δίωξις και φυγή. .
2 Mag. Mor. 1182922, συμβαίνει ούν αυτή επιστήμας ποιούνται τας αρετάς αναιρεϊν το άλογον μέρος της ψυχής, τούτο δε ποιών αναιρεί και πάθος και ήθος.
ΙΙΙ. 7, 431814, τη δε διανοητική ψυχή τα φαντάσματα οίον αισθήματα υπάρχει όταν δε αγαθών ή κακόν φήση ή αποφήση φεύγει ή διώκει.
431b2, τα μεν ούν είδη το νοητικόν εν τοις φαντάσμασι νοεί.
more the practical reason itself than the air which forms the medium and condition of eyesight constitutes the pupil'.
The motive or conative aspect of the soul thus includes two main factors which require to act in unison in order that action may result. And thus a dúvajis like this conative power just shews the weakness of a system of mental faculties. One element which enters into it belongs to the sphere of the rational, another falls within the limits of the irrational. The real truth is that desire and reason must co-operate in order that a moral conclusion may be carried into effect: in the language of the Ethics, moral choice or poaipeous may be described as either νούς ορεκτικός reason stimulated by desire, or όρεξις διανοητική desire guided by understanding.
This conception of the will, or (if the term be disapproved) the origin of moral decision is explained for us by what Aristotle tells us in the Psychology itself about the springs of action. The spring of action cannot, he there shews at length, be found either in mere animal processes of vegetation and nutrition which contain no conception of an end at which they aim, or in the faculties of sense which often exist without the concomitant of any tendency to spontaneous action, or even in the purely cognitive reason which is as such impotent to produce any effect upon the feelings or even to counteract their influence“. And here the Ethics itself comes in in turn to expand and interpret these remarks. The merely logical understanding, says the writer in the sixth book, never leads to action. But if reason as reasoning be thus powerless to influence and shape the will, as little can mere animal appetite produce this end. For appetite is merely affected by what is pleasant and painful—and
431917, ώσπερ ο αήρ την κόρην τοιανδι εποίησεν, αυτή δ' έτερον. III. 9, 43255. 3 Eth, Nic. VI. 2.
4 De Αn. ΙΙΙ. 9, 43226, αλλά μην ουδε το λογιστικών και ο καλούμενος νους έστιν ο κινών· ό μεν γαρ θεωρητικός ούθεν νοεί πρακτόν...αλλ' ουδ' όταν θεωρή τι τοιούτον, ήδη κελεύει φεύγειν ή διώκειν, οίον πολλάκις διανοείται φοβερόν τι η ηδύ, ου κελεύει δε φοβείσθαι. .
5 Eln. Nic. VI. 2, 1139*35.