knowledge, on the other hand in the application of these truths to new fields of intellectual interest. The knowledge, in other words, through which man as a rational being attains the full fruition, the perfect realization of his faculties, may be either knowledge possessed but dormant in the mind or it may proceed to something further and be this same knowledge consciously applied and used. Now it is in the first of these two senses that soul is the entelechy or perfect realization of the body: it! is the first or earliest-that is the relatively dormant or implicit actualization in which our bodily processes attain their real truth. "Thus then," writes Aristotle, "if we be required to frame some one common definition which will apply to every form of soul, it will be that soul is the earlier perfect realization of a natural organized body." The words imply that Aristotle knows how perilous it is to lay down any general phrases which will apply to all the different forms of soul in the wide meaning in which he employs the expression. The love of concrete particular facts which shews itself in the distrust which he expresses in the Ethics for vague general theories and definitions would have led him rather to pass directly to the study of the different phases of soul and the distinctive characteristics of the separate mental functions. But the need of a general comprehensive study of psychology in opposition to the limited and unsystematic propositions of earlier thinkers made it imperative on Aristotle to supply a conception of the soul which should` apply not merely to that vital force which gave meaning to the human organism but also to the animal creation generally and even to the forms of vegetable life. And such a comprehensive definition of the soul Aristotle found in calling it the earliest entelechy of body - the perfect development which having reached the stage of realization is capable of continued action,

1 De An. II. I, 41254, εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ή πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ.

* Eth. Nic. II. 7, 1107 29, οἱ μὲν καθόλου (λόγοι) κενώτεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ ̓ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι.

L

the ἐνέργεια which is still a δύναμις, the developed state which is the condition of perfect action.

There are other expressions by which Aristotle enables us to grasp still further his conception of the soul'. Soul for instance he asserts is the rí hv eival of the body, the manifestation or expression of the being of the body. This strange-looking term is one possessed of much significance. It would seem to have arisen from the combination of the phrase Ti GT with the words τὸ εἶναι. The τί ἐστι of an object is the statement of its general leading nature. By rò eivat on the other hand we must understand simply the definite existence, the particular manifestation of any object to which the term is applied. If then we combine the two formulæ together-the change from Tí ẻσTI tori u would seem intended to remove the notion outside the limits of present time and so give the phrase a wider and more abstract character than it would otherwise possess—we arrive at that same notion of concrete reality, of individualized universality which we found before to be the sense of substance (ovola). The substance or reality however with which we are now dealing is without matter' (ävev üλns)—it is, that is to say, fully determined and realized and therefore free from all those associations of something not yet fully formed which are inherent in Aristotle's theory of matter".

Soul is accordingly, as the Ti v elva of the body, the realization of its general character-the manifestation of its a priori meaning-the exposition of what body was and is. Thus further soul is the Xóyos, the idea of body. It is so because

1 De An. 11. 1, 412. Cp. Meta. Ζ. 10, 1935 14, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῴων ψυχὴ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι τῷ τοιῳδε σώματι.

* Μετα. Ζ. 7, 1032014, λέγω δ' οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. It is frequently identified with the use of elva with a dative, as denoting the essential character of some object. So Meta. Z. 4, 1029b14, discussing the conception λoyikŵs, says čσTI τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἕκαστον δ λέγεται καθ' αυτό. οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σοὶ εἶναι τὸ μουσικῷ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σαυτὸν εἰ μουσικός. Cp. also Meta. Η. 3, τὸ γὰρ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ ἐνεργεία υπάρχει. ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι ταὐτόν, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐ ταυτόν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄνθρωπος λεχθήσεται,

it expresses the true significance of the body and so contains its definition. It is in short, Aristotle implies, only through the soul that we can understand, explain or comprehend the body. And so far as modern physiological psychology asserts that mind is to be known only through a study of the material processes which are its concomitants, it reverses altogether the standpoint of Aristotle's psychology.

This relation of the body to the soul has been however strangely misunderstood by most commentators on the Aristotelian psychology. So deep rooted is the conviction that mind and body are two entirely different forces that few thinkers have been able to grasp the Aristotelian conception of their mutually complementary character. Even a writer who has devoted so much of a lifetime to the work of expounding Aristotle to his countrymen as M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire finds the secret of all the aberrations of Aristotle in his failure to distinguish between the body and the soul. "He has confounded them," he writes, "by ascribing to the one functions which belong exclusively to the other." But the truth is that Aristotle has neither confounded them nor misappropriated their functions. He has simply risen above the ordinary popular standpoint which views them as two mutually exclusive forms, and regarded them as moments in one great idea-as factors which require the support of one another-and in which nevertheless mind or soul is the real truth of the union. He does not for one moment deny, as we shall find when we consider his theory of reason, that there may be activities of thought independent of material organization. What he does maintain is that soul represents the true meaning of the body, so that body cannot be rightly said to exist apart from soul-and that it is through soul that the bodily processes attain their true significance.

Regarding soul in this way as the truth of body, Aristotle will not accept such phrases as harmony or adjustment (ovvOeois) as expressions of the relations which subsist between the body and the soul. In many ways indeed the conception of

harmony would seem to be not unlike the manner in which Aristotle conceives the soul in its connection with the physical organism. But the fourth chapter of the first book of the Psychology shews how far he is from accepting such an explanation of the soul. Not indeed that Aristotle rejects this conception of the mental functions with the same decisiveness as that with which he sets aside various other theories advanced upon the subject. He sees that the view which regards the living being as compounded of contraries (συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων) agrees in some respects with his own theory of the relations which subsist between the body and the mind: and with genuine dialectical subtlety, after he has enumerated the different arguments which seem to shew that the soul cannot be regarded as a harmony of different elements in proper ratio, he proceeds to state the difficulties which meet his own conclusion, from the fact that the destruction of the body ends in the destruction of the soul just as conversely the destruction of the soul coalesces with the annihilation of the body'. Yet none the less Aristotle holds to his own conclusion, which maintains that soul and body are not simply a harmony or proportionate ratio of opposing elements, but rather an inner unity in which the bodily functions find their truth and real meaning in the soul. Body, in fact, exists for the sake of soul and while the mental functions are dependent for their exercise upon the body, it is equally true that body is devoid of meaning when apart from soul.

'We must then,' says Aristotle, 'no more ask whether the soul and the body are one, than ask whether the wax and the figure impressed upon it are one, or generally inquire whether the material and that of which it is the material, are one?.' The two, he means, are only complementary sides of one and the same.

1 De An. 1. 4, 40730, ἁρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτὴν (i.e. ψυχὴν) λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων· καίτοι γε η μὲν ἁρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν μιχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἷον τ ̓ εἶναι τούτων. . . . ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τοιαύτας ἀπορίας· εἰ δ ̓ ἐστὶν ἕτερον ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς μίξεως, τί δή ποτε ἅμα τῷ σαρκὶ εἶναι ἀναιρεῖται ;

2 Id. II. 1, 4126.

state or object. Not that Aristotle anticipates the monistic standpoint of Spinoza and regards thought and extension, mind and body, as only different aspects of one and the same substance, viewed now under one attribute, now under another, or that he holds with George Henry Lewes that "a mental process is only another aspect of a physical process." Aristotle does not leave the mind in a position of simple equilibrium against the body. To him body only attains reality in soul and the mental functions, while the outcome of the physical, are yet also in a way the presupposition on which they rest. Soul, in fact, is what gives meaning and reality to body just as it is vision which gives meaning and reality to the eye: or as it is axehood which, were we to conceive an axe as a natural body, would be the soul and truth of an axe. Just, in short, as the eye is only properly an eye when it sees, the axe only properly an axe when it is used as such, so the body is only rightly called body when it is realized in soul'.

Such an explanation of the relation between mind and body is not perhaps altogether flawless, but it goes a long way to a solution of a problem which has often met with very insufficient answers. It involves no such deus ex machina as is involved in the Occasionalism of Geulinx or the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz. It holds, it will be seen, that mind and body are not to be viewed as entities entirely separated from one another, but as correlatives which mutually imply each other as terms in fact which stand as right and left or as the outward and the inward. It maintains, to use the words of Prof. Erdmann's Leib und Seele-a book which is in many ways the best commentary to be had on Aristotle's general psychological position-that as body cannot be imagined without mind, so mind cannot be conceived without body-that the two in fact presuppose one another. Body and soul thus stand in the closest relation to one another.

The soul is the immanent end or

1 De An. 41212 and 413a1.