therefore the means to make us happy. This inference might, indeed, be juft, if he could fhew each diftinct condition to be efpecially fuited to the particular temperature and difpofition of the individual to whom it is allotted: but as fuch allotment is often, feemingly at least, partial and prepofterous, the unequal diftribution of the goods of fortune, muft be confidered as the moft fertile fource of infelicity. The fixth epifle treats of abstract good and evil. He is of opinion, that no abstract evil exists: for that whatever calamities human life be fubject to, their evil depends merely on our own fenfibility. Even phyfical evils, he fays, are evidently relative to their effects on the fufferings or enjoyments of mankind and therefore must not be accounted as abftract evils, or real defects in the general fyftem of things; fince we cannot tell how far apparent imperfections may conduce to the perfection of the whole. He afferts, that the evils of life are but temporary; and that, on a fair and impartial eftimate, our fufferings and enjoyments feem to stand on an equal balance.-As we do not doubt but the Author writes from his own perceptions, we congratulate him on his finding the account fo even: we are afraid, however, that too many of his fellow-creatures perceive the balance to be against them.-He afferts in the next place, that if there be no abftract phyfical evil in the universe, there is as little reafon for us to hold the exiftence of phyfical good.-As to moral good and evil, he fays, that we owe a fenfe of them purely to phyfical; for had mankind felt neither pain nor pleafure, they would never, from the light of nature, have acquired the ideas of moral good or ill. He affirms, that thofe actions are morally good which give rife to more pleasure than pain, and morally bad vice verfa: that innocence is neither good nor evil, and inconfiftent with a state of action.-Here we cannot admit that thofe actions are morally good which give rife to more pleasure than pain, and fo vice verfa: fuch actions are, indeed, phyfically good, but it is the intention to give rife to more pleafure than pain, which conftitutes moral virtue in the agent. Our Author, in the next place, contends, that moral evil is merely relative to man, and can by no means be confidered as a defect in the defigns of Providence. He argues from St. Paul, that we cannot tranfgrefs without a law.'-Now nature's law, fays our Author, is Heaven's command, whofe will no mortal can refift. He likewife endeavours to prove, that moral good is equally relative, and can plead no abftract merit with the Deity. Neverthelefs, he reafons in fupport of a future state of retribution, where the virtuous and vicious may be very differently difpofed of in the fcale of exiftence. Upon Upon the whole of this argument, we agree with our Philo fopher, that there is no abftract good or evil. Nevertheless, we would not have our Readers haftily infer, that this principle deftroys free agency. Admitting good and evil to be merely relative, ftill the merit accompanying the one, and the demerit attending the other, will be equally relative: fo likewife will the rewards and punishments due to each, both here and hereafter. The difference between a good man and a bad one will yet remain. The honour also with which we diftinguish the virtuous, and the difgrace with which we ftigmatize the vicious, will ftill hold their proportion. Thefe confiderations, therefore, are fufficient incitements to active virtue. In the seventh epiftle, our Author afferts, that whatever diftinction be made between the virtuous and vicious in a future ftate, it must be purely owing to the good pleasure of our Creator, and not to the influence of our merit over his final determinations. He affirms, that no rational conviction whatever is of itself a sufficient motive to virtue; the use of reafon being only to determine what is true or false, just or unjust; and not to excite us to embrace either.-That this is the business of the paffions, which are in themselves neither good nor evil: those difpofitions of mind which are generally termed virtuous, being the frequent occafion of our falling into vices, from which oppofite ones, though generally difapproved or detefted, would have fecured us. In fact, he fays, we are much deceived in the motives, as well as in the practice of virtue: it being not only neceffary that we should mean to do good, and take the best way our reafon may direct us to effect it, but that we should previously take those measures which are in our power, to acquire the knowlege of the means of doing fuch good. He declares wilful ignorance therefore to be intentionally vicious: and he infifts, that as phyfical good in the confequence, is the measure of moral good in the action, the very appearance of merit in the agent in a great degree vanishes: our power of doing good depending frequently on accident, and not very feldom on downright knavery. On all which confiderations, he lays down knowlege as a fundamental and indispensable moral principle. This argument conveys fome folid truths, interfperfed with fome dangerous errors. It is certain that virtue and vice are often merely accidental, as depending frequently on the adventitious circumstances of birth, education, and fortune. Many an opulent Knight, had he been doomed to ftruggle under the preffure of poverty, might have worn a rope of hemp instead of a collar of gold. Our ideas of virtue and vice are, in general," fo imperfect, that we often admire the fame principles in a certain degree, and in men of a certain rank, which in a lefs de gree, gree, and in perfons of inferior condition, we fhould deem worthy of punishment. Thus Cæfar and Alexander, those great ravagers of mankind, had they moved in a fubaltern ftation, might have fuffered death as paultry marauders. Virtue and vice, however, do not only depend on the precarious contingencies of worldly endowments, but are, in a great measure, produced by the different perceptions of mankind. However it may mortify human pride, we may venture to alledge, that a good man and a bad one are influenced to action by the fame principle. Each is determined by the profpect of fome pleasure, either immediate or more remote: but the man of grofs ideas, and limitted capacity, pursues his immediate pleasure, without regard to confequences, which may affect himself or others; whereas the man of more refined notions, and enlarged comprehenfion, compares prefent gratification with the uneafy coniciousness which may enfue hereafter: fo likewife with respect to active virtue, he often prefers the good of others to his own convenience, for the fake of that pleafing gratulation, and more permanent fenfation of pleasure, which he expects to arise from the facrifice he makes. This method of reasoning, it is true, renders the most compleat virtue accidental, or, at beft, in some degree, felfish: and fo far we agree with our Philofopher, that the very appearance of merit in the agent in a great degree vanishes. Nevertheless, we cannot acknowlege, with him, that phyfical good in the confequence, is the meafure of moral good in the action. The criterion of moral good in the action, is the intention of the agent to produce phyfical good. Whether fuch phyfical good be confequential or not, is no ways elfential to determine the moral good of the action. A wicked man, by a bad act, may confequentially produce phyfical good, but the action is not therefore moral: and fo vice verfa. Neither can we agree with him, that our merit, relative as it is, has no influence over the final determinations of our Creator. We conceive this to be a very difcouraging, as well as very erroneous and dangerous doctrine. However fallible our mortal capacity may be in describing the divine attributes, yet we cannot fuppofe the Deity to be otherwise than just: and, at least, the improvement of our mental faculties, even to that degree of refined selfishness which teaches us to place our pleasure in the esteem of others, and the plaudits of a good confcience, must give us fome title to the divine favour. We may certainly challenge this defert as our own, unless our Philofopher supposes * We would not be understood to speak of a naked intention, or abstract benevolence; but of any intention carried into action, as far as the power of the agent extends: and fuch active good will, the most abject of human Beings may find opportunities to exert. that that every hour of application, and every effort of thought is predeftined, which we imagine he will scarce venture to allert. The fubject of the laft epiftle, is an enquiry concerning the immortality of the foul. Our Philofopher affirms, that the doctrine has been both weakly attacked, and lamely fupported, by the philofophical arguments generally made ufe of for, or against it. He endeavours to prove, that comparisons drawn from the vegetable creation-moral arguments-metaphyfical refinements concerning the foul's immateriality-our natural defire of exiftence, &c. are no proofs of our immortality. On the other hand, that the intimate connection between body and mind affords no argument against it. But fetting all thefe metaphyfical refinements afide, he confiders man merely in the light of an animal. In which state of humiliation, he fays, his pretenfions to a future ftate, are, notwithstanding, evidently juftified, on the plain. and reasonable fuppofition, that the Creator hath given to all animals fuch powers and faculties, as were neceffary to the ftate of Being appointed them. He very juftly obferves, that the purfuits of other animals tend to the gratification of themfelves, or the prefervation of their kind: but that with man the cafe is otherwife. He is of opinion, that the faint image of the Deity may be traced in the powers of imagination and genius; and that philofophy alone affords us fufficient reafon to believe the certainty of a future ftate. In the illustration of these sentiments, the Author difcovers great good fenfe, and genuine piety: and the following conclufion, which is truly confolatory, is worthy of a Chriftian and a Philofopher. Diftinguifh'd from the beals, my friend, The pow'rs Heav'n meant them to employ; On man, or beat, a ufelefs load; To th' end for which they were defign'd." Tho' generations rife and fall. The The human genius never dies; The wreck of kingdoms doth furvive ; What idle mourner droops his head? With Locke we wing the naked foul, To animals of ev'ry kind Are, then, their proper pow'rs affign'd; Than cooling fprings and ftrength'ning fruit? Of wholefome roots, his winter fare? As well thofe arts had been without That give, while none can cure, the gout. If not to teach the way to Heav'n? The butcher'd atoms robb'd of life; |