he, confiders man as a compound being, confifting of body and of foul: the fuperior part of which foul, is MIND; by which he is intimately connected with, and of near kindred to, the divine nature; the inferior part is made up of passions and affections, reducible all to two kinds, having all of them either pain or pleasure for their object; by means of which, and alfo of his body, he is outwardly related to, and connected with, the fellows of his own fpecies, and with all outward nature. He is moved by fome commanding power within him, the principle of action, commonly called will; and when the motion given by it is right, and in right direction, moves him for his good. The motion and direction both are right, when the one is measured, and the other dictated by right reafon. The measure and the rule of a man's actions, are agreeable to right reafon, when his mind fees things as they are, and partakes of truth. By means of truth, is a man's reafon empowered to govern him, and his will to move him for his good. Now the power of fo governing and fo moving is man's virtue: the virtue of every thing being its power to produce or procure fome certain good †. Thus, he concludes, that truth and virtue are the two great objects of the Platonic philosophy: truth, the good of all mind; and virtue, the good of the whole man.

Truth, he continues to obferve, that is, the reality of things, being eternal, abfolute, and independant upon any particular mind, the real effences of things not only always are, but always have the fame manner also of being; that is, uniform and invariable. Our ideas, when true, are the exact copies or perfect images of thefe: and when we know them to be fo, and can refolve them into other principles, then we have true Science.

The refemblances of thofe real effences, fays our author, are alfo in outward things, ferving firft to excite in the foul those true ideas. But because of the ever changing and tranfient nature of fuch things, those resemblances being uncertain, they are no lefs apt to raife falfe fancies, and to give birth to erroneous opinions.

But befides thefe natural representations of things, he obferves, that there are others which are arbitrary; invented by men, in order to exprefs or fignify to each other whatever they perceive or fancy, know or think. These are words, framed into propofitions or difcourfes, which are delivered in three ways; either in the way of reafon, applying themselves

We cannot forbear thinking that there is a neutral state between pain and pleasure.

†This, in our judgment, is a good definition of phyfical, but not of meral, virtue.

to

to the understanding, with pretenfions to prove; in the way of oratory, addreffing the paffions, in order to perfuade; or in the way of poetry, engaging the imagination, with a view to pleafe. The mind, therefore, fays he, is in danger of being feduced into error by words in four different ways: either by wrong names attributed to things, difguifing thus their real nature; by fophiftical arts of reasoning, thus exhibiting falfhood in the dress of truth; by the adulterated colours of rbetorick, deluding us; or the fantastic figuring of poetry, enchanting us.

As to the other object of platonick wifdom, fays our author, VIRTUE, or the fettled power in the foul of governing man rightly; confidered as adhering to its divine principle, truth, it takes the form of SANCTITY; confidered as prefiding over every word and action, it has the nature of PRUDENCE; in controlling and ordering the concupifcible part of the foul, or the affections and paffions that regard pleasure, it is called TEMPERANCE; in compofing and directing the irafcible part of the foul, or the affections and paffions relative to pain, it affumes the name of FORTITUDE. And thus far it refpects private good immediately, yet extending its influence to the good of others, through the connections of kindred nature and of social life.

But fince every man is a member of fome civil community, is linked with the fellows of his own fpecies, is related to every nature Superior and divine, and is a part also of univerfal nature; he must always of neceffity participate of the good and evil of every whole, greater as well as lefs, to which he belongs; and has an intereft in the well-being of every fpecies, with which he is connected. With immediate reference therefore to the good of others, to the public good, to the general good of mankind, and to univerfal good; yet remotely, and by way of confequence affecting private good; virtue, as the regulates the conduct of man, in order to these ends, has the title given her of JUSTICE, univ.rfal, or particular in all its various branches, FRIENDSHIP, PATRIOTISM, humanity, equity and PIETY, with every subordinate duty springing out of these

But fince, in order to effect thoroughly, and fully to accomplifb, the good of any vital whole, there must be a confpiration and co-operation of all the parts; there ought in every public to be ONE MIND or Law prefiding over, difpofing, and directing all; that through all may run one fpirit, and in all one virtue operate. To illuftrate this, the idea is prefented of a perfect COMMONWEALTH, and a juft model is framed of public LAWS. And in this the nature of virtue is feen moft godlike,

that

that is, of herself moft diffufive, and of the moft good productive, in her making all happy, as fhe is POLITICAL and LEGISLATIVE.'

The writer, in the laft place, confiders the dialogues of Plato, with refpect to their fubjects, which he divides into the Speculative, the practical, and fuch as are of a mixed nature: and has thus presented us with a distinct and comprehenfive view of Plato's writings, under the just and natural distinctions of their GENIUS, their CHARACTER, their SUBJECT, and their DESIGN.

Prologue to the

To this fynopfis, is annexed a tranflation of the prologut ; which is followed by an advertifement, wherein our author, with that amiable modefty peculiar to merit, declares himself conscious of the inequality of his powers to the due performance of the task he hath undertaken; and, expreffing his earneft defire, that fo ufeful a defign may, by the joint aid of many, be fecured from failing in the execution, he invites and intreats all that part of the learned world, who are versed in the writings of Plato, to contribute their affiftance to a work, from which he apprehends the world may receive equal entertainment and improvement: affuring them at the fame time, that their remarks or comments, fhall be inferted among his own notes, and with justice and gratitude afcribed to their proper authors; or fhall have a diftinét place by themselves at the end of those dialogues, to which their notes relate.

The author farther affures us in the conclusion of his propofals, that if his defign fhould meet with a reception from the publick, favourable enough to encourage the undertakers to proceed in the execution of his plan, that he will present his readers the next winter with a map of all the countries, cities, &c. mentioned by Plato; and after the work is entirely completed, with a general preface, concerning his tranflation into English, as alfo concerning those which have preceded, in other languages: together with three differtations; one, concerning the life and writings of Plato; another, concerning the platonick philofophy; and a third, concerning the connection of the dialogues, and the feveral methods of reading them, recommended by philofophers and criticks, whether

antient or modern.

This is the fum of our author's propofals. From the introductory fpecimen our readers will judge of his talents, which are, in our opinion, equal to his undertaking. We would recommend it to him however to fhorten his periods, which by their prolixity, fometimes render the fenfe perplexed, and the ftile inelegant.

R-d

THE

MONTHLY REVIEW,

For APRIL, 1759.

Plutarch's Lives, in fix Volumes: tranflated from the Greek. With notes explanatory and critical, from Dacier and others. To which is prefixed, the Life of Plutarch, written by Dryden. 8vo. 11. 10s. bound. Tonfon.

T

HE Public is here prefented with a new edition of the Tranflation of Plutarch's Lives by feveral Hands, but much altered and improved. In the Preface, we are told, that the old tranflation has been diligently compared with the Greek; that thofe paffages which appeared exceptionable, with regard either to the fenfe or the expreffion, have been altered; and that two of the lives, thofe of Pericles, and Demetrius Poliorcetes, the verfion of which seemed to require moré than a partial amendment, have been entirely tranflated. As to the merit of the work, we fhall only fay, that the translation, as far as we have been able to compare it with the original, appears to be fufficiently exact, and faithful.

From the many proofs which the Editor has given of his judgment, and acquaintance with the Greek language, we cannot help regretting that he has not favoured us with a translation of Plutarch entirely new; for though most of those passages of the old verfion, where the fenfe of the Author was mistaken, (and thefe certainly were not a few) appear to have been altered, yet, in regard to the expreffion, there are many paffages retained, which by moft Readers, we apprehend, will be deemed exceptionable but we shall infert a fpecimen or two, and leave our VOL. XX.

U

Readers

Readers to determine for themselves, concerning the merit of this edition.

The firft fpecimen we fhall give is taken from the life of Lycurgus. When Lycurgus had appointed the thirty Senators, his next task, and, indeed, the most hazardous he ever undertook, was the making a new divifion of the lands. For there was a very strange inequality among the inhabitants of Sparta; fo that the city was overcharged with a multitude of neceffitous perfons, whilft the lands and money were engroffed by a few. Therefore, that he might banish out of the commonwealth luxury and arrogance, and envy and fraud, together with those more fatal and inveterate diftempers of a state, wealth and poverty, he perfuaded the people to reduce the whole country to a common ftock, to consent to a new divifion of the land, and to live all in perfect equality, allowing the pre-eminence to virtue only, and confidering no other difference or inequality between one man and another, but what the disgrace of doing base actions, or credit of doing worthily, created.

6 Having got their confent to his proposals, he immediately put them in execution. He divided the whole country of Laconia into thirty thousand equal fhares, and the territory of the city of Sparta into nine thousand; and these he diftributed to the inhabitants of the city, as he did the others to them who dwelt in the country. Some authors fay, that he made but fix thousand lots for the citizens of Sparta, and that King Polydore afterwards added three thousand more. Others fay, that Polydore doubled the number Lycurgus had made, which, according to them, was but four thousand five hundred. A lot was fo much as to yield, one year with another, about feventy bufhels of grain for the mafter of the family, and twelve for his wife, with a fuitable proportion of wine and other liquid fruits. This was thought fufficient to keep their bodies ftrong and healthy; and they had no occafion for fuperfluities. It is reported, that as he returned from a journey fome time after the divifion of the lands, in harvest-time, the ground being newly reaped, obferving the fheaves to be all equal, he smilingly faid to those about him, "Methinks Lacedæmon is like the inheritance of a great many brothers, who have newly made a divifion of it among themselves."

Not contented with this, he refolved to make a divifion of their moveables too, that there might be no odious diftinction or inequality left amongst them; but finding that it would be very difficult to make them part with what they had directly, he took another courfe, and got the better of their avarice by this ftratagem. Firft, he commanded that all gold and filver coin

fhould