it on to action, where otherwife it would be too flow, and by giving it fpirit in refifting and fleeing from evil, where it would be too deliberate and languid: and thus they are of use in our conftitution, as crutches are to feeble limbs.

But we have faid enough to give our Readers a pretty juft idea of what is contained in this little tract. Those that will give themselves the trouble of looking into it, and are converfant with fuch fubjects, will readily fee whether or not Dr. Taylor has given a just representation of Dr. Hutchefon's scheme of morality.

De l'Esprit; or, Elays on the Mind, and its feveral Faculties. Written by Helvetius. Tranflated from the French. 4to. 14s. bound. Dodley, &c.

the great avidity with which this work hath been bought up in fome parts of Europe, and the clamours which have been every where raised againft it, are proofs of its importance, the publication of it cannot but be efteemed as extremely interefting to mankind; nevertheless (while we fee the world as eagerly contending about the most infignificant trifles, merely because they are new) it may not be unreafonably queried, whether a few hours amusement, or lofs of time, may not prove the best and worft confequence attending this fo much admired and cenfured performance.

If we give ear to its profeffed admirers we fhall hear them cry it up as a mafter piece of philofophy, and boast its author as the first genius of the prefent age; as one by whom the clouds of ignorance are at once to be difpelled, our prejudices rooted up, and our eyes opened to the knowlege of truth. On the other hand, if we liften to the oppofite party, perhaps the more numerous, we shall hear this celebrated work reprefented as an attempt to fap the foundations of religion and morality, badly defigned, and as injudiciously executed. Nay, there are not wanting thofe who have ventured to pronounce the author an infidel, others a coxcomb, and not a few who have fagaciously discovered his brain not to be quite so found as it fhould be.

Amidst this diverfity of opinions, we deem it our duty to render both the Author and his work impartial juftice. With refpe& to the former, he appears at firft fetting out to betray a diffidence injurious to himself, if in reality he had no defign to weaken the influence of religious opinion on the minds of men. This is the principal accufation brought against him. But perhaps we

have no right to put fuch a question home to any author, as to afk whether he had or had not a farther defign than appears in his work. Certain it is, he frequently puts in a caveat, when fpeaking of fubjects nearly connected with the fundamentals of the Chriftian religion, to inform the Reader that he writes in the character of a Philofopher, and not of a Divine. This, however, may be fufpected as artifice. The greatest Scepticks have made ufe of this pretence; but it is not fo very easy for the generality of readers to feparate the affumed character from the real one: they very naturally conclude, that if the Philofopher be right the Divine who contradicts him muft needs be wrong; for that truth is truth, whether canwaffed in the fchools, or dictated from the pulpit.

Before the Author be given up to cenfure, it is nevertheless needful to confider attentively the plan he propofed to himself. It is by facts,' fays he, 'that I have afcended to caufes: I imagined that morality ought to be treated like all the other fciences, and founded on experiment, as well as natural philofophy.' Hence arifes that general and fertile fource of error, which prevails throughout the whole work, of deducing general principles from particular facts. Indeed, though we cannot deny M. Helvetius the praise due to him, as a writer of prodigious ingenuity, nice di cernment, and an exquifite turn for expofing the foibles of the human mind; yet he does not appear to us, as the most confummate politician, or profound philofopher: and yet with regard to thofe, who may affect to confider this ingenious writer as a vifionary, perhaps he accounts himself for their opinion; when he fays, to call a man a wrong head is frequently calling him, without knowing it, a man that has more wit than ourselves.'

He divides his work into four effays: the firft of which relates to the mind, as confidered in itself; and tends to prove, that

natural fenfibility and memory are the productive caufes of all our ideas; and that all our falfe judgments are the effects of our paffions, or our ignorance.'

As to our paffions, he fays, they not only fix the attention on particular fides of the objects they prefent to us; but they alfo deceive us, by exhibiting the fame objects, when they do not really exist. The ftory of a country clergyman, and an amorous lady, is well known. They had heard and concluded, that the moon was peopled, and were looking for the inhabitants through their tele/copes. If I am not miftaken, said the lady, I perceive two fhadows; they mutually incline towards each other doubtlefs they are two happy lovers.-O fie! Madam, replied the clergyman, thefe two fhadows are the two fteeples of a cathedral. This tale is our Hiftory, it being com

mon

mon for us to fee in things what we are defirous of finding there: on the earth, as in the moon, different paffions will caule us to fee either lovers or fteeples.'

In the last chapter of this effay, he treats of the errors arising from the abufe of words; and has fallen under fome obloquy, on account of the explanation he gives of the term liberty: as he has faid, however, nothing new on this head, we pafs it

over,

In effay the fecond, the mind is confidered, as relative to fociety; the Author endeavouring to prove, that the fame intereft which influences the judgment we form of actions, and makes us confider them as virtuous, vicious, or allowable, according as they are useful, prejudicial, or indifferent, with refpect to the public, equally influences the judgment we form of ideas; and that, as well in fubjects of morality, as in thote of geniu, it is intereft alone that dictates all our judgments.'

This effay is divided into twenty-fix chapters, the Writer very diffufely going about to prove, that felf-intereft is the foundation of all morality. M. Helvetius, here, unfortunately expofes the weak fide of his philofophy. Tho' we grant that the principle of felf love arifes from our natural love of pleasure, and hate of pain, yet it cannot itself be univerfally held as a first principle. There are many things we do, and are excited to do, before the mind can poffibly have formed any reflection on the confequence attending fuch actions, or the gratification of fuch defires; and it is only from judging of the confequences of our actions, that we can be justly faid to act from the motive of felf-intereft.

It has been faid, indeed, that we often fly objects of danger, and pity or relieve thofe of diftrefs, before we confider what we are about: but that we do both, to ease ourselves of the prefent pain, the sense of thofe objects gives us; which is no more than acting from a principle of telf-love. But granting this, does not the reader plainly fee a material difference between the principle called felf-love in the latter cafe. and what our Author calls felf-intereft in general? The one may be called a a natural, and the other a political principle; and a man who, from the former, is continually doing good to mankind, though for no other reafon than that because he is impatient at the misfortunes of others, and cannot bear to fee them apparently unhappy, fuch a man we say, though he only feeks his own ease, and may be faid to act on a principle of felf-love, would be univerfally esteemed as one of the beft creatures in the world: while another, who feeks only the fame eafe, but is not led directly by his natural feelings to action, before he has confidered and

weighed

weighed the confequences of his actions, will ever be looked on as a defigning, felf-interested man.

Self-intereft, indeed, in the Author's fenfe, is doubtlefs the grand principle of moral attraction; but, like that of phyfical attraction, it will not account for all the various phænomena we meet with. They are both the effects of prior caufes, and will fail when applied to the explication of the nicer operations of nature. We are, perhaps, to look for the first and most general principles of morals among physical causes; but a philofopher, who boafts precifion of terms and ideas, will hardly tell us, that brutes act from a principle of felf-intereft, because they love pleasure as much, and pain as little, as we do.

Notwithstanding, however, fome overfights of this nature, owing, perhaps, to his having begun at the wrong end of his argument, our Author goes on to illuftrate his principles in a very entertaining and ingenious manner; throwing out a variety of fenfible remarks, on various fubjects. Speaking of the vanity of self-esteem, he fays, How can we forbear having the highest ideas of ourfelves? Every man changes his opinions, as foon as he believes that thofe opinions are falfe. Every one therefore believes, that he thinks juftly, and confequently much better, than those whofe ideas are contrary to his own. Now, if there are not two men who think exactly alike, it must neceffarily follow, that each in particular believes, that his fentiments are more just than those entertained by all the reft of mankind. The Dutchefs de la Ferte faid one day to Madam de Stahl, I must confefs, my dear friend, that I find no body always in the right but myfelf. Let us hear the Talopoins, the Bonzes, the Bramins, the Guebres, the Imans, and the Marabouts, when they preach against each other in the affembly of the multitude, does not each of them fay, like the Dutchefs de la Ferte? __ Ye people, I affure you, that I alone am always in the right. Each one believes, that he has a fuperior understanding, and the fools are not the perfons that are the leaft fenfible of it t. This gave

room

Experience informs us, that every one places in the rank of dunces, and of bad books, every man, and every work that contradicts his opinions; that he would impofe filence on the man, and fupprefs the work. Thus the orthodox who are deficient in understanding, have fometimes given heretics an advantage over them. If in a trial at the bar, fay thefe laft, one party should forbid the other to exhibit his proofs in fupport of his right, would not this act of violence in one of the parties be confidered as a proof of the injuftice of his caufe?'

+ What prefumption, fay the perfons of mean abilities, is there in thofe called men of genius? How fuperior do they think themfelves

to

room for the fable of the four merchants, who went to the fair to fell beauty, birth, dignity, and wit; all of whom difpofed of their merchandize, except the laft, who returned without even taking hanfel.'

Then as to the efteem we have for others; it is always, obferves our Author, in proportion to the refemblance their fituation, tafte, and ways of thinking, bear to our own. Thus, with the best intentions, illuftrious men of different tastes, fet very little value on each other. Like feveral empirics difperfed in the market-place, each calls admirers to himfelf, and thinks that he alone can deserve them. The Writer of romances is perfuaded that his work fuppofes the utmoft invention and delicacy of mind: the metaphyfician fancies that he is the fource of evidence, and the confident of nature: the poet, again, who confiders the metaphyficians as grave formal fools, affures them, that the discoveries of their art are doubtful, but that the charms of his are certain; while the politician in his turn, tells them all three, that the arts and fciences are ferious trifles and frivolous difficulties.

Our esteem is fo dependent on this conformity of ideas, that no body can attentively examine themselves, without perceiving, that in all the minutes of a day, they do not afford the fame perfon exactly the fame degree of efteem; and it is always to fome one or other of thefe contradictions, inevitable in the intimate and daily commerce with mankind, that we ought to attribute. the perpetual variation of the thermometer of our esteem: thus every man whofe ideas are not analogous to thofe of the people with whom he converses, is always defpifed by them.

The philofopher who lives among a fet of coxcombs, will be the jeft and ridicule of the company. He will find himself played upon by the greateft fool amongst them, whofe infipid jokes will pafs for excellent turns of wit; for the fuccess of the raillery depends lefs on the delicacy of the Author's wit, than on his attention to ridicule none but thole ideas that are disagreeable to the company.'

Self-love thus induces us, according to our Author, to confider ourselves, and thofe who refemble us, as patterns of polite

to the rest of mankind? But the others reply, the ftag who boasted of being the swiftet of all ftags, muft doubtless be puffed up with pride; but without wounding his modefty, he may fafely fay, that he runs better than a tortoife. You are the Tortoife; you have neither read nor fpent your hours in meditation: how then can you have a mind cultivated like his, who has taken great pains in acquiring knowlege? You accufe him with prefumption; and you, without ftudy and reflection, would be upon an equal footing with him. Which then of the two is the more prefumptuous ?'

I

nefs,