J. H. Bryan and Mordecai, for the plaintiff. 66 RUFFIN, Judge. By the act of 1806, (R. c. 701.) no gift of slaves is good or available, unless made in writing. "Neither," the act continues, shall such gift be valid, "unless the writing shall be proven or acknowledged, "and registered within one year after the execution "thereof." These words seem to denote a purpose in the legislature, then to make the registry acts effectual, at least, in reference to the gift of slaves. Perhaps no pue pose could be more politic; for registration is now scarcely of any use, except as a means of preserving the instrument for the benefit of the person claiming under it, in case of the loss of the original, as the party may keep the deed in his pocket as long as he pleases, and place it on the register's books only when it becomes. his interest to defeat some claimant, who has, ignorant of his deed, acquired a right. Probably these strong reasons induced the judge in the court below, to lay down the rule he did. But they are reasons, which address themselves rather to the discretion of the legislature, than to ours. The legislature has certainly the power to enlarge the time for registration, and to pronounce its effect, and if to them it seem good, the courts must execute their will. From time to time, acts giving further time for registration have been passed; and in each, deeds of gift, and indeed all conveyances, except mortgages and deeds of trust, are expressly included; and it is enacted, that they shall be as good and valid, as if they had been proven and registered within the time before allowed by law. Such are the words of the acts of 1827,c. 30, and 1829. c. 26, which embrace the case now before us. Acts of this character. have always received a literal construction; in fact, they are susceptible of none other. The only exception is the case of Scales v. Fewel. (3 Hawks. 18.) in which there was an hiatus of one year between the extending acts of 1818 and 1821, and during the interval, rights vested in other persons. The court thought the last act was not intended to defeat such vested rights. But in every DEC. 1832. JONES v. SASSER. The case of Scals v Fewel, (3 Hawks, 18,) ► approved. SHERWOOD DEC. 1832. other case, deeds registered at ever so remote a period, have been held, by force of the new registry acts, to be as operative as if registered within the periods prescribed COLLIER. by the acts 1715 or 1806, or any other general statute. Here there was no interval. V. PER CURIAM.-JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. GABRIEL SHERWOOD upon the relation of the STATE Bank, v. PROBATE COLLIER. Where a surety in a joint note paid it, but took no assignment from the creditor, of a judgment previously obtained upon it against the principal debtor: Held, that the payment satisfied the judgment. DEBT upon a bond, given by one W. B. Green, upon taking out letters of administration upon the estate of Benjamin W. Caswell, to which the defendant was surety. The breach assigned, was the non-payment by Green, of a judgment recovered against him by the relators, upon a note of his intestate. Plea-Performance. On the trial, during the last Spring Circuit, before MARTIN, Judge, at Wayne, the case was as follows: The intestate died in 1815, indebted to the State Bank by a note for $630, to which one Hooks was surety; in the year 1816, judgment was recovered by the bank, upon this note against the administrator, W. B. Green, and an execution issued, which was returned nulla bona. In the year 1818, the bank also recovered judgment against the surety Hooks. which was satisfied by him in the year 1823. This action was commenced in the year 1829. Upon these facts, his Honor instructed the jury that the payment by Hooks barred the action. The plaintiff, in submission to this opinion, suffered a nonsuit and appealed J. H. Bryan and Mordecai, for the plaintiff, contended, that the jury should have been directed to find for the plaintiff, if they should think that Hooks. when he paid the judgment against him, intended a purchase and not a satisfaction, and cited The Governor v. Griffin. (Ante Dec. 1832. 2 vol. p. 352.) They also urged, that satisfaction of the judgment against the endorser, was not per se, satisfac SHEWOOD V. tion of that against Green, the administrator of the prin- COLLIER. cipal debtor, and for this was cited Clason v. Morris. (10 John. R. 524.) Gaston and W. C. Stanly, contra, were stopped by the court. RUFFIN, Judge, after stating the case, proceeded as follows: I suppose the present action is brought for the benefit of the surety Hooks, to avoid the effect of the statute of limitations, or a disbursement of the assets subsequent to the judgment of the bank against Green, which might prevent an effectual recovery in a suit in Hooks' own name. But in the case stated, I think the present action equally ineffectual. Since the statute of 4th Ann, payment discharges a judgment, as effectually as entering satisfaction of record. Here there was full payment. It was inten ded as such by Hooks, and so received by the creditor. ence. intended to should be to a stranger. A payment by any one of two or more, jointly, or An assignment jointly and severally bound for the same debt, is payment of a security to by all; and any of the parties may take advantage of it one of the parties to it, is a saand plead it to an action brought by a satisfied creditor, tisfaction-ifit is or in his name by the sureties. It is true, that if a pay- keep it on foot, ment be not intended, but a purchase, there is a differ- the assignment But that can only be by a stranger, or by using the name of a stranger, to whom an assignment can be made when there is but a single security, and that, one upon which all the parties are jointly liable. This is upon the score of intention, and because the plea of payment. by a stranger is bad upon demurrer. If the assignment. of a joint security be taken by the surety himself, there is an extinguishment, notwithstanding the intention ; because an assignment to one, of his own debt, is an absurdity. Where the securities are separate, as several bonds, or a several judgment upon a joint and several note, which is the case here, probably an assignment Совв V. HERRING. DEC. 1832. may be made to the surety himself, since he is no party to the judgment. But if that can be, clearly nothing but a plain intention, evinced by an assignment, to keep up the judgment, can have that effect. Upon the face of the transaction, it is a payment, on which Hooks could have maintained assumpsit in his own name. That shews that this suit is barred; for if it be not, the original creditor, and the surety, may both recover the same debt. The case of This case is just the reverse of Hodges v. Armstrong, Hodges v. Arm (unte 253.) That suit was brought in the name of the 253,) approved. surety, who had taken an assignment to a stranger, and did not intend a satisfaction. This, in the name of the first creditor, who has received payment, and did intend a satisfaction. Both decisions are on clear grounds, and are supported by numerous authorities; amongst them, I recollect Church v. Bishop, (2 Ves. 571,) and Wattington v. Sparks. (Id. 569.) PER CURIAM.-Judgment AFFIRMED. ENOCH COBB v. GRADY Herring. Where, upon the case stated, the judgment of the court below is correct, points which were intended to be presented do not arise, and will not be examined; as where in trespass, the plaintiff was in possession, and the defendant had no title, defects in that of the former will not be noticed, he having recovered upon his possession. TRESPASS QUARE CLAUSUM FREGIT. Plea-Not guilty, and liberum tenementum. The plaintiff claimed under one Whitfield, to whose title the case stated several objections, which it is unnecessary to mention. Whitfield had been in possession for many years, and in January 1830. sold to the plaintiff, who took immediate possession, but no conveyance was stated in the case to have been made by Whitfield to him. The defendant offered no evidence of title in himself. The trespass complained of was, in entering an enclosure and Совв 2. throwing down a fence. MARTIN. Judge, before whom Dec. 1832. the cause was tried at Wayne, on the last spring circuit, after charging the jury as to the alleged defects in the title of Whitfield, informed them, that if the plaintiff had HERRING, actual possession, and not constructive possession merely, and the defendant entered upon him, in the manner stated in the case, without even a color of title, they ought to find for the plaintiff. A verdict was returned accordingly, and the defendant appealed. W. C. Stanly and J. H. Bryan, in opening the case, were asked by RUFFIN, Judge, if the questions intended to be presented as to Whitfield's title, were open upon the case certified with the record? Upon a clear intimation of the opinion of the court, they gave up the cause. Mordecai, for the plaintiff. RUFFIN, Judge.-Most of the points on which the jury were instructed, would have been material if the action had been brought by Whitfield, and had turned on his having a better title than the defendant. But they are out of the present case; because it is immaterial whether the title was in Whitfield or not, since no conveyance is stated from him to the plaintiff. The right of the present plaintiff to recover, must therefore have depended solely on his actual possession, at the time of the trespass committed; and the judge properly said upon that point, that if he had not such possession, he could not recover; but if he had, then without title, he had a right to a verdict against the defendant, who was a mere wrong doer. It may be possible, that it was intended to take the opinion of the court upon Whitfield's title, and to that end, to state a conveyance from him to Cobb, which would have brought that title in issue, in case the plaintiff had not the actual possession. But a case is not made to call for that opinion; for it is only stated that Whitfield sold to Cobb, but whether he conveyed, or by what species of conveyance, does not appear. As therefore the jury have found a verdict for the plaintiff, which, in the case stated, and under the instructions given by the |