country, who wished to raise his character for popularity, muft found it on peace. To maintain peace with dignity and with honour to ourfelves, and when the melancholy hour came for entering into a juft war, to do it with fpirit was a character becoming this country, a character which he trufted ftill belonged to this country, a character for moderation, gallantry, and humanity. To fupport that character uncontaminated, was furely the united aim of every gentleman who then heard him. A bloody war was always an object of regret, as being invariably attended with great expence. It was, however, fome confolation to reflect, that however deeply the country was already diftreffed, particularly the most numerous part of the community, there was ftill that spirit left, ftill that vigorous principle in all ranks, which would enable them to bear additional burdens, and make them lay light on their fhoulders, provided they were convinced that war was entered into on fome justifiable ground. They ought, then, to confider where they stood, and be careful to impofe no burdens but those which were neceffary. The fubjects of this country were jealous of their honour, and therefore they would be ready, at all times, to fuffer new burdens, to spend their last farthing, and the last drop of their blood to fupport their honour. The right honourable gentleman, a few days ago, had brought down a meffage to that Houfe, and they had pledged themselves, in fome degree, to fupport the war, and for that purpose to lay new burdens on the people. No principle of equity had been attempted to be stated. Could it be faid that they had a right to go to war on any principle of moderation? Clearly not; for the very act of war was deftructive of moderation. It was not to preserve the faith of treaties, for no treaty had been violated. Was it for national character, or national honour? Far from it. Why, then, did they enter into the war? Was it to fupport a balance of power? It was to fupport a balance of power never before heard of; an ideal balance of power, which was never before entertained, and which was never supposed to have any relation to the politics of Europe, nor any connection with its political safety or exiftence. For whom did Great Britain ftand pledged? Was it for a people always connected with her? Was it for a people carrying on an extenfive trade with her? No. It was against them, and in favour of those who, for the space of the last century, had been joined with France against us, whofe conduct was always marked with inhumanity, and whofe character and manner. were a difgrace to human nature. The national character, by this measure, must be inevitably loft, and the character of a nation was like that of an individual. This country muft fall from its character of

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juftice, generofity, and moderation; and must sink into the character of a bully, a tyrant, and an oppreffor. What could be fo difgraceful as to enter into a war which could on no ground whatever be juftified? What fo tyrannical, fo oppreflive, or unjust, as to wish another power to do that, which we, in a fimilar fituation, would not be content to do; and what no nation would ever fubmit to, unless the moit pofitive neceflity dicated that fubmiffion. Great Britain Fad only infured to herself, and all her pofterity, the eternal enmity of Ruffia; and from the moment the King's meflage was fent down to the Houfe, they ftood enrolled at the head of the foes of the Emprefs. They had lost all their advantages, and diftrefs alone awaited them in the event of a future war. Major Maitland continuing his remarks, faid, that he would attempt to enter upon an inveftigation of the principles which feemed to have actuated the right honourable gentleman on the prefent occafion. He declared, that to do fo was no eafy talk, fince to keep that House and the whole country in impenetrable darkness, had been the whole object of the right honourable gentleman. All the ftrength of his measures refted in the obfcurity with which they were furrounded, and confequently the Houfe could make nothing. out of this fituation of darknels and obfcurity. The right honourable gentleman had been perfectly juftified in interfering in the affairs of Holland, because the dangers of Holland were well known, and her deftruction was near; fhe might have fallen into the hands of the French, and have thereby enabled France more effectually to a contrary to the interefts of Britain. This was the first principle on account of which fo much praife had been fhowered down on the head of the Minifter. With respect to a treaty with Pruffia, he muft firft obferve, that there either was or there was not a pofitive and specific interpretation to be put on every treaty. The treaty with the King of Pruffia was trictly of a defenfive nature, and he wifhed to afk this fimple queftion, whether any one man who had read the treaty with the King of Pruffia, could have conceived from it that Great Britain was bound to arm, in order to stop the aggrandifement of Ruffia? But he would go farther. Suppole the Emprefs had driven the Turks out of Europe, and had taken poffeffion of Conftantinople, ought we then to go to war? No. But the right honourable gentleman had difcovered that there was a fyftem arifing out of the treaty. The Houfe would pleafe to confider how the treaty ftood with regard to reciprocity. We were obliged to arm because Ruffia was carrying on a war, not a war which fhe had entered into, but into which fhe had been forced by the Turks. If, therefore, the Emprefs entered into a war in which the VOL. XXIX.

was

likely to be aggrandifed, though forced into it, yet we must immediately take up arms. The nature of the fyftem was exactly this. We had engaged ourselves to be ready, at all times, with an army for the protection of Europe, when Pruffia could never be under the fame neceffity to arm for us. By this fyftem, we were bound to expend our laft fhilling, and the laft drop of our blood, without a prospect or a hope of a return. Where then was the reciprocity of this treaty? Were not all treaties contracts entered into between the parties, and beyond which they ought not to proceed even one inch? He would be the very laft man to infringe on any part of the Royal prerogative, and leaft of all on the right of making peace and war; but if they acted with that fpirit and vigour which the times demanded, they would take. care that it should not be stretched beyond its due bounds, and the conftitution had placed in the hands of that House the most complete check on that power. If the House allowed the Minifter to act juft as he pleased, repofing an unlimited confidence in him, there was an end of all national honour, and all national character. It would then be in the power of a Minister of this country to reduce us to a fituation,_from which we might never be able to extricate ourfelves. Every treaty was fpecific in its meaning, and fhould never pafs beyond that meaning. If they admitted of an extenfion, to what length might they not go? The treaty itself was perfectly defenfive; the fyilem arifing out of it, perfectly offenfive. The treaty itfelf was founded in the principles of equity, moderation, and found policy; whereas the fyftem talked of, held out nothing but oppreffion, injuftice, and infolence. The Emperor had made a feparate peace with the Turks; and the Emprefs of Ruffia was alfo ready to put an end to the war on reasonable terms. Why then fhould Great Britain compel the Emprefs to give back all which the had taken? It was faid that Oczakow opened a navigation into the Black Sea, but it was evident to every one that Ruffia could navigate that fea ten years ago, and that it did not depend on her poffeffing Orzakow. The Emprefs had made a very reasonable demand for the blood and treafure fhe had fpent in the war; for that fhe only asked Oczakow, and the country round it, and it was that which was to prove fatal to this country. Certainly it would, but not in the way they had fancied; it would prove hurtful to our finances and our nation, if Minifters went on with a caufelefs war. If the Emprefs aimed at univerfal dominion, then they might apprehend a little for Pruffia; but could any moderate man flate or think, that her fcheme was a fcheme of conqueft? Could any man ftate that Berlin was in danger? The prefent interference, in his mind, was unwarrantable; it was a pre

2

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fcription of terms on which Great Britain had no bufinefs whatever to intermeddle, and he therefore thought it highly difgraceful to this country. It was not to fupport national character, national honour, nor for any other reason, but that Oczakow might be in the hands of the Turks. This, it feemed, was the pivot of European politics, and the center of commerce. We had expended four millions on Nootka Sound, which was not worth a fhilling to us. We had expended alfo very large fums on the war in India, and it was now contended that the fafety of Great Britain confifted in putting Oczakow into the poffeffion of the Turks. The King's Minifters did not act like sober-minded perfons; they were not like merchants, who were cautious of entering into engagements, but ever ready to fulfil them, and always fatisfied with a fair profit. The authors of the prefent fyftem were playing the part of defperate fpeculators, and the whole fcene would at laft terminate in an univerfal bankruptcy, and the fatal hour, he believed, was not far offSince the right honourable gentleman had come into power, the finances of the country, it must be admitted, had been in a confiderable degree of profperity; but it should be remembered, that there were many adventitious circumstances which contributed to that profperity. The difturbances in Holland, in the Netherlands, and in France, had each tended to throw into the hands of the British merchants, many rich fources of commerce: that, he fuppofed, would be eafily granted, but that could not be confidered as a permanent fource of revenue. A fettlement had taken place in Holland and the Netherlands, and the hour was not far off, when France would again raife her head among the powers of Europe, renovated and purified from all her former pollutions, and cured of all her former defects; fhe would then find us with our conftitution on the decline, palfied in every limb, and far gone, in confequence of having been put into the hands of ignorant, felf-conceited quacks. Did they not all know, that the Houfe and the country were at prefent groaning under the preffure of the recent four millions? It had been faid that the war in India would be paid by the Company, and a great deal more of rhodomantade of that fort had been flated; but let it be recollected, that the right honourable gentleman himself had declared that he confidered this country as engaged for every fhilling of the expence of an Indian war. Though this expence might not fall in as the current expences of this year, or of the next year, yet it would come fome time or other, and prove an infupportable burden to the inhabitants of this country. The debt which had been already incurred in India, on account of the war, exceeded Ax millions, and it might amount to ten or twenty millions

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Lord

more before it was concluded. To this was to be added, the lofs of our trade with Ruffia, the moft advantageous trade to Great Britain, furnishing the best nursery for feamen. He reminded the House, that it was by this trade that our beft feamen were raised, and our beft fhips built, and therefore we we e like madmen, acting for themfelves. It was British failors deftroying the British navy. If no fleet could act in the Baltic, why keep up any number beyond the peace establifhment, fince if they could not act, they were useless. At the time the convention took place with Spain, the fleet was as well manned and armed as any which had ever existed in this country, and Minifters then fhould have looked around them with a very jealous eye, before they difmantled that flect. But it was faid that economy was the object. That economy had led them to vote five or fix millions, and to fave an hundred thousand pounds! But what public benefit would poffibly accrue to the country by the prefent war?The caufe of the war could only be an extenfion of the already extended patronage of the right honourable gentleman. He advised them, therefore, to use their eyes, and look be. fore; for they were on the edge of a precipice, and every moment in danger of falling. If the fole reafon for voting millions, was filence, they could only account for it in the iniquity of the cause.

The Speaker put the queftion on the first refolution, when Lord Belgrave rofe, and remarked, that it was neceffary, Belgrave. to a certain degree, to place confidence in Ministers, and that it was not claimed by the prefent Minifters on any vague or undefined ground, but on the unequivocal and fure one of experience of their former merits. Thefe, he prefumed, would be fufficiently elucidated in the occurrences of 1787, and of the last year. With regard to the refolutions moved by the honourable gentleman (Mr. Grey) he would not enter into a fpeculative confideration of them. The first, in particular, might be true, as to the general queftion; peace was certainly more defirable than war; but it was an undoubted truth, that even war was preferable to difhonourable tranquillity. The honour and intereft of a country were infeparable, and it might not be confiftent with the honour of this country to accede to the terms of peace which the Empress of Ruffia had propofed. As to the intereft of the country, fo far as it might be affected by the deftruction of the balance. of power, he judged that the interference of one nation would be neceffary, when another was in danger of being exterminated. Those who looked only at the furface, might fee nothing alarming in the acquifition made by the Empress. Oczakow, and the country between the Bog and the Neifter, might not in themfelves be confidered as of so very great importance;