portance; but gentlemen fhould reflect, that these led to the acquifition of Conftantinople, and from thence to Lower Egypt and Alexandria, which would give to Ruffia the entire fupremacy of the Mediterranean, and render her a formidable rival to England, as a commercial and a maritime power. As to the refolution, which went to condemn the present armament, as impolitic and inexpedient; that Parliament could not agree to, without being guilty of a contradiction; for they had already exprefly approved this armament, and declared their willingness to furnish the fupplies neceffary to fapport it. He fhould, therefore, move the previous queftion, as the best way to get rid of this refolution. Lord Belgrave concluded with fome farther elucidation of the doctrine of confidence. Much, he faid, ought to be entrufted to the difcretion of a Minifter, who had proved himself worthy of the truft; but ftill much ought to be afcribed to accident and good fortune. Prudent difpofitions only were in the power of men; the reft was at the difpofal of Providence. A Minifter, who had exerted his beft abilities in the fervice of his country, had at leaft the comfortable feeling of felf-approbation. Cras vel atra Nube polum pater occupato; HOR. L. 3. Od. 29. Mr. Pybus rofe to fecond the motion made by Lord Bel- Mr. grave, and expreffed his perfect concurrence with the honour- Pybus. able gentleman oppofite to him, in their conftruction of the treaty with Pruffia. It certainly had always appeared to him a defenfive treaty, in the ftricteft fenfe of the term; and if fuch were the real scope and nature of it, it was undoubtedly true that we were not bound by any article in it to come forward as an armed negociator of a peace between Ruffia and the Porte. But though it did differ effentially from a treaty of offenfive alliance in this fundamental point, that we were not obliged to affift the Court of Berlin in any defigns of national aggrandizement, nor to countenance fuch hoftilities as ambition and a love of conqueft might tempt it to commence; though our interference in difputes upon the Continent, could not be infifted upon as a matter of obligation and faith, yet it would be a moft extraordinary mode of reafoning to contend that, becaufe we had connected ourselves by fome fort of treaty with Pruffia; becaufe a close and' friendly alliance did actually subfift between us; and because, with reference to that alliance, we were neceffarily in fome degree ftrong in her ftrength, and safe in her fecurity; we fhould therefore be precluded from taking thofe fleps which might reftore tranquillity, and be for the general intereft of Europe; which might preferve the value of that defenfive fyftem we had formed, by preventing an important injury to our ally; and which might be abfolutely neceffary for our eventual protection. We fhould have been forming treaties upon curious principles indeed, if the effect and operation of them were to place us in a much worse fituation than we fhould have been, if no fuch treaties had exifted: if we had renounced the means of guarding and averting evils from ourselves, and abandoned all right of adopting fuch measures, as would have flowed from clear and rational policy alone, without any continental connections whatever. What was the principle of our interference in the internal difputes of Holland? Were we under any foederal neceffity of becoming parties to altercations refpecting its municipal Government? Under what treaty had we guarantied a fpecific mode of civil establishment in that country? Upon whar point of honour did we feel ourselves called upon to decide between two parties in the State, upon a question of civil right and authority or to what imputation of mala fides fhould we have been fubject, if we had remained totally neuter and inactiye? In fact, we were under no fuch foederal neceffity; we were not guarantees to fuch effect; we were not bound in honour to interfere; we were liable to no fuch reproach: but we confulted our own interest as a nation; we looked to the falvation of our own political importance in the scale of Europe, and fuccefsfully refifted that afcendancy which France was labouring to establish, and must have produced its deftruction. Mr. Pybus faid, he had not the abfurd vanity to affect having received from his right honourable friend any communication upon this fubject; for none could be made, without a criminal violation of his duty to his Sovereign, and a manifeft tendency, either at the prefent crifis, or by example, to hurt the intereft of his country. But Mr. Pybus thought that the pofture of affairs in the North, and the formidable fuccefs of the Ruffian arms, afforded in themfelves quite information enough to juftify the belief, that this country was actuated by the fame fpirit, and had interfered upon the fame grounds of policy, as were the bafis of her conduct in Holland, without feeling herfelf under any obligation to do so, from an article of any exifting treaty. It was the avowed opinion of the moft diftinguifhed Statefmen on both fides of the Houfe, that Great Britain was deeply interefted in the fituation of political affairs on the Continent, and that her exertions were never better and more judicioufly employed than than in preferving the balance of power in Europe. An honourable gentleman had faid, that confidering the Turkish dominions as being of any weight in the icale, was an idea altogether new and unprecedented Without enquiring minutely into the correctness of fuch an affertion, though he believed the honourable gentleman would find, upon examination into the politics of France, and the hiftory of the Turkish empire, that the idea was not altogether of fo modern a date as he had reprefented it, Mr. Pybus begged leave to ftate the mode in which he thought this matter ought fairly to be confidered. Setting afide, therefore, all ideas whatever of the intrinfic importance of the Turkish Government, the question would be, not whether the Ottoman Empire had been ufually contidered by the cabinets of Europe as a proper object of jealoufy to the other States; but whether a defalcation from it in favour of Ruffia, who had been univerfally fo confidered, might not throw into her hands fuch additional advantages, as would greatly increase her confequence as a maritime Power, and make her dangerous to the ftrength and liberties of the neighbouring nations. Ruffia, from the nature of its produce, and from other circumstances, had been ftyled a fitter and more rational object of alliance to this country, than the Porte could be. He was, however, ftrongly convinced, that if we fuffered her to realize her obvious fchemes of conquest and dominion, the might hereafter, and, as States were more frequently guided by the law of power than that of morality or juftice, probably would (at least it became us, for our own fecurity, to act as if we thought fo) do us infinitely more harm, than her friendship could poffibly do us good. She was certainly enabled to be extremely ufeful to us in fupplying us with articles for our navy. But it fhould be remembered, that fhe was not exclufively fo, and that other fources of fupply were open to us. The lofs, therefore, of fuch a market for her ftores, would prefs more feverely upon her trade, than it would upon our convenience. This country, however, fhould take care to prevent her having the beft and moft fubftantial reafon for withholding them from us, by their becoming more neceffary for her own confumption. Relying as we did, and he hoped always fhould do, upon our naval ftrength, as the folid bafis of our power, we should regard every attempt to rival us in that, and to difpute our fuperiority at fea, with the moft ferious jealoufy. Ruffia, in its prefent extent, could hardly ever be formidable to us in that refpect; but naval importance was a favourite object of the Empress's ambition; and he was fure the House must be aware of the maritime advantages fhe would derive from her acquifition of the Turkish dominions in Europe. Viewing the the question in this light, he confidered Great Britain as being deeply interefted, for her own fake, and for the sake of Europe in general, in checking the progrefs of the Ruffian arms. But, fays the honourable gentleman, if our interference were ever neceffary, why was our late naval armament reduced, as the Minifter was, long before its redution, as completely acquainted with the only fact of confequence, namely, the capture of Oczakow, as he is at the prefent moment? If Oczakow were afcertained to be the only difficulty in the way of an immediate accommodation, the fubject would be open to argument upon that ground. But without meaning to undervalue those sources of foreign intelligence, which any Member might be in poffeffion of, he was perfuaded that the points, upon which the negociation was proceeding, could be known to thofe only whom His Majesty's Minifters might have given specific information to upon the fubject; and he was too well fatisfied of their honour and fenfe of duty, to believe that they had done fo to any one of thofe with whom they were intimately connected. To contend, therefore, that Oczakow, or any other fpecial circumftance, was the only impediment to an immediate peace, was to beg the question completely. Yet, if Oczakow had been the only place of confequence, the capture of which had been confidered by this country as fo important an acquifition to Ruffia, it would not by any means follow, that we ought to have armed, or to have interfered at all, the moment we be came acquainted with that event. The fortune of war, while any thing like equality of force fubfifts between belligerent Powers, is continually changing the poffeffion of fortreffes; and we could have had no reafon for being convinced, at that period, that whatever advantages Ruffia had gained by one fiege, he might not lofe by another. The afpect of affairs had fince experienced a confiderable alteration. The fuccefs of the Ruffian arms had not been confined to the barren diftri&t between the Bog and the Neifter; the diftant banks of the Danube had been the fcene of their victories; Ifmael had fallen before them; and the capture of that place had been attended with fuch acts of carnage and barbarity, as could not be thought of without horror, and were a difgrace to humanity. Could we wonder, then, that new terrors had been added to the Ruffian name? Could we doubt that this feries of conqueft had weakened, and muft operate to difmay, the enemy? Conftantinople itself was endangered; and if this country had not interfered to prevent the utter and impending annihilation of the Turkish power in Europe, the time might not be very remote, when the fleets of Ruffia would triumph in the Mediterranean, an object to the whole world, of her activity, adroitness, and power, and of our our fupineness, impotence, and difgrace. He admitted that war was to be deplored under any circumftances, and particularly fo in the prefent ftate of this country. However anxiously we might regard the operations of the two armies, however ardently we might wish that thofe projects of ambition might be defeated, yet, as long as the Turks appeared able to fight their own battles, it would have bet. highly criminal to have involved us in fresh expence. A strict attention, however, to prefent economy, if carried all lengths, might lead to unavoidable expence hereafter, in a moft enormous degree. He was confident that no Minifter had ever been more anxious to revive the drooping credit of the nation, than his right honourable friend had clearly fhewn himself to be. The reduction of that oppreffive load of debt under which we had long groaned, was an object nearest his heart. Was it, then, reasonable to believe, that he would wantonly facrifice his own happiness and fame; that, unless he strongly felt himfelf impelled by confiderations of the most urgent duty, he would retard the progrefs of that arrangement, upon which he had always depended for his best and most valuable character as a Minifter? The fuppofition would be groffly abfurd; it could proceed only from the preposterous doctrine, that human nature was not true to its own propenfities, and delighted in being faithlefs to itself. An honourable gentleman had faid, that the measures lately taken by the King's Minifters, were extremely unpopular. If he meant to use the term in its largeft fenfe, it was an epithet at which no honeft Minifter would be terrified; but if he meant to confine it to thofe, whofe information and habits enabled them to form the most correct opinions upon fubjects of a political nature, it was one that, Mr. Pybus was convinced, had neither been merited, nor would be found to have been generally applied. He admitted that the prefent armament was not likely to meet with that univerfal approbation which attended the laft, after a manifest and palpable infult had been offered to the national honour. The moft illiterate mind could understand when this country had been infulted, and the spirit of an Englishman would be always eager to infift upon reparation. But in the prefent cafe, fomething more than mere uninformed intellect was neceffary; and it would be fetting a low value, indeed, upon experience, talents, and knowledge, the fruit of a whole life's application and labour, if no measure of State, however expedient, no negociation, however complicate, and no war, however politically juft, were entitled to applaufe, unless they fell within the comprehenfion of the meanest and most unenlightened individual. Upon this laft VOL. XXIX. R defcrip |